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Towards Secure & Robust PNT for Automated Systems
Lakshay Narula, Ph.D.
The University of Texas at Austin, 2020
Supervisor: Todd E. Humphreys
This dissertation makes four contributions in support of secure and
robust position, navigation, and timing (PNT) for automated systems. The
first two relate to PNT security while the latter two address robust positioning
for automated ground vehicles.
The first contribution is a fundamental theory for provably-secure clock
synchronization between two agents in a distributed automated system. All
one-way synchronization protocols, such as those based on the Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) and other Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS),
are shown to be vulnerable to man-in-the-middle delay attacks. This contribu-
tion is the first to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for provably
secure clock synchronization.
The second contribution, also related to PNT security, is a three-year
study of the world-wide GPS interference landscape based on data from a dual-
frequency GNSS receiver operating continuously on the International Space
vii
Station (ISS). This work is the first publicly-reported space-based survey of
GNSS interference, and unveils previously-unreported GNSS interference ac-
tivity.
The third contribution is a novel ground vehicle positioning technique
that is robust to GNSS signal blockage, poor lighting conditions, and adverse
weather events such as heavy rain and dense fog. The technique relies on
sensors that are commonly available on automated vehicles and are insensi-
tive to lighting and inclement weather: automotive radar, low-cost inertial
measurement units (IMUs), and GNSS. Remarkably, it is shown that, given a
prior radar map, the proposed technique operating on data from off-the-shelf
all-weather automotive sensors can maintain sub-50-cm horizontal position
accuracy during 60 min of GNSS-denied driving in downtown Austin, TX.
This dissertation’s final contribution is an analysis and demonstration
of the feasibility of crowd-sourced digital mapping for automated vehicles.
Localization techniques, such as the one described in the previous contribution,
rely on such digital maps for accuracy and robustness. A key enabler for large-
scale up-to-date maps is enlisting the help of the very consumer vehicles that
need the map to build and update it. A method for fusing multi-session vision
data into a unified digital map is developed. The asymptotic limit of such a
map’s globally-referenced position accuracy is explored for the case in which
the mapping agents rely on low-cost GNSS receivers performing standard code-
phase-based navigation. Experimental validation along a semi-urban route
shows that low-cost consumer vehicles incrementally tighten the accuracy of
viii
the jointly-optimized digital map over time enough to support sub-lane-level
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and L2 (bottom panel) frequencies as a function of the ISS
zenith angle zs. Each line in the chart corresponds to a GPS SV,
and provides an estimate of the gain pattern of the GPS antenna
at the ISS. The pattern is clear for GPS L2, with 1 dB peak-
to-peak gain variation. The L1 pattern is flatter, but shows
slightly larger gain for larger zenith angles. Compensating for
this effect increases the sensitivity of the hypothesis test. . . . 76
3.5 Top panel shows a histogram of the receiver-reported interference-
free carrier-to-noise ratio C/N0 for both L1 and L2. Bottom
panel shows separate histograms of C/N0 at the two frequencies.
Notice that the histograms are narrower when separated for the
two frequencies. Narrower histograms increase the sensitivity
of the hypothesis test, i.e., weaker interference is detectable if
the interference-free C/N0 is predictable. . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6 Histogram of the interference-free range-compensated carrier-
to-noise ratio Ĉ/N0 for GPS L1 (in blue) and GPS L2 (in red).
Notice that when compared to Fig. 3.5, compensating for range
reduces the uncertainty underH0, thus increasing the sensitivity
of the hypothesis test. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.7 Histogram of the interference-free carrier-to-noise ratio after
compensating for range to the satellite, GPS SV ID, frequency
band, and ISS zenith angle for GPS L1 (in blue) and GPS L2
(in red). Notice that when compared to Figs. 3.5 and 3.6, com-
pensating for the above factors reduces the uncertainty under
H0, thus increasing the sensitivity of the hypothesis test. . . . 78
xvii
3.8 Ratio of number of potential GPS L1 (top panel) and L2 (bot-
tom panel) interference events recorded to total number of hy-
pothesis tests performed at each location on the map for the
full span of data considered in this chapter, from March 2017
to June 2020. The red dot indicates the reported origin of the
Syrian interference in [106]. Another hotspot of interference is
apparent to the west of the Syrian interference. The magenta
dots denote the approximate location of GNSS interference re-
ports in the Libyan region [159]. In addition to the interference
over the Syrian and Libyan regions, strong L2 interference over
mainland China is observed. The green dot at (32° N, 114° E)
indicates a hypothesized interference source location based on
the shape and location of the observed hotspot. . . . . . . . . 81
3.9 Time histories of range-compensated receiver-reported CINR
as the ISS flies over potential GPS interference zones over Syria
and China. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.1 Panel (a) shows a satellite view of the environment being mapped
with automotive radar. Panel (b) shows the generated radar
map point cloud with vehicle pose obtained from a reference lo-
calization system. Note the repeating structure along the road
side due to parked vehicles. An individual radar scan obtained
during localization is shown in panel (c), along with the red tri-
angle denoting vehicle location and heading. The scan is sparse
and contains significant clutter, making it challenging to register
to the prior map. Panel (d) shows a batch of radar scans during
localization, with the red dots denoting the vehicle trajectory
over the past five seconds. The batch captures the underlying
structure which can be registered to the prior map. . . . . . . 89
4.2 Schematic diagram showing four types of grid cells considered
in the inverse sensor model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.3 Block diagram of the localization pipeline. A low-cost MEMS
IMU provides high-rate specific force and angular rate measure-
ments. The error-state multiplicative extended Kalman filter
(M-EKF) makes use of cm-accurate CDGNSS position measure-
ments whenever such measurements are available, e.g., in clear-
sky GNSS environments. Radial velocity and bearing mea-
surements from low-cost automotive radars are combined with
nearly-zero sideslip and vertical speed constraints of a ground
vehicle to continually track and limit the errors in inertial nav-
igation. Smoothed batches of radar scans are correlated with
a prior map to limit odometric position drift during CDGNSS
outages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
xviii
4.4 The University of Texas Sensorium is an integrated platform
for automated and connected vehicle perception research. It in-
cludes three automotive radar units, one electronically-scanning
radar (ESR) and two short-range radars (SRR2s); stereo visi-
ble light cameras; automotive- and industrial-grade IMUs; a
dual-antenna, multi-frequency software-defined GNSS receiver;
and an internal computer. An iXblue ATLANS-C CDGNSS-
disciplined inertial navigation system (not shown) is mounted
at the rear of the platform to provide the ground truth trajec-
tory. The vehicle frame v is located approximately at the center
of the line connecting the rear axles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.5 A visual description of the radar range rate measurement model.
Quantities labeled in green are measured by the radar. The rel-
ative velocity of a stationary target with respect to ri is the
negative of the velocity with respect to n of the ith radar, ex-
pressed in ri, written −vriri,k. The measured radial velocity ṙij
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As critical infrastructure and safety-of-life systems become ever more
automated, the security and robustness of such systems must be thoroughly
examined. It is paramount that these systems have acceptable behavior un-
der naturally-occurring challenging inputs (e.g., outliers and faults) as well as
under attacks (e.g., outlaws and frauds). This dissertation focuses on the po-
sition, navigation, and timing (PNT) component of such automated systems,
making fundamental contributions to PNT security and robustness.
Since the turn of the 21st century, the global positioning system (GPS)
and other such global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) have become the
de facto choice for positioning and timing solutions in critical infrastructure
world-wide, so much so that GPS is often called an “invisible utility.” Trans-
portation, agriculture, energy, finance, and telecommunication all rely on
GNSS-derived PNT for everyday operation [16]. Yet the vulnerability of civil
GNSS receivers to counterfeiting-type attacks, commonly referred to as spoof-
ing, is well-documented [46, 66, 71, 123]. Similarly, GNSS jamming amounts
to a denial-of-service-type attack. While a jamming attack does not lead to
misleading information, it is much simpler to execute, is far more common in-
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the-wild [60, 106, 159]. GNSS impairment in the face of spoofing or jamming
is often a single point-of-failure for large automated systems.
As regulatory bodies catch up with this growing threat, there have
been calls to replace or augment GNSS [31, 114]. But how can one ensure
that alternatives or augmentations to GNSS are not themselves vulnerable to
cyber-physical attacks? Formalizing even the concept of cyber-physical system
security is notoriously hard, to say nothing of provably establishing that a
given system is secure. Ironically, it is often easier to prove the opposite: that
a system is fundamentally vulnerable to a given attack.
Aside from counterfeit attacks, PNT solutions for critical infrastruc-
ture and safety-of-life systems must also deal with challenging natural phe-
nomenon. Automated ground vehicles (AGVs), for example, are safety-of-life
systems that rely on robust positioning and navigation for even the most basic
tasks. The positioning engine, typically realized with a combination of GNSS
and multiple automotive sensors, must provide reliable sub-lane-level accuracy
with high availability in a variety of challenging environments. GNSS, for ex-
ample, suffers from limited availability and accuracy in deep urban canyons
due to signal blockage and multipath. Dead reckoning sensors like inertial
measurement units (IMU) and wheel encoders can quickly drift out of accept-
able accuracy limits unless corrected by other sensors [58]. Cameras are less
useful in poor lighting, and both cameras and lidar perform poorly under ad-
verse weather conditions such as heavy rain, dense fog, or a snowy whiteout.
The real world is fraught with PNT edge cases that must be handled before
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automated safety-of-life systems can be deployed en masse.
The goal of designing a robust and secure PNT service is a lofty one.
This dissertation is certainly not the first to address this goal, and will not be
the last. In the long struggle against outliers and outlaws, this dissertation
seeks victories in a few key battles.
1.1 Towards Secure PNT
1.1.1 Provably Secure Clock Synchronization
This dissertation’s first topic is secure clock synchronization. Attacks
on clock synchronization (or time transfer) services can have serious implica-
tions for critical infrastructure such as smart power grids, telecommunication
networks, financial markets, etc. [16]. Smart power grids demand global syn-
chronization of their phasor measurement units (PMUs) with an accuracy of
26.5 µs [57, 92], which is much smaller than the period of the grids’ alter-
nating current oscillations. This synchronization is currently accomplished,
whether directly or indirectly, using GNSS. A timing attack against key nodes
in a power distribution network could disrupt the grid [139, 140]. A large-
scale power outage due to a cyber attack has long been feared in the United
States [61].
Like power grids, telecommunication networks employ GNSS for reli-
able time synchronization. 5G New Radio requires absolute timing synchro-
nization accurate to 1.5 µs for efficient time division duplex operation [52].
With increased urban densification of cellular base stations, the telecommuni-
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cation industry has expressed concerns that GNSS outages will degrade cellular
performance. Meanwhile, purposeful attacks on clock synchronization could
be far more catastrophic than intermittent outages.
Finally, competition between global financial exchanges for high-freque-
ncy traders, who are particularly concerned about measuring trading latency,
have pushed exchanges toward millisecond-accurate timing or better [134]. In-
deed, traders now even consider relativistic effects of their trades [7,167]. Ma-
nipulation of exchange and market participant timing via attacks on clock syn-
chronization could lead to confusion in the markets or illicit financial gains [146].
Despite these high-profile concerns, the security of clock synchroniza-
tion methods against attacks has received little scrutiny in the literature. Un-
like most cyber-physical attacks, it turns out that the problem of secure clock
synchronization can be formally analyzed with a set of mathematical defini-
tions, assumptions, and proofs. This dissertation is the first to make this
observation and to establish a fundamental theory of provably secure clock
synchronization, presented in Chap. 2. This work, published in [108], makes
the following contributions:
• An argument that synchronization based on one-way communication be-
tween the master and slave clocks, e.g., with GNSS, cannot be provably
secured.
• A proof that a proposed set of necessary and sufficient security conditions
holds for a generic two-way synchronization system model.
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• An analysis of specific timing protocols such as the IEEE 1588 Precision
Time Protocol (PTP), leading to the conclusion that none of the major
synchronization protocols currently in use is provably secure.
1.1.2 GNSS Interference Monitoring from Low-Earth Orbit
The threat of GNSS spoofing is no longer just an academic concern. Al-
most all civil GNSS receivers on the market today can be spoofed with cheap
off-the-shelf radio equipment and open-source software. GNSS jamming, for
its part, is also a security threat, as it can be used to selectively deny GNSS
service. While a jamming attack does not lead to misleading information, it is
much simpler to execute, is far more common in-the-wild [60,106,159], and can
impact the security of other systems that rely on GNSS for positioning and/or
timing, e.g., the TESLA broadcast authentication protocol [117]. Terrestrial
GNSS interference activity “in the wild” has grown more widespread and so-
phisticated over recent years. Conspicuous GNSS jamming or spoofing has oc-
curred, or is ongoing, at urban and coastal sites around the globe [3,27,30,137].
The second topic addressed in this dissertation is that of GNSS inter-
ference monitoring from low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites. The most obvious
advantages of space-based interference observation from LEO are world-wide
coverage and frequent flyovers at low altitude. No prior public literature ex-
plores the use of a space-borne GNSS receiver for monitoring terrestrial GNSS
interference. Chap. 3 presents a three-year study of GNSS interference moni-
toring with a software-defined GNSS receiver aboard the International Space
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Station (ISS). This work constitutes one part of the work published in [106].
The author of this dissertation made the following contributions to [106]:
• An analysis of the expected performance for terrestrial GNSS interference
monitoring from LEO with receiver-reported carrier-to-noise ratio.
• Confirmation of previously-reported interference activity in Syria and
Libya, and discovery of previously-unreported ongoing GNSS interfer-
ence in mainland China.
1.2 Towards Low-Cost Robust PNT
1.2.1 Low-Cost All-Weather Positioning
Development of AGVs has spurred research in lane-keeping assist sys-
tems, automated intersection management [53], tight-formation platooning,
and cooperative sensing [37,77], all of which demand accurate (e.g., 50-cm at
95%) ground vehicle positioning in an urban environment. AGVs are currently
being operated almost exclusively in areas with dry and sunny climes. Adop-
tion of AGVs in many other parts of the world will demand robustness to hos-
tile weather elements. But the majority of positioning techniques developed
thus far depend on lidar or cameras, which perform poorly in low-visibility
conditions such as snowy whiteout, dense fog, or heavy rain.
Radio-wave-based sensing techniques such as radar and GNSS remain
operable even in extreme weather conditions [173] because their longer-wave-
length electromagnetic radiation penetrates snow, fog, and rain. However,
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as mentioned earlier, GNSS is either inaccurate or unavailable in deep ur-
ban canyons. Additionally, use of automotive radar for localization faces the
significant challenges of data sparsity and noise: an automotive radar scan
has vastly lower resolution than a camera image or a dense lidar scan, and is
subject to high rates of false detection (clutter) and missed detection.
Publicly-available information suggests that no AGV on the road to-
day makes use of radar for all-weather positioning, and no prior literature has
demonstrated lane-level-accurate positioning based on automotive radar. In
Chap. 4, this dissertation shows that given a prior map of radar reflectors,
sub-50-cm accurate all-weather positioning is achievable with low-cost auto-
motive sensors. This work has been published in [109], and makes the following
contributions:
• A correlation-maximization-based globally-optimal radar scan registra-
tion algorithm applicable to the highly sparse and cluttered data pro-
duced by commercially-available low-cost automotive radars.
• A technique for optimally combining sequential radar target estimates
so that they are spatially registered with metric consistency. The tech-
nique draws on inertial measurements, radar range rate measurements,
ground vehicle dynamics constraints, and cm-accurate GNSS measure-
ments, when available.
• A technique for online estimation of the vehicle center of rotation for
effective application of ground vehicle dynamics constraints.
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• Evaluation of the full positioning pipeline on an urban driving dataset,
showing that it maintains 95th-percentile errors below 35 cm in horizontal
position and 0.5° in heading during 60 min of GNSS-denied driving.
1.2.2 Crowd-Sourced Mapping & Localization
Mapping the quasi-static driving environment is key to robust posi-
tioning and navigation systems, including the radar-based positioning engine
mentioned above. These so-called digital high-definition (HD) maps for AGVs
have many other applications beyond localization: responding to traffic signs
and signals, for example, is greatly simplified if the vehicle has prior knowl-
edge of where such signs are located. In short, a map of the surrounding
environment enables an AGV to expect the expected.
Generating and maintaining these HD maps, however, is a major chal-
lenge. Most AGV manufacturers, such as Waymo and General Motors, deploy
specialized fleets of mapping vehicles. Generating a map of the environment
requires precise knowledge of the vehicle pose (position and orientation) that
must be obtained with either an expensive tactical-grade inertial navigation
system (INS) or with a high-resolution lidar in a simultaneous localization and
mapping (SLAM) framework, or a combination thereof. Furthermore, the map
must be updated whenever the quasi-static environment changes, e.g., due to
construction. It is time-consuming and impractical to maintain HD maps of
entire continents.
A key enabler for large-scale up-to-date maps will be enlisting the help
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of the very consumer vehicles that need the maps to build and update them.
But connected and automated consumer vehicles will likely be equipped only
with low-cost consumer-grade sensor suites. Accordingly, this dissertation ex-
plores the accuracy limit of globally-referenced mapping involving collabo-
rating consumer vehicles (Chap. 5). Additionally, it demonstrates a stereo-
camera-based digital mapping pipeline called GEOSLAM (globally-referenced
electro-optical simultaneous localization and mapping) that achieves the ac-
curacy limit of digital mapping with low-cost automotive sensors (Chap. 6).
This work has been published in [113], and makes the following contributions:
• Determination of the asymptotic average error statistics of code-phase
GNSS positioning. These statistics govern the accuracy limit of crowd-
sourced mapping with code-phase-based GNSS.
• A SLAM pipeline called GEOSLAM that generates a jointly optimized
crowd-sourced localization map with mass-market GNSS and visible-
light cameras.
• Evaluation of GEOSLAM on a multi-day dataset, showing that sub-50-
cm mapping and localization accuracy is achieved after joint optimiza-
tion over time-separated GNSS measurements.
1.3 Organization
Chaps. 2 and 3 present the contributions in PNT security. The theory
of provably secure clock synchronization is detailed in Chap. 2, and a global
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survey of GNSS interference is presented in Chap. 3. Chaps. 4, 5, and 6 present
the contributions in robust positioning for AGVs. In particular, Chap. 4 de-
velops and demonstrates a prior-map-based all-weather sub-50-cm-accurate
localization system, and Chaps. 5 and 6 describe how such a prior map can be
crowd-sourced from low-cost consumer vehicles to enable lane-level positioning
at scale. Chap. 7 concludes the dissertation.
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Requirements for Secure Clock
Synchronization
2.1 Abstract
This chapter establishes a fundamental theory of secure clock synchro-
nization. Accurate clock synchronization is the backbone of systems manag-
ing power distribution, financial transactions, telecommunication operations,
database services, etc. Some clock synchronization (time transfer) systems,
such as the GNSS, are based on one-way communication from a master to
a slave clock. Others, such as the Network Transport Protocol (NTP), and
the IEEE 1588 Precision Time Protocol (PTP), involve two-way communi-
cation between the master and slave. This chapter shows that all one-way
time transfer protocols are vulnerable to replay attacks that can potentially
compromise timing information. A set of conditions for secure two-way clock
synchronization is proposed and proved to be necessary and sufficient. It is
This chapter is based on: Lakshay Narula and Todd E. Humphreys. Requirements
for secure clock synchronization. IEEE Journal of Selected Topics in Signal Processing,
12(4):749–762, Aug. 2018.
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shown that IEEE 1588 PTP, although a two-way synchronization protocol, is
not compliant with these conditions, and is therefore insecure. Requirements
for secure IEEE 1588 PTP are proposed, and a second example protocol is
offered to illustrate the range of compliant systems.
2.2 Introduction
Secure clock synchronization is critical to a host of technologies and in-
frastructure today. The phasor measurement units (PMUs) that enable mon-
itoring and control in power grids need timing information to synchronize
measurements across a wide geographical area [120]. Wireless communication
networks synchronize their base stations to enable call handoff [93]. Financial
networks transfer time across the globe to ensure a common time for pricing
and transaction time-stamping [8]. Cloud database services such as Google’s
Cloud Spanner similarly require precise synchronization between the data cen-
ters to maintain consistency [42]. These clock synchronization applications
have sub-millisecond accuracy and stringent security requirements.
Clock synchronization is performed either by over-the-wire packet-based
communication (NTP, PTP, etc.), or by over-the-air radio signals (GNSS [93],
cellular signals, LORAN [138], DCF77 [15], etc.); both wired and wireless
clock synchronization are used extensively. Synchronization by GNSS is the
method of choice in systems with the most stringent accuracy requirements.
Equipped with atomic clocks synchronized to the most accurate time stan-
dards available, GNSS satellites can synchronize any number of stations on
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Earth to within a few tens of nanoseconds [4]. NTP is usually only accurate
to a few milliseconds, but essentially comes for free whenever the host device
is connected to a network.
One-way clock synchronization protocols are based on unidirectional
communication from the time master station, A, to the slave station, B. In
such protocols, A acts as a broadcast station and may send out timing signals
either continuously or periodically. The principal drawback of one-way wire-
less clock synchronization protocols is their vulnerability to delay attacks in
which a man-in-the-middle (MITM) adversary nefariously delays or repeats a
valid transmission from one station to another. Cryptographic and other mea-
sures can improve the security of one-way protocols against delay and other
signal- and data-level spoofing attacks [38,123,164], but, as will be shown, such
protocols remain fundamentally insecure because of their inability to measure
round trip time. They can be secured against unsophisticated attacks, but
remain vulnerable to more powerful adversaries.
Two-way clock synchronization protocols involve bi-directional com-
munication between stations A and B. Such protocols enable measurement of
the round trip time of the timing signal, which is shown to be necessary for
detecting MITM delay attacks. This measurement, however, is not by itself
sufficient for provable security against such attacks.
This chapter establishes a fundamental theory of secure clock synchro-
nization. In contrast to the current literature on timing security [19,97,98,115,
154,158,171], the problem is formalized with definitions, explicit assumptions,
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and proofs. The major contributions of this work are as follows:
[T1] One-way synchronization protocols are shown to be insecure against a
MITM delay attack. Adversarial delay is shown to be indistinguishable
from clock bias, and hence is unobservable without further assumptions.
[T2] A set of necessary conditions for secure two-way clock synchronization
is presented and proved. Similar protocol-specific conditions have been
previously proposed [9, 98, 158], but have not been generalized to apply
to a universal clock synchronization model.
[T3] The proposed necessary conditions, with stricter upper bounds, are shown
to be sufficient for secure synchronization in presence of a probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) adversary. Provable security for clock synchro-
nization has not previously been explored in the literature.
[T4] The two-way synchronization scheme of IEEE 1588 PTP is shown to
violate a necessary condition for security. This is a known vulnerability
of PTP for which a fix has been proposed [158]. Having established
a theory for security, this chapter is able to show that the proposed
fix is sufficient but is not the minimal necessary modification. A more
parsimonious security requirement for PTP is presented that is both
necessary and sufficient for secure synchronization.
[T5] A generic construction of a secure two-way clock synchronization pro-
tocol is presented to illustrate the general applicability of the proposed
necessary and sufficient conditions to a range of underlying protocols.
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Wired clock synchronization is inherently more secure than its wireless
counterpart because physical access to cables is easier controlled than access
to radio channels. This chapter primarily focuses on the more challenging task
of clock synchronization over a wireless channel; nonetheless, the attacks and
security protocols discussed herein also apply to wireline clock synchronization
protocols in the case where the adversary gets access to the channel. For
example, if an adversary is able to hijack a boundary clock in a wireline PTP
network, then the resulting vulnerabilities are equivalent to that of wireless
synchronization where the adversary has open access to the radio channel.
In fact, an adversarial boundary clock is even more potent than a wireless
adversary since it can completely block the authentic signal from reaching B.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Previous works on se-
cure clock synchronization, and their relation to this chapter, are summarized
in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents a generic model for clock synchronization
and shows that all possible one-way synchronization protocols are insecure.
Section 2.5 presents the set of security conditions for a wireless clock synchro-
nization protocol, proving these to be necessary by contradiction. Section 2.6
presents a proof of sufficiency for the same set of conditions with stricter up-
per bounds. A construction of an example secure protocol is presented in
Section 2.7, along with the security requirements for IEEE 1588 PTP. Sec-
tion 2.8 presents a simulation study of a secure clock synchronization model




GNSS, NTP, and PTP are the most widely used protocols for clock
synchronization. A number of research efforts have been made to assess and
improve the security of these protocols. This section reviews some of the
notable efforts in the literature.
The GNSS jamming and spoofing threat has been recognized in the
literature for more than a decade. A survey of the current state-of-the-art in
spoofing and anti-spoofing techniques is presented in [123]. Recent works on
GNSS anti-spoofing techniques have specifically focused on the case of timing
security. Collaborative multi-receiver [19] and direct time estimation [115]
techniques have been proposed for robust GNSS clock synchronization.
The growing popularity of IEEE 1588 PTP for synchronization in crit-
ical infrastructure has brought about concerns regarding its security [97, 98,
154,158,171]. The threats to IEEE 1588 PTP can broadly be categorized into
data-level attacks (such as modification of time messages) and physical layer
attacks (such as replay and delay attacks). While cryptographic protocols are
able to foil data-level attacks against realistic adversaries, some signal-level
attacks, such as the delay attack, remain open vulnerabilities. Unfortunately,
their execution is relatively simple. Signal-level attacks, such as the man-
in-the-middle attack, have been studied in the recent past. However, these
studies only include a brief discussion on countermeasure techniques, and no
proof or theoretical guarantee of the efficacy of the countermeasures has been
provided.
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Ullman et al. [158] propose measuring the propagation delays during
initialization of clock synchronization and monitoring the propagation delays
during the normal operation of the time synchronization protocol. However,
[158] does not prove that such a defense would be sufficient to prevent the
delay attacks.
In [98], it is remarked that the clock offset computed between multiple
master clocks over a symmetric channel must be zero, and thus, if multiple
master clocks are available, they can detect any malicious delay introduced by
an adversary. However, this defense does not consider the possibility that the
adversary may only delay the packets sent to the slave nodes.
The work presented in [9] is perhaps in closest relation to the current
chapter. Annessi et al. upper bound the clock drift between subsequent syn-
chronization signals using a drift model, and perform two-way exchange of
timestamps such that the master clock is able to verify the time at the slave.
Furthermore, given the maximum clock drift rate and the maximum and min-
imum propagation delay of the timing signal, they derive an upper bound
on the adversarial delay that can go unnoticed. However, with conservative
bounds on the maximum clock drift rate and the variation in path delays, the
accuracy guarantees derived in [9] may be insufficient for certain applications.
Moreover, as will be shown in this chapter, they fail to take account of one
the necessary conditions for secure synchronization.
This chapter abstracts the clock synchronization model and assesses
its security in a generic setting. It is shown that specialization of the generic
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security conditions to the particular protocols assessed in the aforementioned
efforts leads to solutions similar or identical to those previously advanced.
Thus, establishing the fundamental theory of secure clock synchronization also
serves to unify the prior work in the literature.
2.4 System Model
A general system model for clock synchronization is shown in Fig. 2.1.
The time seeker station, B, wishes to synchronize its clock to that of the time
master station, A. For wireless synchronization applications, stations A and B
are assumed to have known locations, xA and xB, respectively. Due to clock
imperfections, the time at station B, tB, continuously drifts with respect to tA,
the time at station A. Station B seeks to track the relative drift of its clock by
an exchange of signals between A and B. Without loss of generality, this chapter
assumes tA is equivalent to true time (relative to some reference epoch), a close
proxy for which is GPS system time.
It is assumed that A and B are able to exchange cryptographic keys
securely, if required. This exchange may occur over a public channel via a
protocol such as the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [94] or via quantum key
exchange techniques [18, 48]. Alternatively, symmetric keys for neighboring
stations may be loaded at the time of installation.
Station A sends out a sync signal, sA, having distinct features which
can be disambiguated from one another by observing a window of the signal
containing the feature. The transition in sA marking the beginning of a data
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Table 2.1: Notation used in Chapter 2
A Time master station
B Time seeker station
tmim Transmit time, according to m, of its ith signal feature
tmin Receipt time, according to n, of the ith signal feature transmitted
by m
τ imn Delay, in true time, experienced by the ith feature in propagating
from m to n
τ imnM Component of τ
i
mn introduced by the man-in-the-middle adversary
τ imnN Component of τ
i
mn due to natural factors, including processing,
transmission, and propagation delay







τBB Delay, in true time, between the receipt of sync and transmission
of response at B
τ̄BB Delay, according to B, between the receipt of sync and transmission
of response at B
τ̃BB τBB − τ̄BB
∆tiAB Clock offset between A and B at the time of receipt of the ith feature
at B
∆t̂iAB B’s best estimate of ∆t
i
AB
wimn Measurement noise associated with the measured time-of-arrival of
the ith signal feature from m at n
τ ijRTT Round trip time, in true time, involving the ith and jth signal
features of A and B, respectively
τ̄ ijRTT Modeled or a priori estimate of τ
ij
RTT




Figure 2.1: Abstract model of a clock synchronization system with a time
master station A and a time seeker station B. The antenna outputs are driven
by the clock through the receiver and transmitter blocks.
packet is an example of such a signal feature. Furthermore, the system at
A is designed such that the kth feature is transmitted at time tAkA . B either
knows tAkA by prior arrangement, or a digital representation of t
Ak
A is encoded
in sA (e.g., a timestamp). In any case, B knows when the kth feature was sent,






where SkA represents a window of sA containing the kth feature.
Station B’s received sync signal, denoted rB, is a delayed and noisy
replica of sA. Let τ
k
AB denote the delay (in true time) experienced by the
kth feature of sA as it travels from A to B. For line-of-sight (LOS) wireless
communication, τ kAB is the sum of the free-space propagation delay over the
distance ‖xB − xA‖ and additional delays due to interaction of the timing
signal with the intervening channel.
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2.4.1 One-Way Clock Synchronization Model
In one-way clock synchronization, the exchange of signals between A
and B terminates with reception of the sync signal at B. Let tAkB denote the
time according to B at which the kth feature of sA is received at B. The win-
dow captured by B containing the kth feature of sA, denoted R
k
B , enables B
to measure tAkB to within a small error caused by measurement noise. This
error, wkAB, is modeled as zero-mean with variance σ
2
ε . The measurement itself,






= tAkA + τ
k









is the unknown time offset B wishes to estimate. As the bijection in (2.1) is
known to B, B can obtain tAkA for the kth detected feature. If a prior estimate τ̄
k
AB






AB − zkB (2.4)
As a concrete example, consider the case of clock synchronization via
GNSS in which B is a GNSS receiver in a known fixed location xB, and A is
a GNSS satellite whose location is known to vary with time as xA(tA). On
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detection of the kth feature in a window of captured data, B determines tAkA





AB −∆tkAB + wkAB
= tAkA +
[




where Dkρ is the sum of excess ionospheric and neutral-atmospheric delays (in
distance units) and c is the speed of light.
The known receiver and satellite positions can be invoked to model the
signal’s propagation delay as
τ̄ kAB =
‖xB − xA(tAkA )‖+ D̄kρ
c
where D̄kρ is a model of the excess delay D
k
ρ at the time of receipt of the
kth feature at B. The modeled excess delay is based on atmospheric models
possibly refined by dual-frequency measurements [96]. An estimate of the time




B , and τ̄
k
AB in (2.4).
It must be noted that, for one-way clock synchronization, any errors in
the estimate of the distance between A and B, and in the estimate of the excess
channel delay, will appear as an error in the estimate of the time offset.
2.4.2 Two-Way Clock Synchronization Model
As discussed above, if an estimate of τ̄ kAB is available, then clock synchro-
nization is complete after B receives the sync signal rB. The response signal
from B in a two-way protocol is typically used to either determine, or refine,
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the estimate of τ̄ kAB with a measurement of the round trip time (RTT). The
ability to measure RTT obviates the requirement that ‖xB − xA‖ be known a
priori. In IEEE 1588 PTP, for example, RTT is measured to initially obtain,
and periodically refine, the value of τ̄ kAB used in deriving ∆t̂
k
AB from (2.4).
In the system model considered in this chapter, station B transmits a
response sB that is designed such that (1) there is a one-to-one mapping l(k)
between the lth feature in sB and the kth feature in sA, and (2) the lth feature’s
index can be inferred by observation of a window containing it. Symbolically,




On receipt of the kth feature in sA, at time t
Ak
B by B’s clock, but at z
k
B as
measured by B, B transmits the lth feature in sB after a short delay, τBB (in
true time), hereon referred to as the layover time.
The layover time is introduced as a practical consideration. On receipt
of A’s kth feature, B is physically unable to transmit its own lth feature with
zero delay. Thus, B is allowed to specify a short layover time, τ̄BB, after which
it intends to launch its lth feature. It is important to note that the actual
layover time, τBB, will not be the same as the intended layover time due to
(1) non-zero measurement noise wkAB and (2) non-zero frequency offset of the
clock at B with respect to true time. However, if the layover time is sufficiently
short and the measurement noise is benign, the difference τ̄BB−τBB can be made
negligible compared to the time synchronization requirement, with the actual
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value depending on the quality of B’s clock.
Station A receives the response signal as a delayed and noisy replica of
sB, denoted rA. The delay experienced by the lth feature as it travels from
B to A, in true time, is denoted τ lBA. Station A captures a window R
l
A of rA
that enables A to identify the lth feature in sB according to (2.5), and to infer
that the received feature is in response to the kth feature transmitted by A.
Furthermore, A makes a noise-corrupted measurement zlA of the time-of-arrival
of the lth feature in sB, according to A’s clock. The noise, denoted w
l
BA, is again







= tAkA + τ
k





Since tAkA is exactly known at A, a direct noisy measurement of the round trip
time τ kAB + τBB + τ
l
BA can be made as
zklRTT ≡ zlA − t
Ak
A (2.6)




RTT is embedded within z
l
A and τBB, re-
spectively. Under the assumption of symmetric delays, i.e., τ kAB = τ
l
BA, and with
knowledge of τ̄BB, the measured RTT in (2.6) can be exploited to improve the






where m > k and n > l.
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The two-way exchange of sync and response messages is summarized
visually in Fig. 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Two-way exchange of sync and response messages between A and
B in the absence of a man-in-the-middle adversary.
Since RTT will play a central role in the discussion on secure synchro-
nization later on, various definitions and assumptions concerning RTT are
stated here for clarity:
• RTT for the kth feature in sA and the corresponding lth feature in sB is
defined as
τ klRTT ≡ τ kAB + τBB + τ lBA










• Modeled RTT, also called the prior estimate of RTT, is defined as
τ̄ klRTT ≡ τ̄ kAB + τ̄BB + τ̄ lBA (2.7)
For example, in the case of wireless clock synchronization with LOS
electromagnetic signals, a prior estimate of RTT is based on the distance
between A and B and on models of channel delays in excess of free-space
propagation between these.
• The modeled RTT, τ̄ klRTT, can be refined with measurements of RTT
in a two-way protocol. Alternatively, as will be discussed later, if an
accurate modeled RTT is available, it and the measured RTT can be
used to detect delay attacks.
• Unambiguous measurement of RTT requires that there exist a one-to-
one mapping between the signal features in sA and sB, as mathematically
represented in (2.5). On detection of the lth feature in sB, A must be
able to deduce that this feature was transmitted approximately τ̄BB after
B received the kth feature in sA. This requirement is appropriately a part
of the RTT definition since it enables A to unambiguously measure RTT.
2.4.3 Attack Model
The attack model in this chapter considers a MITM adversary M. The
available computational resources allow M to execute probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) algorithms. M can receive, detect, and replay signals from A and
B with arbitrarily precise directional antennas. Additionally, M has precise
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knowledge of xA and xB, and can take up any position around or between the
two stations. It has unrestricted access to the signals that A and B exchange
over the air, and has complete knowledge of their synchronization protocol
save for the cryptographic keys.
Let L denote the alert limit, defined as the error in time synchronization
not to be exceeded without issuing an alert.
Definition 1. Clock synchronization is defined to be compromised if |∆tAB −∆t̂AB| ≥ L.
Note that, in the absence of an adversary, clock synchronization is not
compromised so long as
|τ kAB − τ̄ kAB + wkAB| < L
However, in the presence of a MITM adversary, the sync signal is delayed or
advanced such that
τ kAB = τ
k
ABN
+ τ kABM (2.8)
where τ kABN > 0 is the natural or physical delay (equal to τ
k
AB in the absence of
an adversary) and τ kABM ≥ 0 is the adversarial delay. In this case, if





+ wkAB| ≥ L (2.9)
then clock synchronization is compromised.
2.4.4 Vulnerability of One-Way Clock Synchronization
One-way clock synchronization is fundamentally vulnerable to a delay
attack because it provides no mechanism to measure RTT. The adversary
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M can compromise any one-way wireless clock synchronization protocol by
retransmitting the authentic sync signal from A such that the retransmitted
signal, sM, overpowers or otherwise supersedes the authentic signal sA. In
the absence of additional assumptions beyond those underpinning the one-
way protocol described earlier, M can introduce an arbitrary delay τ kABM in its
retransmission, thereby compromising the synchronization process.
Note that whereas counterfeit signal attacks can be prevented by au-
thentication and cryptographic methods [166], these techniques do not prevent
delay attacks because the delayed or repeated signal has the same crypto-
graphic characteristics as that of the genuine signal, the only difference being
that it is received with a (possibly small) additional delay.
The delay introduced by M is added to the natural delay, τ kABN , of the
signal between A and B. As a result, an error of ≈ τ kABM is introduced in the












AB −∆tkAB + wkAB)
= (τ̄ kAB − τ kABN)− τ
k
ABM
+ ∆tkAB − wkAB
≈ ∆tkAB − τ kABM (2.10)
where it is assumed that the error due to inaccurately modeled delay is negligi-
ble and that σε  τ kABM . In the absence of an RTT measurement, and without
further assumptions on the nature of the protocol or the clock drift model
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considered, the adversarial delay τABM is indistinguishable from a clock offset
of the same magnitude.
To be sure, measures can be taken to make a MITM delay attack harder
to execute without detection. But, importantly, these measures cannot guar-
antee that the synchronization will remain uncompromised. Various measures
proposed in the literature, and their shortcomings, are discussed below.
Received Signal Strength Monitoring The adversary M might attempt
to overpower the authentic signal in order to spoof the sync message, lead-
ing to an increase in the total signal power received at B. Station B could
monitor the received signal strength (RSS) to detect such an attack [2]. How-
ever, a potent adversary could transmit, in addition to its delayed signal, an
amplitude-matched, phase-inverted nulling signal that annihilates the authen-
tic sync signal sA as received at B, thus preventing an unusual increase in
received power at B. If M is positioned along the straight-line path between A
and B, nulling of sA can be effected without prior knowledge of sA. A laboratory
demonstration of such nulling is reported in [65].
Selective Rejection of False Signal If B receives both the authentic and
false (delayed) sync signals, it may be able to apply angle-of-arrival or signal
processing techniques to selectively reject the delayed signal [25, 95, 123, 164].
However, discrimination based on angle-of-arrival fails if M is positioned along
the line from A to B, and, as conceded in [164], signal-processing-based tech-
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niques for selective rejection of false signals can be thwarted by an adversary
transmitting an additional nulling signal, as described above.
Collaborative Verification Multiple time seekers may attempt to synchro-
nize to the same time master. In this scenario, the time seekers can potentially
detect malicious activity by cross-checking the received signals [19]. In the sim-
plest implementation, all time seekers can collaborate to verify that they are
synchronized amongst each other. In case of an uncoordinated attack against a
subset of time seekers, this verification would expose the attack since the time
offset computed at the attacked subset would be different from that computed
at the other stations. In principle, however, it is possible for an adversary to
execute a coordinated attack against all the time seekers, thus concealing its
presence.
2.5 Necessary Conditions for Secure Synchronization
This section presents a set of conditions for secure two-way clock syn-
chronization and proves these to be necessary by contradiction. In other words,
it is shown that if a two-way clock synchronization protocol does not satisfy
any one of these proposed conditions, there exists an attack that can compro-
mise clock synchronization without detection.
It is important to note that the ability to measure RTT in a two-way
protocol is necessary, but not sufficient, for provably secure synchronization.
As an example, IEEE 1588 PTP is a two-way protocol that has been proposed
35
as an alternative to GNSS for sub-microsecond clock synchronization in crit-
ical infrastructure such as the PMU network. But, despite the bi-directional
exchange between stations, and hence the ability to measure RTT, recent work
has shown that PTP is vulnerable to delay attacks in which a MITM introduces
asymmetric delay between A and B. Asymmetric delay breaks the assumption
that τ kAB = τ
k
BA and leads to an erroneous prior for τ̄AB and τ̄BA for future ex-
changes. This vulnerability is documented in both the literature [9, 98, 158]
and the IEEE 1588-2008 standard. Thus, a secure two-way clock synchroniza-
tion protocol must satisfy additional security requirements beyond the ability
to measure RTT.
The conditions introduced below are not tied to any specific protocol,
unlike some measures proposed in the current literature [19, 97, 98, 115, 154,
158, 171]. They are generally applicable to any two-way protocol (e.g., PTP)
for which the foregoing two-way synchronization model applies.
Assuming the time master A initiates the two-way communication, the
necessary conditions for secure clock synchronization are as follows:
[T1] Both A and B must transmit unpredictable waveforms to prevent the ad-
versary M from generating counterfeit signals that pass authentication.
In practice, this implies the use of a cryptographic construct such as a
message authentication code (MAC) or a digital signature.
[T2] The propagation time of the signal must be irreducible to within the
alert limit L along both signal paths. For wireless clock synchronization,
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this condition implies synchronization via LOS electromagnetic signals
as L→ 0.
[T3] The RTT between A and B must be known to A and measurable by A
to within the alert limit L. The RTT must include the delays internal
to both A and B, in addition to the propagation delay. Station A must
know of any intentional delay introduced by B, such as the layover time
τBB introduced earlier.
2.5.1 Proof of Necessity of Conditions
Stations A and B must transmit unpredictable signals To prove this
condition is necessary, two scenarios are considered: a) station A transmits a
signal waveform sA that is predictable, and, b) station B transmits a signal
waveform sB that is predictable.
sA is predictable M can compromise synchronization without detec-
tion as follows:
i) M takes up a position between A and B along the line joining the antennas
at the two stations.
ii) M initially transmits a replica of sA such that B receives identical signals
from both A and M. Subsequently, M increases its signal power or oth-
erwise supersedes sA (e.g., via signal nulling, as discussed earlier) such
that B tracks sM, the signal transmitted by M. (Hereafter, whenever
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signals from M compete with those from A or B, it will be assumed that
those from M exert control.)
iii) Exploiting the predictability of sA, M advances its replica sM with respect
to sA by |τ kABM|, where τ
k
ABM
< 0. B tracks the advanced signal, resulting
in an error of τ kABM in the computed ∆t̂
k
AB as shown in (2.10).
iv) B transmits the unpredictable response sB compliant with the prear-
ranged layover time τ̄BB. M intercepts this signal from B, and replays
it to A with a delay of τ lBAM = −τ
k
ABM
> 0, causing A to track the delayed
signal. As a result, the RTT is τ kAB + τBB + τ
l
BA as A expects. In summary:




τ lBA = τ
l
BAN




⇒ τ kAB + τ lBA = τ kABN + τ
l
BAN
Thus, M undoes the effect of its sync advance, preventing A from detect-
ing the attack.
sB is predictable M can compromise synchronization without detec-
tion by replicating B’s behavior:
i) M takes up a position between A and B along the line joining the antennas
at the two stations.











such that the RTT is τ̄ kAB + τ̄BB + τ̄
l
BA, as A expects.
iii) M records the unpredictable signal from A and replays it to B with an
arbitrary delay τ kABM > 0. This results in an error of approximately τ
k
ABM
in the computed ∆t̂kAB at B, as shown in (2.10).
Propagation time must be irreducible to within L If there exists a
channel that reduces the propagation time from A to B or from B to A by more
than L as compared to the channel used by A and B, then M can compromise
synchronization without detection. The following attack assumes the propa-
gation time from A to B is reducible by more than L; a similar attack exploits
the situation in which the propagation time from B to A is reducible by more
than L.
i) M records the sync signal sA going from A to B.
ii) M makes the recorded signal reach B advanced by |τ kABM| compared to sA,
where τ kABM < −L. An error of τ
k
ABM
is introduced in the time offset value
computed at B as shown in (2.10).
iii) M records the response signal sB, which has the expected prearranged
layover time τBB ≈ τ̄BB. M replays this signal to A with a delay of τ lBAM =
−τ kABM such that the RTT is consistent with what A expects.
RTT known to and measurable by A to within L Synchronization can
be compromised without detection if |zklRTT − τ̄ klRTT| > L with non-negligible
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probability even in the absence of an adversary. This condition can be met
if a) the prior estimates τ̄ kAB, τ̄
l
BA, or τ̄BB are not accurate to the corresponding
true values to within L, or b) the magnitude of the measurement error sum
|wkAB + wlBA| is larger than L. Note that the condition |wkAB| > L compromises
synchronization even absent an adversary. An adversary M can exploit the
condition |zklRTT − τ̄ klRTT| > L as follows:
i) M initially transmits a replica of sA such that B receives identical signals
from both A and M. Subsequently, M introduces a delay τ kABM > 0 in the
replayed signal sM. As assumed earlier, sM exerts control and introduces
an error of approximately τ kABM in the computed ∆t̂
k
AB at B, as shown in
(2.10).
ii) Station B transmits the response signal with the prearranged layover
time τBB ≈ τ̄BB with respect to the delayed signal.
iii) In the received signal rA, A identifies the expected feature l(k). The RTT,
if measurable, includes the delay τ kABM introduced by M.
iv) However, A is unable to definitively declare an attack, since the errors in
the modeled RTT and/or the measurement of RTT are possibly larger
than L. In other words, it is not possible to claim that |zklRTT− τ̄ klRTT| > L
only in the presence of adversarial delay.
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2.6 Proof of Sufficiency
This section presents a sufficiency proof for the set of security condi-
tions proposed in the previous section. A sufficiency proof guarantees secure
synchronization under the considered system and attack models. This chapter
draws inspiration from the literature on modern cryptography and formalizes
the problem of secure clock synchronization with explicit definitions, assump-
tions, and proofs.
2.6.1 Assumptions
This proof assumes that the system under consideration strictly com-
plies with the set of necessary security conditions. Specifically,
[T1] Both A and B use an authenticated encryption scheme to generate unpre-
dictable and verifiably authentic signals in the presence of a probabilistic
polynomial time (PPT) adversary.
[T2] The difference between the RTT along the communication channel be-
tween A and B and the shortest possible RTT is negligible as compared
to L.
[T3] The difference between the modeled delays τ̄ kAB and τ̄
l
BA and the true delays
τ kAB and τ
l
BA, respectively, is negligible as compared to L.
|τ̄ kAB − τ kABN |  L (2.12)
and
|τ̄ lBA − τ lBAN |  L (2.13)
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Furthermore, A and B agree upon a fixed layover time τ̄BB, and the differ-
ence between this and the true layover time is negligible: |τBB− τ̄BB|  L.
[T4] The standard deviation of the noise corrupting the measurements tAkB and
tBlA is negligible compared to the alert limit:
σε  L (2.14)
Notice that the above assumptions are the same as the necessary conditions
in Section 2.5, but with stricter upper bounds on the conditions.
If symmetric keys are exchanged prior to synchronization, then private-
key cryptographic schemes such as Encrypt-then-MAC [17] can be used for
authenticated encryption. Alternatively, if the keys must be exchanged over
a public channel, then digital signatures [59] can be used to authenticate the
encrypted messages. Cryptographic authentication schemes like MAC and
digital signatures generate a tag associated with a message. Qualitatively, a
MAC or digital signature scheme is secure if a PPT adversary, even when
given access to multiple valid message-tag pairs of its own choice (as many as
possible in polynomial time), cannot generate a valid tag for a new message
with non-negligible probability. Irrespective of the cryptographic scheme used,
this proof assumes that the probability of M generating a new valid sync or
response signal is a negligible function of the key length n:
P[Valid] < negl(n) (2.15)
To detect an attack before the synchronization error exceeds L, A must select
a threshold lower than L beyond which an attack is declared. Consider the
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modeled RTT, τ̄ klRTT, as defined in (2.7), and the measurement z
kl
RTT as defined
in (2.6). A threshold less than L, say L− δ with 0 < δ < L, is set by station
A such that if |zklRTT − τ̄ klRTT| > L− δ, then an attack is declared.
2.6.2 Definitions
Definition 2. A PPT adversary M succeeds if clock synchronization is com-
promised (Definition 1) and
|zklRTT − τ̄ klRTT| ≤ L− δ
Definition 3. Faster-than-light (superluminal) propagation is defined to be
hard if M cannot propagate a signal at a speed higher than the speed of light
with non-negligible probability. Under hardness of superluminal propagation
P[Superluminal] ≈ 0
Definition 4. A clock synchronization protocol is defined to be secure if, under
the hardness of superluminal propagation assumption,
P[Success] < negl(n)
where Success for M is defined in Definition 2.
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2.6.3 Proof





+ τ kABM + τ
l
BAN
+ τ lBAM + τBB + w
l
BA (2.16)
Let τ̃ kABN and τ̃
l
BAN
denote the error in the modeled signal delay due to natu-
ral/physical phenomenon. Also, let τ̃B be the difference between the intended
layover time τ̄BB and the actual layover time τBB. Note that these might be
positive or negative.
τ̃ kABN = τ
k
ABN
− τ̄ kAB (2.17)
τ̃ lBAN = τ
l
BAN
− τ̄ lBA (2.18)
τ̃BB = τBB − τ̄BB (2.19)






+ τ kABM + τ̃
l
BAN
+ τ lBAM + τ̃BB + w
l
BA
Following the assumptions in (2.12) and (2.13), the residual delays are negli-
gible in comparison to L:
|τ̃ kABN |  L (2.20)
|τ̃ lBAN |  L (2.21)
This assumption is reasonable since otherwise the system could not confidently
meet the accuracy requirements even in the absence of an adversary. Also, if
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τ̄BB is a short time interval and the measurement noise σε is benign, it is
reasonable to assume that
|τ̃BB|  L (2.22)
Note that M can advance the signal by (a) forging a valid message/tag pair, or
(b) propagating the signal faster-than-light. The assumptions of secure MAC
and hardness of superluminal propagation enforce that
P[τ kABM < 0] < P[Valid] + P[Superluminal]
≈ negl(n)
In order to stay undetected, the adversary must ensure
L− δ ≥ |zklRTT − τ̄ klRTT|
= |τ̃ kABN + τ
k
ABM
+ τ̃ lBAN + τ
l
BAM
+ τ̃BB + w
l
BA| (2.23)
At the same time, in order to compromise time transfer, from (2.9), M must
ensure




≤ |τ̃ kABN + w
k
AB|+ |τ kABM|





The probability of success for M is evaluated as




= P[(Success)|(τ kABM < 0)]P[τ
k
ABM
< 0] + P[(Success) ∩ (τ kABM ≥ 0)]




< negl(n) + P[(Success) ∩ (τ kABM ≥ 0)] (2.25)
In the case where τABM ≥ 0, (2.24) simplifies to




Substituting the least possible value of τ kABM into (2.23), it follows that
|τ̃ kABN + L− |τ̃
k
ABN
+ wkAB|+ τ̃ lBAN + τ
l
BAM
+ τ̃BB + w
l
BA| ≤ L− δ
Notice that from the assumptions made in (2.14), (2.20), (2.21), and (2.22), all
terms except L and τ lBAM on the left-hand side of the inequality are negligible
compared to L; thus,
|L+ τ lBAM| ≤ L− δ
Since both L and L−δ are defined to be positive, the above inequality simplifies
to
τ lBAM ≤ −δ
where δ > 0. Thus, for M to succeed in the case where τ kABM ≥ 0, we must
have that τ lBAM < 0. As a result




Qualitatively, the proof presented here argues that for the adversary
to succeed, it needs to either advance the sync signal (τABM < 0), or advance
the response signal (τBAM < 0). With the use of a secure MAC (or digital
signature) and the hardness of superluminal propagation, the adversary can
only succeed with a negligible probability.
2.7 Secure Constructions
This section specializes the necessary and sufficient conditions for secure
clock synchronization to IEEE 1588 PTP. In addition, it presents an alternative
to PTP for wireless synchronization—a compliant synchronization system with
GNSS-like signals.
2.7.1 Secure IEEE 1588 PTP
The necessary and sufficient conditions for secure synchronization, as
adapted to IEEE 1588 PTP, are as follows:
[T1] Stations A and B must use an authenticated encryption scheme to prevent
M from generating valid message/tag pairs.
[T2] The difference between the path delays between A and B and the shortest
possible path delays must be negligible as compared to L. For wireless
PTP [41,91], this implies communicating over the LOS channel as L→ 0.
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For traditional wireline PTP, A and B must attempt to communicate over
the (nearly) shortest possible path.
[T3] The path delay, which is usually estimated from the RTT measurements,
must be accurately known a priori for secure synchronization. The RTT
measurements must be verified against the expected RTT. This implies
that the layover time τ̄BB must also be known to A.
Note that in the usual PTP formulation, the path delay is measured and used
by the time seeker B. To this end, in the usual formulation A sends the transmit
time of the sync message and the receipt time of the delay req message (in PTP
parlance). Similar conventions may be accommodated in the system model





and the following calculations may be performed and used at B. However, this
would only be a cosmetic change and does not affect the arguments in this
chapter.
The first security condition has already been proposed in the IEEE
1588-2008 standard. The second condition, however, has not been considered
in any of the earlier works in the literature. Following the depiction of sync
and response signal exchange in Fig. 2.2 and the attack strategy outlined in
Section 2.5.1, Fig. 2.3 illustrates an example attack against a PTP implemen-
tation that does not satisfy the second necessary condition. Notice that the
existence of a shorter time path enables M to advance the sync signal relative
to the authentic message from A. Subsequently, M is able to undo the effect of
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the advance on the RTT by delaying the response signal from B to A. Station
A does not measure any abnormality in the RTT, and thus cannot raise an
alarm. Meanwhile, synchronization has been compromised at B.
Figure 2.3: Illustration of an example attack against a PTP implementation
that violates the second necessary condition.
The third condition is similar to the proposal in [158] of measuring the
path delays during initialization and monitoring the delays during normal op-
eration. However, [158] requires that B respond to A with zero delay during
initialization to enable measurement of the reference delays. This condition
is sufficient, but not necessary for secure synchronization. The system is in
fact secure even if B is allowed a fixed layover time. Fig. 2.4 illustrates an
example attack against a PTP implementation in violation of the third neces-
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sary condition. Note that the uncertainty of the a priori estimate of the RTT
(σ̄RTT) is larger than the alert limit, violating the third necessary condition
which requires that the expected RTT be known to within the alert limit (and
with much higher accuracy for provable sufficiency). Even though the mea-
sured RTT in this case is inconsistent with the expected RTT, it cannot be
definitively flagged as an attack since benign variations in the RTT may also
have led to the observed RTT.
Figure 2.4: Illustration of an example attack against a PTP implementation
that violates the third necessary condition.
Interestingly, at first sight, the third security condition in this chapter
does not resemble the proposed defense in [9] that enforces an upper bound
on the synchronization error accumulated between sync messages and rec-
ommends that B send its timestamps to A periodically for verification. As
explained next, this condition is in fact equivalent to the condition of known
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and measurable RTT, when adapted according to the system model considered
in [9].
Note that the requirement of a zero delay in [158], or a short layover
time in this chapter, enables A to measure the RTT since the transmit time
of the lth feature in sB, that is t
Bl
B , can be approximately traced back to A’s
clock to within the alert limit as tAkA + τ̄
k
AB + τ̄BB. Enforcing the synchronization
error to within L and transmitting B’s timestamp to A achieves the same
objective for the defense in [9], since the transmit time from B can be traced
back to A’s clock with the assumed approximate synchronization. Therefore,
the proposed countermeasures in [158] and [9] are two different incarnations
of the third security condition proposed in this chapter. Of course, the failure
of both [158] and [9] to address the second necessary condition makes their
proposed defenses vulnerable to an adversary that can communicate along a
shorter time path between A and B.
2.7.2 Alternative Compliant System
This section describes an alternative wireless clock synchronization pro-
tocol that satisfies the set of necessary and sufficient conditions presented in
Section 2.5. The proposed protocol involves bi-directional exchange of GNSS-
like pseudo-random codes for continuous clock synchronization, in contrast to
discrete packet-based synchronization techniques such as NTP and PTP. It is
offered here to illustrate the general applicability of the proposed necessary
and sufficient conditions to a range of underlying protocols. Such a protocol
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can potentially be applied in two-way satellite time transfer and terrestrial
wireless clock synchronization systems for continuous clock synchronization,
in contrast to the packet-based discrete synchronization in NTP/PTP.
The time master A and the time seeker B communicate wirelessly over
the LOS channel between the nodes. To simplify the analysis, it is assumed
that A and B securely share long sequences of pseudo-random bits prior to
synchronization. These sequences of bits will later enable generation of unpre-






, bkA ∈ {0, 1}
The pseudo-random code CA(tA) for A is then generated as
CA(tA) = 2b
k




A ), k ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }
where tAkA denotes the time according to A at which the start of the kth bit in
A’s signal is transmitted. The pseudo-random nature of bA ensures that CA(tA)
has good cross-correlation properties, which enables an accurate measurement
of the time-of-arrival of A’s signal at B, that is, σε  L. Station A modulates a
carrier with the code CA and transmits a signal sA(tA) whose complex baseband
representation is given as
sA(tA) = CA(tA) exp (jθA(tA))
This signal is received at B as
rB(tA, τAB) = sA(tA − τAB) + wAB(tA)
= CA(tA − τAB) exp (jθA(tA − τAB)) + wAB(tA)
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where all symbols have their usual meanings as detailed in Section 2.4. Station
B captures a window RkB of rB and correlates it with a local replica of CA. The
result of the correlation enables B to detect the start of the kth bit of CA in






of the time-of-arrival of the kth bit at B. Furthermore, the relationship between
the start of the kth bit and tAkA enables B to infer the latter.
If a prior estimate τ̄ kAB of τ
k
AB is available, then B estimates the clock
offset ∆tkAB as in (2.4).
Similar to the pseudo-random sequence and code construction for A, B
generates its unpredictable code CB(tB). A and B agree on a one-to-one mapping
between CA and CB such that B responds with the lth bit of CB on reception
of the start of the kth bit of CA. Furthermore, A and B agree that the start of
the lth bit of CB will have a code-phase offset of τ̄BB with respect to the start
of the kth bit of CA. Station B transmits the response signal as















Station A receives the response as
rA = sB(tB − τBA) + wBA(tA)
and captures a window of the signal RlA. A correlates R
l
A with a local replica







Moreover, the detection of the lth bit indicates that it was transmitted in
response to the receipt of the start of the kth bit of CA. Since A knows the
start time of the kth bit as tAkA , it measures the RTT as described in (2.6).
Note that the exchange of one-time pad sequences enables the proposed
system to satisfy the first security condition. Wireless LOS communication
satisfies the second security condition, and the knowledge of the code-phase
layover offset enables A to make an accurate prior estimate of the RTT within
the alert limit, thereby satisfying the third security condition. Thus, the pro-
posed system complies with all three necessary and sufficient conditions for
secure clock synchronization.
2.8 System Simulation
This section presents a simulation study of a secure clock synchroniza-
tion model operating over a simplistic channel model. Unlike the abstract
treatment of delays in the security derivations presented earlier, the simula-
tion is carried out with models of delays experienced by the synchronization
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messages over a real channel. This study also expounds the interplay between
slave clock stability, security requirements, attack models, and attack detection
thresholds that must be determined in a practical synchronization system. The
channel and attack models developed in this simulation are not comprehen-
sive. Rather, relatively simple models are considered to clearly demonstrate
the underlying principles. More sophisticated channel and attack models can
similarly be analyzed by following the outline of this simulation.
2.8.1 Channel Model
The simulated system resembles a traditional local area network, and
is schematically depicted in Fig. 2.5. As before, A and B are the time master
and seeker stations, respectively. The messages between these stations pass
through a series of N routers. Each router is under network traffic loading
generated by the nodes labeled T. The routers perform simple packet forward-
ing, i.e., no cryptographic operations or complex payload modifications are
performed. Each router transmits the queued packets at a service rate of 1
Gbps. Each network packet is assumed to have a size of 1542 bytes. The
MITM adversary M maliciously inserts itself along the communication path
between A and B.
The sync and response packets from A and B experience processing and
queueing delay at each router, and propagation/link delay between routers.
Queueing delay is the duration for which the packet is buffered in the router
before it can be transmitted. Processing delay is the time taken by the router
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Figure 2.5: Schematic diagram of the network topology considered in this
section.
to process the packet header, for example, to determine the packet’s destina-
tion. Since the routers in this simulation perform simple packet forwarding,
the processing delay is negligible as compared to the queueing delay [126]. The
propagation/link delay is also insignificant for local networks because the prop-
agation speed is a comparable fraction of the speed of light. Thus, only the
queueing delay significantly contributes to the overall channel delay variations.
Let the network idle probability for a particular router, denoted by ρ,
be defined as the probability of the router queue being empty at a randomly
chosen time instant. Since the synchronization packets are delay-sensitive,
the routers in this simulation implement non-preemptive priority scheduling
for synchronization packets when the queue is not empty. This means that
on arrival of a sync or response packet, the router is allowed to complete
the transmission of the data packet currently being serviced, if any, but is
required to service the delay-sensitive packet before the other network data
in the queue. Since the time period between consecutive sync-response pairs
is quite large as compared to the RTT for a given pair, it is assumed that a
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router never has more than one delay-sensitive packet in its queue. Under such
scheduling, the delay experienced by the timing messages is best modeled as
follows: with probability ρ, the total router delay is zero, and with probability
(1 − ρ) the total router delay is uniformly distributed between zero and the
maximum time to service a packet of length 1542 bytes (1542×8×2−30 ≈ 11.49
microseconds for a Gigabit router).
Given the above channel specifications and values for N and ρ, it is
possible to perform a Monte Carlo simulation to obtain the anticipated RTT
τ̄RTT, which is taken to be the empirical mean of the RTT measurements in
the simulation, and the associated standard deviation σ̄RTT. As shown in
Fig. 2.6, in case of a single sync-response pair measurement, the RTT has
an empirical mean of 80.34 microseconds and an empirical standard deviation
of 17.09 microseconds with N = 10 and ρ = 0.3. Observe that even for a
relatively small N , the empirical distribution approaches the Gaussian shape,
but has slightly heavier tail on the higher end of the delay. The distribution for
mean of batches of 10 observations has a smaller empirical standard deviation
of 5.41 microseconds.
2.8.2 System and Security Requirements
The clock at the time seeker B drifts with respect to the true time clock
at A unless corrected by a sync message from A. As before, let L denote the
alert limit for the system. Let T denote a time duration over which a perfectly
synchronized clock at B at the beginning of the duration, absent an adversary,
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Figure 2.6: Empirical distribution of the RTT of sync-response pairs through
a network of N = 10 routers with network idle probability of ρ = 0.3. The
light-shaded histogram shows the empirical distribution of the RTT of a sin-
gle sync-response pair. The dark-shaded histogram shows the corresponding
distribution for the mean of batches of 10 observations of the RTT.
drifts more than LN for some LN < L with a probability smaller than an
acceptably small bound Pε.
In the system under simulation, the clock offset for B is estimated and
corrected for every T seconds. By definition of T , it holds that if the clocks at
A and B are perfectly synchronized after every T seconds, then the natural drift
envelope of B’s clock does not exceed L with an unacceptably high probability.
Define
LM , L− LN
Observe that if an adversary is able to introduce a synchronization error larger
than LM, then the system is compromised since the natural drift of the clock
at B could potentially lead to a clock offset greater than L before the next
synchronization interval, with a probability greater than Pε. Thus, A must
flag any adversarial delay greater than L − LN with probability higher than
a desired detection probability, denoted by PD. It is worth noting that this
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practical complication of the magnitude of LN was abstracted in the sufficiency
proof, where the threshold was set to L− δ for δ > 0.
In general, A makes multiple measurements of the RTT between A and
B over the time period T . As shown in Fig. 2.6, the mean of multiple observa-
tions over T has a distribution with a smaller standard deviation as compared
to that of a single observation. In the simulated system, if no attack is de-
tected, A updates τ̄ kAB every T seconds based on the empirical mean of the RTT
measurements made over that period. Note that even though τ̄ kAB is updated
based on the measurements, no updates are applied to τ̄RTT and σ̄RTT, which
are predetermined by simulation or measurements under a secure calibration
campaign.
The empirical mean of the measured RTT is taken as the test statistic
to detect an attack. For the attack model detailed next, it can be shown that
this test statistic becomes optimal for large values of N [161].
2.8.3 Attack Model
The synchronization system considered in this simulation complies with
the necessary security conditions presented in this chapter. Consequently, the
adversary M is unable to advance the sync or response messages, and can
only increase the RTT measured by A relative to the authentic RTT. This
simulation considers a simple adversary model that introduces a fixed delay
in the measured RTT. In order to conceal its presence while compromising
synchronization with appreciable probability, M introduces a delay of LM + ξ
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seconds for some small ξ > 0.
Let H0 denote the null hypothesis (no attack), and H1 denote the al-
ternative hypothesis. Under H0, the measured RTT at A is drawn from the
distribution that was used to calibrate/simulate the channel delay distribu-
tion, while under H1, the measured RTT is drawn from a distribution that is
shifted from the calibration distribution by LM+ξ. This is visually depicted in
Fig. 2.7. Given a detection threshold λ, the dark-shaded region in Fig. 2.7 de-
notes the probability of false alarm, PF, while the light-shaded region denotes
the probability of missed detection (1 − PD). In observing Fig. 2.7, it might
be argued, and holds true, that a reasonable attacker may introduce noise in
the introduced delay to inflate the width of the distribution under H1 and
thereby decrease the probability of detection of an attack. However, in that
case, the empirical mean test statistic is no longer optimal. Instead, A would
incorporate the observed variance of the RTT in its test statistic in addition
to the empirical mean. In short, the attack model in this simulation is not
comprehensive, as explained previously. For a more sophisticated treatment
of sensor deception and protection techniques, the reader may refer to [21].
2.8.4 Simulation
The system and attack described above have been simulated with N =
10 and ρ = 0.3 for all routers. The adversarial delay LM + ξ is set to 10 mi-
croseconds, and the required probability of detection PD is set to 0.999. The
number of RTT observations made in time T are varied between 1 and 200.
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Figure 2.7: Representation of the distributions under H0 and H1 along with
the detection threshold and the associated PF and PD.
Given the number of observations, and a required PD, the system is simu-
lated under H1 for 10
6 detection epochs and the maximum possible detection
threshold λ that satisfies the detection probability is obtained. Subsequently,
the system is simulated under H0 and the number of test statistics exceeding
the threshold λ are recorded. The frequency of such epochs is reported as the
probability of false alarm PF.
Fig. 2.8 shows the above procedure for 80 RTT measurements made
per test statistic. In this case, λ is obtained to be 84.53 microseconds and the
corresponding PF is 1.59%. Fig. 2.9 shows a log-log plot of PF as a function
of the number of observations made per test statistic. When the number
of observations is greater than 160, no false alarms were observed with 106
trials. For the given channel delay variation statistics, the probability of false
alarm is very high for small number of observations per decision epoch since
the threshold λ that must be set to detect an attack with the required PD is
large in comparison to the minimal delay that the adversary must introduce
to compromise synchronization (LM). For a more stable channel, such as a
wireless or PTP-aware channel, fewer measurements per decision epoch would
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suffice.
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Figure 2.8: Distribution of the test statistic under H0 and H1 for 80 RTT






























Figure 2.9: Probability of false alarm as a function of number of observations
per decision epoch. (N = 10, ρ = 0.3, LM + ξ = 10µs, PD = 0.999)
2.8.5 Practical Implications
Section 2.6.1 makes fairly remarkable assumptions about the synchro-
nization system to show provably secure time transfer. For instance, it requires
that errors in the a priori estimate of the RTT of the timing messages be neg-
ligible compared to the alert limit. Nonetheless, as shown in this section, for
a given channel with bounded delay variations and a given slave clock, some
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level of security guarantee can be made for a synchronization system that satis-
fies the necessary and sufficient conditions presented herein. For concreteness,
consider a system that requires an alert limit of L = 100 microseconds and a
slave clock that drifts no more than LN = 50 microseconds over a period of
T = 1 second with acceptably high probability (1−Pε). Then, for N = 10 and
ρ = 0.3, if A makes 10 RTT measurements over 1 second, the empirical mean
test statistic is distributed as the dark-shaded distribution in Fig. 2.6 with a
standard deviation of ≈ 5.4 microseconds. For LM = L − LN = 50 microsec-
onds, a threshold of ≈ τ̄RTT + 30 microseconds will yield a missed detection
rate of approximately 1 in 15000, and a false alarm rate of approximately 3.5
in 1 million. With a more stable slave clock or more measurements per second,
these probabilities can be made more favorable.
Another important concern that has not been addressed in the sim-
ulation is that of the incorporation of cryptographic constructs in the syn-
chronization protocol. The encryption and decryption algorithms are often
complex and take non-negligible processing time to execute. However, note
that at A, the sync message is timestamped after the encryption process, and
thus the time taken for encryption is inconsequential. At B, it is important to
concede that the decryption of the sync message and the encryption of the re-
sponse message cannot be assumed to happen instantaneously. This has been
accounted for by allowing the layover time τ̄BB for the cryptographic processes
to execute. Once again, the receipt timestamp of the response message at A is
applied before the decryption process, and hence the decryption time at A is
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inconsequential. Thus, compliance with the first security condition must not
pose significant practical challenges.
2.9 Conclusions
A fundamental theory of secure clock synchronization was developed for
a generic system model. The problem of secure clock synchronization was for-
malized with explicit assumptions, models, and definitions. It was shown that
all possible one-way clock synchronization protocols are vulnerable to replay
attacks. A set of necessary conditions for secure two-way clock synchronization
was proposed and proved. Compliance with these necessary conditions with
strict upper bounds was shown to be sufficient for secure clock synchroniza-
tion, which is a significant result for provable security in critical infrastructure.
The general applicability of the set of security conditions was demonstrated
by specializing these conditions to design a secure PTP protocol and an alter-
native secure two-way clock synchronization protocol with GNSS-like signals.
Results from a simulation with models of channel delays were presented to ex-
pound the interplay between slave clock stability, security requirements, attack
models, and attack detection thresholds.
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Chapter 3
World-wide GNSS Interference Monitoring
from Low-Earth Orbit
3.1 Abstract
Observation of terrestrial GNSS interference (jamming and spoofing)
from low-earth orbit (LEO) is a uniquely effective technique for world-wide
monitoring of hostile and contested GNSS environments, and for estimating
the locations of interference sources. Such details are useful for situational
awareness, interference deterrence, and for developing interference-hardened
GNSS receivers. This chapter explores the performance of LEO interfer-
ence monitoring using receiver-reported carrier-to-interference-and-noise ratio
(CINR) and presents the results of a three-year study of global interference.
Using CINR data from a GNSS receiver aboard the International Space Sta-
tion (ISS), this study confirms the presence of reported interference activity
This chapter is a subset of: Matthew J. Murrian, Lakshay Narula, Peter A. Iannucci,
Scott Budzien, Brady W. O’Hanlon, Steven P. Powell, and Todd E. Humphreys. GNSS
interference monitoring from low Earth orbit. Navigation, Journal of the Institute of Nav-
igation, 2020. Submitted for review. The material presented in this chapter only includes
the contributions made by the author of this dissertation.
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in Syria and Libya, and uncovers the existence of hitherto unknown ongoing
GNSS interference in mainland China.
3.2 Introduction
Terrestrial GNSS interference activity has grown more widespread and
sophisticated over recent years. Conspicuous GNSS jamming or spoofing has
occurred, or is ongoing, at urban and coastal sites around the globe [3, 27,30,
137]. Given the dependence of critical infrastructure and safety-of-life systems
on GNSS [71,122,139,165], there is great interest in detecting, characterizing,
and localizing sources of interference.
Space-based observation of terrestrial GNSS interference is attractive
for several reasons. Most obviously, it offers world-wide coverage: moderately-
powerful terrestrial interference sources anywhere on the globe can be detected
by LEO satellites multiple times per day, making it possible to maintain a com-
mon operating picture of world-wide GNSS interference. A single LEO-based
sensor is sufficient to characterize the strength, spectral properties, structural
content, and even the location of terrestrial interference sources, provided a
Doppler time history can be extracted from a carrier component of the inter-
ference signal [106]. For signals from which no carrier can be isolated, multiple
synchronized LEO-based sensors can employ time- and frequency-difference-
of-arrival (TDOA and FDOA) techniques to infer the source’s location [20,21].
Another simple and effective interference detection test can be formu-
lated solely from the standard carrier-to-noise ratio observable, C/N0, pro-
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duced by a GNSS receiver. The presence of an interference source in the
GNSS radio-frequency band reduces the receiver-reported C/N0, and in the
worst case, leads to a complete loss of signal tracking. This chapter presents
the results of a three-year study of terrestrial GNSS interference as observed
through the reported C/N0 from a software-defined GNSS receiver operating
since February 2017 on the ISS. The FOTON receiver, developed by The Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin (UT) and Cornell University, is part of a larger
science experiment called GPS Radio Occultation and Ultraviolet Photome-
tryColocated (GROUP-C), an unclassified experiment aboard the ISS that is
part of the Space Test ProgramHouston Payload 5 (STP-H5) payload.
The FOTON receiver is a science-grade spaceborne dual-frequency (GPS
L1 and L2) GNSS receiver [87]. Three levels of FOTON data are available for
interference analysis: (1) raw 5.7 Msps intermediate frequency (IF) samples
output by the FOTON front-end’s analog-to-digital converter, (2) 100-Hz data-
modulation-wiped complex correlation products, and (3) 1-Hz standard GNSS
observables. The analysis presented in this chapter only makes use of the 1-Hz
observables, which, in addition to the C/N0, includes the receiver’s position
and velocity, and flags indicating the health of the signals being tracked.
The two contributions of this chapter are (1) it provides an analysis of
expected performance for terrestrial GNSS interference monitoring from LEO
with C/N0 observables, and (2) it presents the results of a three-year study
of global GNSS interference monitoring from the ISS. This chapter is a subset
of the work presented in [106]. In particular, only direct contributions of the
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author of this dissertation have been included in this chapter.
No prior public literature explores the use of a space-borne GNSS re-
ceiver for monitoring terrestrial GNSS interference, despite increasing concern
over such interference [65,122,123,164].
3.3 Interference Detection Performance via C/N0 Mon-
itoring
This section explores the potential performance of LEO GNSS interfer-
ence monitoring based on receiver-reported C/N0 in terms of detection sensi-
tivity.
Detection of GNSS interference can be broadly classified as operating at
the pre- or post-correlation stage within a GNSS receiver [28]. Pre-correlation
detection is much less sensitive, but works for all signals with power falling
in the band of interest. Post-correlation detection can only be applied to
structured interference with a known waveform, but due to processing gain, is
much more sensitive. What follows is a sensitivity analysis of the C/N0-based
interference detection technique, which operates at the pre-correlation stage
(with respect to the interference signal).
A simple and effective pre-correlation interference detection test can be
formulated solely from the standard carrier-to-noise ratio observable, C/N0,
produced by a GNSS receiver. In the presence of interference, C/N0 actually
measures the carrier-to-interference-and-noise ratio, CINR. Let C be the re-
ceived authentic signal power for a particular satellite-and-signal combination
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[e.g., the GPS L1 C/A signal corresponding to pseudo-random number (PRN)
code 4], N0 be the (approximately flat) receiver thermal noise power density
near the frequency band of interest, and I0 be the spectrally-flat-equivalent in-
terference noise power density, whose relationship with the actual interference




When compensated for satellite- and receiver-side antenna gain pat-
terns and for spreading loss along the satellite-to-receiver path, and absent
signal blockage, strong scintillation, and “flex-power” satellite power adjust-
ments, CINR variations are primarily driven by multipath, which is charac-
terized by a log-normal distribution [164]. Let z be a vector of CINR mea-
surements expressed in dB for a particular frequency band, with predictable
variations due to antenna gain pattern and spreading loss removed. A hypoth-
esis test for interference can be formulated in terms of the common decrease
in the elements of z due to an increase in I0. In particular, the distribution of
z under the null (H0) and alternate (H1) hypotheses may be modeled as
H0 : z ∼ N(µ, P ) (3.2a)
H1 : z ∼ N(µ− δ1, P ) (3.2b)
where µ ∈ Rnz , P ∈ Rnz×nz , 1 denotes an all-ones column vector of the same
length as µ, and δ > 0 is the amount in dB by which all CINR values drop
due to interference under H1.
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The model in (3.2) conservatively assumes that z’s covariance matrix,
P , is identical for H0 and H1. In practice, although the receiver’s multipath
environment remains unchanged from H0 to H1, interference sources can cause
time variations in I0 that inflate P in the positive definite sense. But because
the magnitude of increase in P is impossible to know a priori, the less-sensitive
model presented above is assumed.
The model in (3.2) is a special case of the general Gaussian problem






where l(z) is the test’s (sufficient) detection statistic. This test is optimal
despite δ being unknown a priori because l(z) is independent of δ (i.e., the
test is uniformly most powerful with respect to δ). Note that P may not be
diagonal because the elements of z may be correlated through dependence on
the spacecraft attitude or because z may contain multiple elements for the
same satellite-signal pair taken over a sliding window of time.
As a linear transformation of a Gaussian vector, l(z) is itself Gaussian.
Hence, the performance of the test in (3.3) can be completely characterized
by the normalized distance between the means of l(z) under H0 and H1:





Fig. 3.1 shows how the performance improves with increasing d.
If the CINR measurements in z are taken at a single epoch of time, and
if the effect of multipath on each measurement is only weakly coupled through
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Figure 3.1: Detection probability for the test in (3.3) as a function of d for
three different values of false alarm probability.
the spacecraft attitude, then P may be modeled as diagonal. In the simplest




For the FOTON receiver on the ISS, the ISS’s extended shape and large solar
panels create an unfavorable multipath environment, resulting in a relatively
high σz ≈ 1.5 dB. More compact LEO satellites such as the main sounding
rocket payload in [87] enjoy σz < 1 dB.
Approximate LEO interference detection sensitivity in the L1 GNSS
band using only CINR measurements can be calculated by assuming σz = 1 dB
and nz = 15, which are reasonable parameters for a single-epoch test, a
horizontally-oriented hemispherical-gain antenna, and full constellations of
GPS, Galileo, and BDS III satellites. From (3.5) and Fig. 3.1, a drop in
CINR of δ > 1.4 dB is required at PF = 10
−5 to yield PD > 0.9. Con-
servatively assuming that the interference power is spread evenly across the
4-MHz bandwidth covering the most-widely-used civil L1 GNSS signals, then
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I0 = PI−66 dBW/Hz, where PI is the received interference power in dBW. As-
suming N0 = −204 dBW/Hz, a CINR drop by δ = 1.4 dB implies PI = −142
dBW. Denote spreading loss by L dB, receiver antenna gain by Gr dB, and
interference source effective isotropic radiated power (EIRP) by PEIRP dBW.
Then
PEIRP = PI −Gr + L (3.6)
Spreading loss at L1 from the surface along the shortest distance to a typical
LEO altitude of 400 km is L = 148.5 dB. Then, supposing Gr = 3 dB, the
minimum EIRP of an interference source detectable solely from CINR mea-
surements with PF ≤ 10−5 and PD > 0.9 is approximately PEIRP = 3.5 dBW.
3.4 LEO Interference Survey via C/N0 Observables
The 1-Hz standard GNSS observables have been logged from the FO-
TON receiver nearly continuously since early 2017. These data facilitate a
world-wide survey of strong GNSS interference.
The carrier power C of an authentic signal can be modeled as a function
C(j, f, rsr, zs, zr), where j is the GNSS satellite identifier (SV ID), f is the
frequency band (L1 or L2), rsr is the range between the GNSS satellite antenna
and the ISS FOTON antenna, zs is the angle between the satellite boresight
direction and the direction to the ISS antenna (i.e., the satellite antenna zenith
angle), and zr is the angle between the ISS antenna boresight direction and
the direction to the satellite (the receiver antenna zenith angle). As discussed
in Section 3.3, a hypothesis test based on the receiver-reported CINR can
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be designed to detect whether (H1) or not (H0) the receiver is experiencing
interference. Setting up this test based on the FOTON data presents two
additional challenges:
[T1] The hypothesis test requires that the statistics E[l|H0] and Var(l|H0)
be known. This requires a “calibration” process where the receiver is
known to be in an interference-free environment. Since this knowledge
cannot be guaranteed in a practical setting, an assumption needs to be
made. This section assumes the receiver reports interference-free data
(consistent with H0) when the ISS is over deep ocean bodies.
[T2] Modeling of interference-free C/N0 is further complicated by the ISS’s
local multipath environment. The ISS antenna is flanked by solar panels
that move with respect to the FOTON antenna, causing a non-stationary
signal obstruction and multipath environment. Nevertheless, a zenith
angle window zr ∈ [0◦, 15◦] is known to be free of obstructions. Only the
signals received in this window are considered for interference detection
in this chapter’s analysis.
To maximize the sensitivity of the hypothesis test, one must eliminate
or model all non-interference sources of variation in the reported CINR. First,
observe that the dependence of C on rsr can be easily removed by compensating
for the free space path loss:






Figure 3.2: For receiver zenith angle zr ≤ 15◦ (within the gray region), the
satellite zenith angle zs is restricted between 14.2
◦ ≤ zs ≤ 15.2◦
Effectively, this eliminates the variation in CINR due to different GNSS satel-
lites being at different distances from the receiver.
Furthermore, it turns out that given the restriction of zr ∈ [0◦, 15◦],
the geometry between GNSS satellites and the ISS is restricted such that
zs ∈ [14.2◦, 15.2◦] (see Fig. 3.2). This implies that the dependence of Ĉ on zs
may be ignored, since the GNSS antenna gain pattern can be assumed to be
constant over ±0.5◦. In other words, Ĉ is only a function of the SV ID j, the
frequency band f , and the receiver zenith angle zr.
To set up the hypothesis test, the mean and variance of ISS-reported
range-compensated-CINR values Ĉ/N0 collected over deep ocean regions are
maintained as control data (H0) in a three-dimensional grid of SV ID, fre-
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Figure 3.3: Average interference-free range-compensated carrier-to-noise ratio
Ĉ/N0 at L1 (top panel) and L2 (bottom panel) frequencies for GPS satellites
over 3 years of collected data. Notice that some SVs are up to 4 dB more pow-
erful than others at GPS L1. The blank bars in the bottom panel correspond
to GPS satellites without an L2 signal. Compensating for this effect increases
the sensitivity of the hypothesis test.
quency band, and receiver zenith angle.
Fig. 3.3 shows the average interference-free range-compensated carrier-
to-noise ratio Ĉ/N0 at L1 and L2 frequencies for GPS satellites over 3 years
of collected data. Notice that some GPS L1 SVs are up to 4 dB more power-
ful than others. Compensating for this effect increases the sensitivity of the
hypothesis test by reducing the uncertainty of the test statistic under H0.
The test sensitivity is further improved by compensating for the gain
pattern of the GPS antenna at the ISS. Fig. 3.4 shows the average interference-
free mean-adjusted Ĉ/N0 at L1 and L2 frequencies as a function of the ISS
zenith angle zs. Mean adjustment removes the effect of SV-specific power
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Figure 3.4: Average interference-free mean-adjusted Ĉ/N0 at L1 (top panel)
and L2 (bottom panel) frequencies as a function of the ISS zenith angle zs.
Each line in the chart corresponds to a GPS SV, and provides an estimate
of the gain pattern of the GPS antenna at the ISS. The pattern is clear for
GPS L2, with 1 dB peak-to-peak gain variation. The L1 pattern is flatter, but
shows slightly larger gain for larger zenith angles. Compensating for this effect
increases the sensitivity of the hypothesis test.
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Figure 3.5: Top panel shows a histogram of the receiver-reported interference-
free carrier-to-noise ratio C/N0 for both L1 and L2. Bottom panel shows sep-
arate histograms of C/N0 at the two frequencies. Notice that the histograms
are narrower when separated for the two frequencies. Narrower histograms
increase the sensitivity of the hypothesis test, i.e., weaker interference is de-
tectable if the interference-free C/N0 is predictable.
variation observed in Fig. 3.3. The trend in Fig. 3.4 provides an estimate of
the gain pattern of the ISS GPS antenna. The pattern is clear at GPS L2, with
1 dB peak-to-peak gain variation. The L1 gain pattern is less pronounced, but
shows slightly larger gain for larger zenith angles.
To demonstrate the effect of compensating for the various factors de-
scribed above, Figs. 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 show the histograms of the carrier-to-noise
ratio data from a single day after the various corrections are applied. The top
panel in Fig. 3.5 shows a histogram of the receiver-reported interference-free
carrier-to-noise ratio C/N0 for both L1 and L2 before any processing. The
bottom panel shows separate histograms of C/N0 at the two frequencies. No-
tice that the histograms are narrower when separated for the two frequencies,
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Figure 3.6: Histogram of the interference-free range-compensated carrier-to-
noise ratio Ĉ/N0 for GPS L1 (in blue) and GPS L2 (in red). Notice that when
compared to Fig. 3.5, compensating for range reduces the uncertainty under
H0, thus increasing the sensitivity of the hypothesis test.
Figure 3.7: Histogram of the interference-free carrier-to-noise ratio after com-
pensating for range to the satellite, GPS SV ID, frequency band, and ISS
zenith angle for GPS L1 (in blue) and GPS L2 (in red). Notice that when
compared to Figs. 3.5 and 3.6, compensating for the above factors reduces the
uncertainty under H0, thus increasing the sensitivity of the hypothesis test.
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increasing the sensitivity of the hypothesis test.
After compensating for the path loss between the GPS SV and the ISS,
the resulting histograms for GPS L1 and L2 are shown in Fig. 3.6. Notice
that when compared to Fig. 3.5, compensating for range reduces the uncer-
tainty under H0. Finally, Fig. 3.7 shows the histogram of the interference-free
carrier-to-noise ratio after further compensation for the GPS SV ID, the fre-
quency band, and the ISS zenith angle. When compared to Figs. 3.5 and 3.6,
compensating for the above factors further reduces the uncertainty under H0.
The hypothesis test is performed on the test statistic derived from
Ĉ/N0 values that fall within zr ∈ [0◦, 15◦]. The test is performed separately
for the L1 and L2 bands since the interference characteristics are frequency
dependent. If the reported test statistics falls below E[l|H0] − 3
√
Var(l|H0),
the receiver is declared to be under interference. This threshold respects a
PF of approximately 1.35 × 10−3. Fig. 3.8 shows the ratio of the number of
potential interference events recorded at L1 (top panel) and L2 (bottom panel)
to total number of hypothesis tests performed at each location for the foregoing
detection threshold. A high ratio of potential interference events is reported
for both L1 and L2 near Syria (marked with a red dot). This is consistent with
the discovery of a strong GNSS jamming source at the Khmeimim Air Base
in Syria [106]. Note that the interference “hotspot” appears to the east of the
source because the ISS orbit is prograde and the FOTON antenna points in
the anti-velocity direction. In other words, the FOTON antenna is exposed to
interference only after the ISS passes eastward over an emitter’s location.
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The high values of the statistic for both L1 and L2 east of Syria indicate
that the interference activity in Syria has been persistent over nearly the full
interval considered in this chapter, from March 2017 to June 2020. A monthly
analysis (not shown) revealed that the source has been transmitting at L2 since
at latest March 2017. It began transmitting weak interference at L1 during
the second half of 2017, then much stronger interference at L1 during the first
quarter of 2018. The interference at L1 and L2 was ongoing in June 2020.
A weaker hotspot is present to the west of the Syrian interference. This
hotspot, which emerged in the second half of 2019, is consistent with reports
of GNSS interference in the Libyan region [159]. The magenta dots in Fig. 3.8
denote the approximate location of the area in which interference has been
documented (33° N, 14° E). Fig. 3.8 also reveals strong L2 interference over
mainland China. This interference has been present since at latest March 2017
and was ongoing in June 2020. The green dot in Fig. 3.8, marked at (32° N,
114° E), indicates a hypothesized interference source location based on the
shape and location of the observed hotspot.
Note that the above method of counting potential interference events
based on CINR degradation ignores cases where interference might lead to
complete loss of track of some or all GPS signals. However, the data from the
ISS shows that FOTON does not lose track of authentic GNSS signals even
when flying by the strong interference source in Syria. In fact, the reported
CINR over Syria is well above the weakest signal that FOTON is capable of
























































































































































































































































































































































































































track few or no GPS signals, it is likely due to some abnormal behavior of the
receiver, and not due to a potential interference event.
In addition to the global average analysis summarized in Fig. 3.8, it
is instructive to examine the time history of receiver reported CINR as the
ISS passes over an interference hotspot. Fig. 3.9 shows two such histories for
signals within the admissible range of zr as the ISS goes over the strong in-
terference regions in Syria (Fig. 3.9(a)) and China (Fig. 3.9(b)). Green and
blue data points represent range-compensated CINR values for authentic L1
and L2 GNSS signals, respectively, above the applicable threshold, which de-
pends on i, f , and zr. Light red data points are the same data when below
the applicable threshold. Both L1 and L2 signals are declared under interfer-
ence in Fig. 3.9(a), whereas only L2 signals are declared under interference in
Fig. 3.9(b). The brief dip in Fig. 3.9(b) prior to the major dip over China is
caused by the Syrian interference. Gaps in the time histories indicate periods
with no tracked signals in the admissible zenith angle window.
3.5 Conclusions
Low-earth-orbiting instruments capable of receiving signals in GNSS
bands are a powerful tool for detecting GNSS interference emanating from ter-
restrial sources. Data from one such instrument, the FOTON software-defined
GNSS receiver, which has been operational on the International Space Station
since February 2017, reveal interesting patterns of GNSS interference from
March 2017 to June 2020. Previously-reported powerful interference sources
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Figure 3.9: Time histories of range-compensated receiver-reported CINR as
the ISS flies over potential GPS interference zones over Syria and China.
active in Syria and Libya were confirmed with the FOTON-reported C/N0
data. In addition, this study reports the approximate onset of these interfer-
ence activities, as well as their persistent and ongoing nature. Remarkably, the
global analysis revealed another previously-unreported interference hotspot in
mainland China that only affects the GPS L2 frequency band.
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Part III






Deployment of automated ground vehicles beyond the confines of sunny
and dry climes will require sub-lane-level positioning techniques based on ra-
dio waves rather than near-visible-light radiation. Like human sight, lidar and
cameras perform poorly in low-visibility conditions. This chapter develops and
demonstrates a novel technique for robust sub-50-cm-accurate urban ground
vehicle positioning based on all-weather sensors. The technique incorporates
a computationally-efficient globally-optimal radar scan batch registration al-
gorithm into a larger estimation pipeline that fuses data from commercially-
available low-cost automotive radars, low-cost inertial sensors, vehicle motion
constraints, and, when available, precise GNSS measurements. Performance
This chapter is based on:
Lakshay Narula, Peter A Iannucci, and Todd E Humphreys. All-weather sub-50-cm radar-
inertial positioning. Field Robotics, 2020. Submitted for review.
Lakshay Narula, Peter A Iannucci, and Todd E Humphreys. Automotive-radar-based
50-cm urban positioning. In Proceedings of the IEEE/ION PLANSx Meeting, 2020.
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is evaluated on an extensive and realistic urban data set. Comparison against
ground truth shows that during 60 min of GNSS-denied driving in the urban
center of Austin, TX, the technique maintains 95th-percentile errors below
50 cm in horizontal position and 0.5° in heading.
4.2 Introduction
Development of automated ground vehicles (AGVs) has spurred re-
search in lane-keeping assist systems, automated intersection management [53],
tight-formation platooning, and cooperative sensing [37, 77], all of which de-
mand accurate (e.g., 50-cm at 95%) ground vehicle positioning in an urban
environment. But the majority of positioning techniques developed thus far
depend on lidar or cameras, which perform poorly in low-visibility conditions
such as snowy whiteout, dense fog, or heavy rain. Adoption of AGVs in many
parts of the world will require all-weather localization techniques.
Radio-wave-based sensing techniques such as radar and GNSS (global
navigation satellite system) remain operable even in extreme weather con-
ditions [173] because their longer-wavelength electromagnetic radiation pen-
etrates snow, fog, and rain. Carrier-phase-differential GNSS (CDGNSS) has
been successfully applied for the past two decades as an all-weather decimeter-
accurate localization technique in open-sky conditions. Proprioceptive sensors
such as IMUs also continue to operate regardless of external conditions. Cou-
pling a CDGNSS receiver with a tactical-grade inertial sensor, as in [72, 119,
133, 176] delivers robust high-accuracy positioning even during the extended
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signal outages common in the urban environment, but such systems are far
too expensive for widespread deployment on AGVs. Recent work has shown
that 20-cm-accurate (95%) CDGNSS positioning is possible at low cost even
in dense urban areas, but solution availability remains below 90%, with occa-
sional long gaps between high-accuracy solutions [67]. Moreover, the global
trend of increasing radio interference in the GNSS bands, whether accidental
or deliberate [65], underscores the need for GNSS-independent localization:
GNSS jamming cannot be allowed to paralyze an area’s automated vehicle
networks.
Clearly, there is a need for AGV localization that is low cost, accurate
at the sub-50-cm level, robust to low-visibility conditions, and continuously
available. This chapter is the first to establish that low-cost inertial- and
automotive-radar-based localization can meet these criteria.
Mass-market commercialization has brought the cost of automotive
radar down enough that virtually all current production vehicles are equipped
with at least one radar unit, which serves as the primary sensor for adaptive
cruise control and automatic emergency braking. But use of automotive radar
for localization faces the significant challenges of data sparsity and noise: an
automotive radar scan has vastly lower resolution than a camera image or
a dense lidar scan, and is subject to high rates of false detection (clutter)
and missed detection. As such, it is nearly impossible to deduce semantic
information or to extract distinctive environmental features from an individ-
ual radar scan. This is clear from Fig. 4.1c, which shows a sparse smattering
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of reflections from a single composite scan using three radar units. The key
to localization is to aggregate sequential scans into a batch, as in Fig. 4.1d,
where environmental structure is clearly evident. Even still, the data remain so
sparse that localization based on traditional machine vision feature extraction
and matching is not promising. Additionally, stable short-term odometry is a
pre-requisite for aggregating radar scans, which in itself is a challenge when
dealing with low-cost inertial sensing.
This chapter proposes a two-step process for radar-based localization.
The first is the mapping step: creation of a geo-referenced two-dimensional
aggregated map of all radar targets across an area of interest. Fig. 4.1b shows
such a map, hereafter referred to as a radar map. The full radar map used
throughout this chapter, of which Fig. 4.1b is a part, was constructed with the
benefit of a highly stable inertial platform so that a trustworthy ground truth
map would be available against which maps generated by other techniques
could be compared. But an expensive inertial system or dedicated mobile
mapping vehicle is not required to create a radar map. Instead, it can be
crowd-sourced from the very user vehicles that will ultimately exploit the map
for localization. During periods of favorable lighting conditions and good visi-
bility, user vehicles can exploit a combination of low-cost CDGNSS, as in [67],
and GNSS-aided visual simultaneous localization and mapping, as in [113], to
achieve the continuous decimeter-and-sub-degree-accurate geo-referenced po-
sition and orientation (pose) required to lay down an accurate radar map. In
























































































































































































































































































































































































































exploited at any later time, such as during times of poor visibility.
Despite aggregation over multiple vehicle passes, the sparse and clut-
tered nature of automotive radar data is evident from the radar map shown in
Fig. 4.1b: the generated point cloud is much less dense and has a substantially
higher fraction of spurious returns than a typical lidar-derived point cloud,
making automotive-radar-based localization a significantly more challenging
problem.
The second step of this chapter’s technique is the localization step. Us-
ing a combination of all-weather odometric techniques such as inertial sensing,
radar odometry, and ground vehicle dynamics constraints, a sensor fusion filter
continually tracks the changes in vehicle pose over time. Over the latest short
interval (e.g., 5 s), pose estimates from the filter are used to spatially organize
the multiple radar scans taken over the interval and generate what is hereafter
referred to as a batch of scans, or batch for short. Fig. 4.1d shows a five-second
batch terminating at the same location as the individual scan in Fig. 4.1c. In
contrast to the individual scan, some environmental structure emerges in the
batch of scans, making robust registration to the map feasible. Even so, the
localization problem remains challenging due to the dynamic radar environ-
ment: note the absence of parked cars on the left side of the street during
localization. The batch of scans is matched against the prior map of the sur-
roundings to estimate the pose offset of the batch from the truth. This pose
offset is then applied as a measurement to the sensor fusion filter to correct
odometric drift.
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Contributions. This chapter’s overall contribution is a robust pipeline
for all-weather sub-50-cm urban ground vehicle positioning. This pipeline in-
corporates a computationally-efficient correlation-maximization-based globally-
optimal radar scan registration algorithm that estimates a two-dimensional
translational and a one-dimensional rotational offset between a prior radar
map and a batch of current scans. Significantly, the registration algorithm can
be applied to the highly sparse and cluttered data produced by commercially-
available low-cost automotive radars. Maximization of correlation is shown to
be equivalent to minimization of the L2 distance between the prior map and the
batch probability hypothesis densities. The pipeline supports the construction
of the radar registration estimate and optimally fuses it with inertial measure-
ments, radar range rate measurements, ground vehicle dynamics constraints,
and cm-accurate GNSS measurements, when available. A novel technique for
online estimation of the vehicle center of rotation is introduced, and calibra-
tion of various other extrinsic parameters necessary for optimal sensor fusion
is described.
This chapter also presents a thorough evaluation of the positioning
pipeline on the large-scale dataset described in [111]. Data from automotive
sensors are collected over two 1.5 h driving sessions through the urban center
of Austin, TX on two separate days specifically chosen to provide variety in
traffic and parking patterns. Comparison with a post-processed ground truth
trajectory shows that proposed pipeline maintains 95th-percentile errors below
35 cm in horizontal position and 0.5° in heading during 60 min of GNSS-denied
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driving.
Organization of the rest of this chapter. Sec. 4.3 establishes the
significance of this contribution in view of the prior work in related fields.
The radar batch-based pose estimation technique for the low-cost automotive
radar sensor model is developed in Sec. 4.4. Sec. 4.5 describes the overall sensor
fusion architecture involving inertial sensing, GNSS, motion constraints, and
radar measurements. Implementation details and experimental results from
field evaluation are presented in Sec. 4.6, and Sec. 4.7 provides concluding
remarks.
4.3 Related Work
This section reviews a wide variety of literature on mapping and lo-
calization with radar and radar-inertial sensing. This includes prior work on
point cloud alignment and image registration techniques, occupancy grid-based
mapping and localization, random-finite-set-based mapping and localization,
and inertial-aided mapping and localization.
Related work in point cloud alignment. A radar-based map can
have many different representations. One obvious representation is to store
all the radar measurements as a point cloud. Fig. 4.1b is an example of this
representation. Localization within this map can be performed with point
cloud registration techniques like the iterative closest point (ICP) algorithm.
ICP is known to converge to local minima which may occur due to outlying
points that do not have correspondences in the two point clouds being aligned.
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A number of variations and generalizations of ICP robust to such outliers have
been proposed in the literature [35,56,62,70,107,156,163]. A few of these have
been applied specifically to automotive radar data [62,163]. But the technique
in [163] is only evaluated on a 5 min dataset, while [62] performs poorly on
datasets larger than 1 km.
This chapter steers away from ICP and its gradient-based variants be-
cause automotive radar data in urban areas exhibit another source of incorrect-
but-plausible registration solutions which are not addressed in the above lit-
erature: repetitive structure, e.g., due to a series of parked cars, may result
in multiple locally-optimal solutions within 2–3 m of the globally-optimal so-
lution. Gradient-based techniques which iteratively estimate correspondences
based on the distance between pairs of points are susceptible to converge to
such locally-optimal solutions. Accordingly, the batch-based pose estimator
proposed in this chapter is designed to approximate the globally-optimal so-
lution.
In contrast to ICP and its variants, globally-optimal point cloud regis-
tration can be achieved by performing global point correspondence based on
distinctive feature descriptors [12, 33, 34]. All of these works use a sophisti-
cated mechanically-rotating radar unit that is not expected to be available on
an AGV. Feature description and matching on the low-cost automotive radars
used in this chapter is likely to be fragile. Even when using the mechanically-
rotating radar, [13] shows that a correlation-based approach, such as the one
developed in this chapter, outperforms other feature-descriptor-based point
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cloud methods.
Related work in image registration and occupancy grid tech-
niques. Occupancy grid mapping and localization techniques have been tra-
ditionally applied for lidar-based systems, and recent work in [135, 136] has
explored similar techniques with automotive radar data. In contrast to batch-
based pose estimation described in this chapter, both [136] and [135] perform
particle-filter based localization with individual scans, as is typical for lidar-
based systems. These methods were only evaluated on small-scale datasets
collected in a parking lot, and even so, the reported meter-level localization
accuracy is not sufficient for lane-level positioning.
Occupancy grid maps are similar to camera-based top-down images,
and thus may be aligned with image registration techniques, that may be
visual-descriptor-based [32, 63] or correlation-based [174]. Reliable extraction
and matching of visual features, e.g., SIFT or SURF, is significantly more chal-
lenging with automotive radar data. Correlation-based registration is more
robust [13, 174], and forms the basis of one of the components in this chap-
ter. In contrast to prior work [13, 174], this chapter provides a probabilistic
interpretation for the correlation operation. The mechanically-rotating radar
of [13] allows correlation-based pose estimation based on a single scan of radar
data. But for the low-cost automotive radars used in this chapter, it becomes
necessary to accumulate radar scans over time, which requires integration with
other odometric sensors. This chapter develops and demonstrates a complete
sensor fusion pipeline around radar-based pose estimation and evaluates its
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performance on a large urban dataset.
Related work in random finite set mapping and localization.
The occupancy grid representation commonly used in robotics is an approxi-
mation to the probability hypothesis density (PHD) function [51,90]: a concept
first introduced in the random finite set (RFS) based target tracking litera-
ture. Unsurprisingly, PHD- and RFS-based mapping and localization have
been previously studied in [47, 101, 152]. In contrast to occupancy grid-based
methods, techniques in [47, 101,152] make the point target assumption where
no target may generate more than one measurement in a single scan, and no
target may occlude another target. However, in reality, planar and extended
targets such as walls and building fronts are commonplace in the urban AGV
environment. Mapping of ellipsoidal extended targets has recently been pro-
posed in [54], but occlusions are not modeled and only simulation results are
presented.
Related work in inertial-aided mapping and localization. This
chapter couples radar batch-based pose estimation with other all-weather auto-
motive sensors such as IMU and GNSS. Inertial aiding has been widely applied
in visual- and lidar-based mapping and localization [36,55,86,104,125,149,172].
This chapter extends inertial-aiding to sensors that can operate under harsh
weather conditions. Recently, radar measurements have been applied to con-
strain IMU position drift in [14]. Radar-inertial odometry for indoor robots
has been proposed in [5, 75]. This chapter is the first to integrate low-cost
automotive radars with inertial sensing, GNSS, and ground vehicle dynamics
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for lane-level accurate positioning in challenging urban environments.
4.4 Radar-Batch-Based Pose Estimation
This section describes the formulation of the radar-batch-based pose
estimation method introduced in this chapter. It first details the statistical
motivation behind the method, and then develops an efficient approximation
to the globally-optimal estimator. The output of this estimator acts as one of
the measurements provided to the overall localization system presented later
in Sec. 4.5.
4.4.1 Pose Estimation using Probability Hypothesis Density
For the purpose of radar-based pose estimation, an AGVs environment
can be described as a collection of arbitrarily shaped radar reflectors in a spe-
cific spatial arrangement. These radar reflectors exist in a two-dimensional
plane since the automotive radars used in this work only provide range and
azimuth measurements. Assuming sufficient temporal permanence of this envi-
ronment, radar-equipped AGVs make sample measurements of the underlying
structure over time. This section assumes a static radar environment, dynamic
objects in the environment are excluded in a pre-processing step (Sec. 4.5.4.3).
4.4.1.1 The Probability Hypothesis Density Function
A probabilistic description of the radar environment is required to set
up radar-based pose estimation as an optimization problem. This chapter
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chooses the PHD function [90] representation of the radar environment. The
PHD at a given location gives the density of the expected number of radar
reflectors at that location. For a static radar environment, the PHD D(x) at
a location x ∈ X can be written as
D(x) = I · p(x)
where X is the set of all locations in the environment, p(x) is a probability
density function such that
∫
p(x)dx = 1, and I, the intensity, is the total
number of radar reflectors in the environment. For a time-varying radar en-
vironment, both I and p(x) are functions of time. For A ⊂ X, the expected





4.4.1.2 Estimating Vehicle State from PHDs
Let Dm(x) denote the “map” PHD function representing the distribu-
tion of radar reflectors in an environment, estimated as a result of mapping
with known vehicle poses. During localization, the vehicle makes a radar scan,
or a series of consecutive radar scans. A natural solution to the pose estimation
problem may be stated as the vehicle pose which maximizes the likelihood of
the observed batch of scans, given that the scan was drawn from Dm(x) [107].
This maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) has many desirable properties such
as asymptotic efficiency. However, the MLE solution is known to be sensitive
to outliers that may occur if the batch of scans was sampled from a slightly dif-
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ferent PHD, e.g., due to variations in the radar environment between mapping
and localization [70].
A more robust solution to the PHD-based pose estimation problem may
be stated as follows. Let Θ denote the vector of parameters of the rigid or non-
rigid transformation T between the vehicle’s prior belief of its pose, and its true
pose. For example, in case of a two-dimensional rigid transformation (for linear
phased-array radars), Θ = [∆x,∆y,∆φ]>, where ∆x and ∆y denote a two-
dimensional position and ∆φ denotes heading. Also, let Db(x
′) denote a local
“batch” PHD function estimated from a batch of scans during localization,
defined over x′ ∈ A ⊂ X. This PHD is represented in the coordinate system
consistent with the vehicle’s prior belief, such that x′ = TΘ(x). Estimating
the vehicle pose during localization is defined as estimating Θ such that some
distance metric between the PHDs Dm(x) and Db(x
′) is minimized.
This chapter chooses the L2 distance between Dm(x) and Df(x
′) as the
distance metric to be minimized. As compared to the MLE which minimizes
Kullback-Leibler divergence, L2 minimization trades off asymptotic efficiency
for robustness to measurement model inaccuracy [70]. The L2 distance dL2(Θ)





For rigid two-dimensional transformations, it can be shown as follows
that minimizing the L2 distance between the PHDs is equivalent to maximiza-
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Note that the first term above is fixed during optimization, while the second
term is invariant under rigid transformation. As a result, the above optimiza-






For differentiable Dm and Db, the above optimization can be solved with
gradient-based methods. However, the cross-correlation maximization prob-
lem in the urban AGV environment may have locally optimal solutions in the
vicinity of the global minimum due to repetitive structure of radar reflectors.
In applications with high integrity requirements, a search for the globally opti-
mal solution is necessary. This chapter notes that if the PHDs in (4.1) were to
be discretized in x, then the cross-correlation values can be evaluated exhaus-
tively with computationally efficient techniques. Let xpq denote the location








where b.e denotes the nearest grid point in the discretized space.
The technique developed above relies on the PHDs Dm and Db. The
next subsections detail the recipe for estimating these PHDs from the radar
observations.
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4.4.2 Estimating the map PHD from measurements
This section addresses the procedure to estimate the map PHD Dm(x)
from radar measurements. This chapter works with an occupancy grid map
(OGM) approximation to the continuous PHD function. In [51], it has been
shown that the PHD representation is a limiting case of the OGM as the grid
cell size becomes vanishingly small. Intuitively, let cpq denote the grid cell
region with center xpq, and let δcpq denote the area of this grid cell, which is
small enough such that no more than one reflector may be found in any cell.
Let ppq(O) denote the occupancy probability of cpq, and let A be defined as the
region formed by the union of all cpq whose centers xpq fall within A. Then,



















where D̄(xpq) ≡ ppq(O)δcpq can be considered to be an approximation of the PHD
D(x) for x ∈ cpq since its integral over A is equal to the expected number of
reflectors in A.
The advantage of working with an OGM approximation of the PHD is
two-fold: first, since the OGM does not attempt to model individual objects, it
is straightforward to represent arbitrarily-shaped objects, and second, in con-
trast to the “point target” measurement model assumption in standard PHD
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filtering, the OGM can straightforwardly model occlusions due to extended
objects.
At this point, the task of estimating Dm(x) has been reduced to esti-
mating the occupancy probability of each grid cell in discretized A. Each grid
cell cpq takes up one of two states: occupied (O) or free (F ). Based on the
radar measurement zk at each time k, the Bernoulli probability distribution
of such binary state cells may be recursively updated with the binary Bayes




1− ppq(O | z1:k)
(4.3)






with ppq(O) being the prior belief on the occupancy state of cpq before any
measurements are made. With these definitions, the binary Bayes filter update
is given by [153]
lkpq(O) = log
ppq(O | zk)
1− ppq(O | zk)
− l0pq(O) + lk−1pq (O) (4.4)
where ppq(O | zk) is known as the inverse sensor model: it describes the
probability of cpq being in state O, given only the latest radar scan zk.
The required occupancy probability ppq(O | z1:k) is easy to compute
from the log odds ratio in (4.3). Observe that the inverse sensor model
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ppq(O | zk), in addition to the prior occupancy belief ppq(O), completely de-
scribes the procedure for estimating the OGM from radar measurements, and
hence approximating the PHD. Adapting ppq(O | zk) to the characteristics of
the automotive radar sensors, however, is not straightforward, and is discussed
next.
4.4.3 Automotive Radar Inverse Sensor Model
This section addresses the challenge of adapting the inverse sensor
model ppq(O | zk) to the measurement characteristics of automotive radar
sensors. Fig. 4.2 shows a simplified radar scan zk of an underlying occupancy
grid. For clarity of exposition, four distinct categories of grid cells in Fig. 4.2
are defined below:
• Type A: Grid cells in the vicinity of a radar range-azimuth return.
• Type B : Grid cells along the path between the radar sensor and Type A
grid cells.
• Type C : Grid cells in the “viewshed” of the radar sensor, i.e., within the
radar field-of-view and not shadowed by another object, but not of Type
A or Type B.
• Type D : Grid cells outside the field-of-view of the radar (Type D1 ) or
shadowed by other objects closer to the radar (Type D2 ).
The inverse sensor model must choose a ppq(O | zk) value for each of these







Figure 4.2: Schematic diagram showing four types of grid cells considered in
the inverse sensor model.
notation.
4.4.3.1 Conventional Choices
Since zk provides no additional information on Type D grid cells, the
occupancy in these cells is conditionally independent of zk, that is
pD(O | zk) = p(O)
where p(O) is the prior probability of occupancy defined earlier in Sec. 4.4.1.
Grid cells of Type B and Type C may be hypothesized to have low
occupancy probability, since these grid cells were scanned by the sensor but
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no return was obtained. As a result, conventionally
pB(O | zk) ≤ p(O)
and
pC(O | zk) ≤ p(O)
Finally, grid cells of Type A may be hypothesized to have higher oc-
cupancy probability, since a return has been observed in the vicinity of these
cells. Conventionally,
pA(O | zk) ≥ p(O)
In the limit, if the OGM grid cell size is comparable to the sensor range and
angle uncertainty, or if the number of scans is large enough such that the
uncertainty is captured empirically, only the grid cells that contain the sensor
measurement may be considered to be of Type A.
4.4.3.2 Automotive Radar Sensor Characteristics
Intense clutter properties and sparsity of the automotive radar data
complicate the choice of the inverse sensor model.
Sparsity. First, sparsity of the radar scan implies that many occupied
Type A grid cells in the radar environment might be incorrectly categorized
as free Type C cells. This can be observed in Fig. 4.1. As evidenced by the
batch of scans in Fig. 4.1d, the radar environment is “dense” in that many grid
cells contain radar reflectors. However, any individual radar scan, such as the
one shown in Fig. 4.1c, suggests a much more sparse radar environment. As a
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result, a grid cell which is occupied in truth will be incorrectly categorized as
Type C in many scans, and correctly as Type A in a few scans.
The sparsity of radar returns also makes it challenging to distinguish
Type C cells from cells of Type D2. Since many occluding obstacles are not
detected in each scan, the occluded cells of Type D2 are conflated with free
cells of Type C.
In context of the inverse sensor model, as the radar scan becomes more
sparse
pC(O | zk)→ pD(O | zk)
−
where the superscript − denotes a limit approaching from below. Intuitively,
approaching pD(O | zk) implies that the measurement zk is very sparse in
comparison to the true occupancy, and thus does not provide much information
on lack of occupancy.
Clutter. Second, there is the matter of clutter. The grid cells in the
vicinity of a clutter measurement may be incorrectly categorized as Type A,
and the grid cells along the path between the radar and clutter measurement
may be incorrectly categorized as Type B.
In context of the inverse sensor model, as the radar scan becomes more
cluttered
pB(O | zk)→ pD(O | zk)
−
pA(O | zk)→ pD(O | zk)
+
where the superscript + denotes a limit approaching from above.
105
4.4.3.3 A Pessimistic Inverse Sensor Model
The results presented in Sec. 4.6 are based on a pessimistic sensor
model, such that pB(O | zk) = pC(O | zk) = pD(O | zk). This model assumes
that the radar measurements provide no information about free space in the
radar environment.
In particular, the inverse sensor model assumes
pB(O | zk) = pC(O | zk) = pD(O | zk) = p(O) = 0.1
and
pA(O | zk) = 0.2
4.4.4 Estimating the batch PHD from measurements
The procedure for generating an approximation to Db(x
′) from a batch
of radar measurements is identical to the procedure for generating Dm(x) from
mapping vehicle data, except that precise, absolute location and orientation
data is not available during localization. Instead, pose estimates from the sen-
sor fusion filter described in Sec. 4.5 are used to estimate the relative locations
and orientations of each radar scan in the batch, and the scans are transformed
into a common coordinate frame before updating the occupancy state of grid
cells.
Once the map and batch PHDs have been approximated from radar
measurements, the correlation-maximization technique developed in Sec. 4.4.1
can be applied to obtain the estimate Θ̂. This estimate is handed back to the
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sensor fusion filter as a pose offset measurement to constrain the odometric
drift during absence of other sources of absolute localization, e.g., GNSS.
4.4.5 Efficient FFT-Based Implementation
This section notes that efficient globally-optimal procedures exist for
maximizing the discretized PHD correlation as defined in (4.2), and outlines
two optimizations which further reduce the computational complexity of the
problem.
4.4.5.1 FFT-based Cross-Correlation
For two-dimensional vehicle state estimation, the cross-correlation in
(4.2) is to be maximized over the three parameters of two-dimensional rigid
transformation [∆x,∆y,∆φ]>.
For a given value of ∆φ, the cross-correlation can be maximized effi-
ciently over ∆t = [∆x,∆y]> with FFT-based cross-correlation. The size of
the discretized map and batch PHDs to be correlated, denoted P ×Q in (4.2),
is limited by the area scanned by the radar over a batch. Without loss of
generality, let P = Q = n. Due to the convolution property of the FFT, the
circular cross-correlation between n × n matrices Dm(x) and Db(TΘ(x)) can
be computed as
Dm ∗Db = F−1{F{Dm(x)} ◦ F{Db(−TΘ(x))}}
where F denotes the FFT operator and ◦ the denotes element-wise multipli-
cation operator. To compute the required linear cross-correlation, however,
107
both Dm and Db must be padded with n/2 zeros on each side along each di-
mension, leading to matrices Ďm and Ďb of size 2n × 2n. Then, the linear
cross-correlation is
Dm ? Db = F
−1{F{Ďm(x)} ◦ F{Ďb(−TΘ(x))}} (4.5)
The two FFTs and one inverse FFT (IFFT) in (4.5) each have a com-
putational complexity
k(2n)2 log (2n)2 ≈ 8kn2 log n
where k is a constant factor dependent on the FFT implementation. If the
number of rotations to be examined are m, this leads to a total complexity of
3m× 8kn2 log n = 24kmn2 log n (4.6)
One observation here is that F{Ďm(x)} for the map is independent of
∆φ, and so must only be computed once. This reduces the overall complexity
to 8k(2m+ 1)n2 log n.
4.4.5.2 Minimal Padding
Typically, the size of the map and batch PHDs to be correlated, given
by P × Q, is much larger than the translational offset search space due to
initial uncertainty in the vehicle position. In other words, the admissible
values of ∆t lie within a small fraction of the space scanned in the radar
batch. Accordingly, the optimization method only requires the linear cross-
correlation values within this admissible region. If nl denotes the size of the
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translational search space in discretized PHD coordinates, then Dm and Db
need only be padded with nl/2 zeros on each side along each dimension, leading
to matrices Ďm and Ďb of size (n+nl)× (n+nl). With minimal padding, the
overall complexity of FFT-based correlation maximization now reduces to
2k(2m+ 1)(n+ nl)
2 log (n+ nl) ≈ 2k(2m+ 1)n2 log n
where the approximation holds if nl  n.
4.4.5.3 The FFT Rotation Theorem
Observe from (4.5) that the method re-computes the FFT after every
rotation of the PHD Db. The FFT rotation theorem [127] states that a co-
ordinate rotation in the spatial domain leads to the same coordinate rotation
in the frequency domain, that is, if R∆φ represents the rotation matrix which
operates on the PHD, then
F{R∆φ ·Db(x)} = R∆φ · F{Db(x)}
This implies that instead of performing m FFTs on rotated replicas of Db, a
single FFT may be performed followed by m coordinate rotations. It must be
noted that rotation of F{Db(x)} could involve interpolation of values to non-
integer indices, which may offset the computational advantage of this method.
Experiments conducted as part of this paper suggest that nearest-neighbor
interpolation, i.e., assigning value from the nearest integer index (complexity
O(n2)), has no discernible adverse effect on the performance of the algorithm.
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With application of the FFT rotation theorem, the overall complexity
is reduced to
2k(m+ 2)(n+ nl)
2 log (n+ nl) +m(n+ nl)
2 ≈ 2kmn2 log n
which is a factor of 12 faster than the basic implementation in (4.6).
Algorithm 1 provides the pseudocode for the optimized FFT-based cor-
relation maximization algorithm. For each epoch, the algorithm is provided
the prior map point cloud in the true world frame, denoted pWm and a batch
of k radar scans in the body frame, denoted pBb,1:k. An initial guess for vehicle
position and heading trajectories tV1:k and φ
V
1:k is provided in a frame V which
is offset from the W frame by a rigid two-dimensional transform parameter-
ized by Θ = [∆x,∆y,∆φ]>. The initial guess uncertainties σt and σφ, and the
desired discretization steps δt and δφ are also provided. The algorithm must
estimate the offset transformation Θ̂ between W and V .
The toOGM routine converts the provided point cloud to an occupancy
grid with the desired grid cell size, according to the procedure described in
Sec. 4.4.2. The pad routine pads the provided array with the desired number
of zeros along each dimension on both ends. The three-dimensional matrix R
holds the linear cross-correlation outputs.
4.5 State Estimation with Sensor Fusion
Thus far, Sec. 4.4 has developed the theory and implementation of the
radar batch correlation measurement, which provides an estimate Θ̂ of the
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Algorithm 1: fastGlobalAlign






1:k, σt, σφ, δt, δφ
Output: Θ̂
1 Dm = toOGM
(
pWm − tVk , δt
)
2 D̃m = FFT2(pad(Dm, 3σt))







4 Db = toOGM
(
pVb,1:k − tVk , δt
)
5 D̃b = FFT2(pad(Db, 3σt))
6 n = 3σt/δt
7 m = 3σφ/δφ
8 for i = -m:m do
9 ∆φ = iδφ










[−n : n,−n : n]
12 end






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3-DoF (degrees-of-freedom) pose offset relative to the prior map. This section
details a localization pipeline that incorporates the batch measurement update
along with an array of other automotive all-weather sensing modalities to track
the full 6-DoF vehicle pose trajectory. The high-rate pose estimates from this
pipeline are also used to spatially organize individual scans to form the batch
of radar scans used in the batch correlation update.
The choice of sensors available for all-weather localization is limited to
radio-frequency sensors such as GNSS and automotive radars, and to propri-
oceptive sensors such as IMUs and wheel encoders. Any additional domain
knowledge, such as properties of ground vehicle dynamics, may also be com-
bined with these sensor measurements.
The localization pipeline in this chapter is developed around a low-cost
MEMS (micro electro-mechanical system) IMU. Fig. 4.3 shows a block dia-
gram of the overall pipeline. The error-state multiplicative extended Kalman
filter (M-EKF) makes use of cm-accurate CDGNSS position measurements
whenever such measurements are available, e.g., in clear-sky GNSS environ-
ments. Radial velocity and bearing measurements from low-cost automotive
radars are combined with nearly-zero sideslip and vertical speed constraints
of a ground vehicle to continually track and limit the errors in inertial naviga-
tion. Smoothed batches of radar scans are correlated with a prior map to limit
odometric position drift during CDGNSS outages. The following subsections
outline the formulation of the estimator, the nonlinear state dynamics, the







Figure 4.4: The University of Texas Sensorium is an integrated platform for au-
tomated and connected vehicle perception research. It includes three automo-
tive radar units, one electronically-scanning radar (ESR) and two short-range
radars (SRR2s); stereo visible light cameras; automotive- and industrial-grade
IMUs; a dual-antenna, multi-frequency software-defined GNSS receiver; and
an internal computer. An iXblue ATLANS-C CDGNSS-disciplined inertial
navigation system (not shown) is mounted at the rear of the platform to pro-
vide the ground truth trajectory. The vehicle frame v is located approximately
at the center of the line connecting the rear axles.
4.5.1 Sensor Platform & Coordinate Frames
To facilitate the discussion on measurement models and calibration,
the sensor-instrumented vehicle and a few related coordinate frames are intro-
duced here. An integrated perception platform called the Sensorium, shown
schematically in Fig. 4.4, brings together the various low-cost automotive sen-
sors considered in this chapter. Many of these sensors provide measurements
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in their respective local frames, leading to a number of different coordinate
frames that must be considered.
The IMU body frame, denoted b, is the frame defined by the IMU’s
accelerometer triad.
The navigation frame, denoted n, is a local geographical reference
frame, e.g., an ENU frame centered at an arbitrary nearby location with the
x-axis pointing towards local east, the y-axis pointing towards local north,
and the z-axis completing the right-handed coordinate system. The estimator
wishes to track the pose trajectory of b with respect to n.
The radar frames, denoted ri for the ith radar, are local frames in which
the radar sensors report range, range rate, and bearing to a number of targets.
The vehicle frame, denoted v, is characterized by the direction in which
the vehicle travels when the commanded steering angle is zero. This direction
defines the y-axis of v, as shown in Fig. 4.4. The origin of v is located at the
center of rotation of the vehicle.
The Sensorium frame, denoted s, is defined by the physical structure
of the Sensorium. It is essentially a convenience reference frame in which the
nominal lever arm and orientation between different sensors are available per
the mechanical specifications of the Sensorium. The origin of s is arbitrarily
chosen to be co-located with one of the GNSS antennas.
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4.5.2 Error-State Filtering














where pnk is the vector from n to b at time k expressed in n, v
n
k is the velocity
of b relative to n at time k expressed in the n frame, qnbk is the quaternion that
rotates a vector from b to n at time k, and bba,k and b
b
ω,k are the accelerometer
and gyroscope biases of the IMU at time k, expressed in b.
Note that the vehicle orientation only has three effective degrees-of-
freedom since qnbk is constrained to be a unit quaternion. Enforcing such a
constraint may result in a singular covariance matrix. This issue is typically














and an error-state vector δxk, related by the generalized addition operator ⊕
as follows:
xk = xnom,k ⊕ δxk
where the error-state vector δxk is the minimal 15-element state representation














The ⊕ operator corresponds to usual vector addition for the position,










where expq denotes the exponential map from so(3) to SO(3) [74], represented
as a quaternion, and  denotes quaternion multiplication. Note that ηnk is
parametrized as an orientation deviation in n. A similar formulation may be
derived with the orientation deviation expressed in b [145].
The nonlinear error-state is tracked with an error-state EKF. Owing
to the multiplicative orientation dynamics and update, this filter is sometimes
referred to as the multiplicative-EKF [43].
4.5.3 State Dynamics
Inertial measurements, collectively denoted uk, are interpreted as con-
trol inputs during the state propagation step. The true-state dynamics func-













































where T is the propagation duration, Rnbk is the rotation matrix representation




ω,k are the IMU specific force and angular rate measurements,
respectively, wa,k and wω,k are the IMU specific force and angular rate white
noise, respectively, gn ≈ [0, 0,−9.8 m s−2] is the acceleration due to gravity
after compensation for the centripetal force due to earth’s rotation, and ωne is
the angular rate of the earth with respect to an inertial frame. The accelerom-
eter and gyroscope biases are modeled as random walk processes driven by
white noise wbba,k and w
b
bω ,k
, respectively, whose variances are derived from
the IMU bias instability parameters [168].









































The error-state dynamics function ferr,k(δxk,uk,wk), is straightfor-
wardly defined as
ferr,k , fk 	 fnom,k
where	 denotes a generalized subtraction operator similar to⊕ defined earlier.
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The linearized covariance propagation step of the EKF requires com-













This involves calculus of rotations. The interested reader is referred
to [74, 145] for further details. The nontrivial sub-blocks of Fk and Gk are
documented in Appendix A.1.
4.5.4 Measurement Models & Calibration
This section details the measurement models for the various measure-
ments applied to the error-state EKF, along with the calibration procedures
necessary for the application of these measurements.
4.5.4.1 Inertial Measurements
IMUs measure the specific force and angular rate experienced by b
relative to an inertial frame. If the centripetal force due to earth’s rotation is
absorbed in gn, then the accelerometer and gyroscope measurements zba,k and

















where ank is the true acceleration of the IMU in the n frame, which double-
integrates to position deviation, and ωbk is the true angular rate of the IMU in
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the n frame, which integrates to orientation deviation. For low-quality IMUs,
accelerometer and gyroscope scale factors may also need to be modeled. For
the MEMS IMU used in this work, it was observed that modeling the scale
factors did not yield any performance benefit.
The stochastic models for IMU white noise and random walk process
are derived from the IMU specifications. In addition to such intrinsic cali-
bration, extrinsic calibration of the IMU with respect to s is necessary for
the application of other measurements expressed in s. The vector pssb from
s to b is taken to be known from the mechanical specification since this is
not strongly observable from the available measurements. It is, however, im-
portant to estimate any deviations from the mechanically specified orientation
q̄sb between b and s, since even sub-degree errors in the IMU orientation rel-
ative to s may lead to substantial errors when multiplied with the lever arm
to another sensor.
The orientation deviation of q̄sb from truth, denoted ηssb, can be ef-
fectively estimated when CDGNSS measurements from multiple antennas are
available to the EKF, as will be discussed in Sec. 4.5.4.2. Accordingly, the
state vector δxk is augmented with η
s
sb during clear-sky periods. It must be
noted, however, that since the IMU is mounted near the line connecting the
Sensorium’s two GNSS antennas, only two of the three elements in ηssb are
strongly observable. Any orientation deviation about the vector joining the
two antennas is poorly unobservable, and must be constrained by construction.
Also note that estimation of ηssb only need be performed once as long as all
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sensors are rigidly mounted, and may not even be necessary if the mechanical
tolerances are acceptably small.
4.5.4.2 CDGNSS Measurements
CDGNSS offers cm-accurate position measurements under all weather
conditions, but typically offers reduced solution availability in deep urban en-
vironments. This chapter takes the approach of incorporating CDGNSS mea-
surements in the localization engine whenever they are available, while being
capable of maintaining the required lane-level accuracy over long CDGNSS
outages in deep urban canyons. In essence, the approach developed in this
chapter leverages CDGNSS for periodic or one-time intrinsic and extrinsic cal-
ibration of other on-board sensors, and relies on these sensors for accurate
localization when CDGNSS is unavailable.
Signals captured from the two GNSS antennas on the Sensorium are
processed together with those from a nearby reference station to provide
nearly-independent three-dimensional position measurements of the antennas







bspsbai + eai,k (4.9)
where eai,k is the CDGNSS measurement noise. The vector p
s
bai
from b to the
antenna ai, expressed in s, is available from the mechanical specification. As
discussed above, Rbs may be taken to be the same as R̄bs from the mechanical
specification, or may be further calibrated by augmenting the state with ηssb.
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Additionally, the error-state EKF requires the Jacobian of the measure-















The nontrivial sub-blocks of Hai,k are documented in Appendix A.1.
4.5.4.3 Radar Range Rate & Bearing Measurements
The range rate and bearing measurements from automotive radars pro-
vide a valuable velocity constraint for inertial navigation. Importantly, the fre-
quency modulated continuous wave (FMCW) signal used in automotive radars
provides instantaneous range rate measurements to the detected targets, i.e.,
target tracking and/or matching across cluttered radar scans is not necessary
to obtain and apply this measurement.
The relative velocity of a stationary target with respect to ri is given
by the negative of the velocity with respect to n of the ith radar, expressed in
ri, written −vriri,k, as shown in Fig. 4.5. Assuming that the radar only detects
targets in the two-dimensional plane of the linear phased array, the range rate
measurement is modeled as
ṙij,k =
 sin θij,k− cos θij,k
0
>RrisRsb(Rbnk vnk + (ωbk ×Rbspsbri)) (4.10)
where the vector psbri and the radar orientation R
ris may be taken from the
mechanical specifications. Note that unlike typical measurement models where











Figure 4.5: A visual description of the radar range rate measurement model.
Quantities labeled in green are measured by the radar. The relative velocity
of a stationary target with respect to ri is the negative of the velocity with
respect to n of the ith radar, expressed in ri, written −vriri,k. The measured
radial velocity ṙij of the jth stationary target is the projection of −vriri,k onto
the line-of-sight direction between the ith radar and the jth target.
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Figure 4.6: Example results of the RANSAC operation on radar range rate
and bearing measurements. The two yellow sinusoidal curves represent the
RANSAC-predicted radial velocities for the port and starboard radars from
Fig. 4.4 as a function of the bearing. With a threshold of 0.2 m s−1, RANSAC
considers violet dots as inliers and magenta dots as outliers. Note that the
radial velocity magnitude is maximized at −30° and 30° for the port and
starboard radars, respectively, in agreement with the mounting angles of these
radars on the vehicle.
being estimated, 4.10 has measured quantities θij,k on the right-hand side of
the equation. This implies that any errors in the bearing measurements will
not be accounted for if the range rate measurements are modeled in the EKF
as shown.
The application of range rate constraints comes with two major chal-
lenges. First, individual radar scans contain a number of spurious targets
as discussed in Sec. 4.2. Second, automotive phased-array radars exhibit poor
bearing resolution and accuracy, and this is further exacerbated by the unusual
range rate measurement model described above. Both of these challenges are
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addressed by pre-processing the range rate and bearing measurements with a
RANSAC (random sample consensus) routine that estimates a best-fit two-
dimensional radar velocity model to the radar measurements. In particular,
with N detected targets, the RANSAC operation finds a robust solution to
the following system of equations: ṙi0...
ṙiN
 =
 sin θi0 − cos θi0... ...





while eliminating the (ṙij, θij) pairs that may be outliers. Example results from
the RANSAC procedure are shown in Fig. 4.6. Ultimately, the solution to




















where the subscript [0, 1] denotes the first two elements of the three-element
vector. Parts of the Jacobian of this measurement model with respect to the
EKF error-state are documented in Appendix A.1.
4.5.4.4 Ground Vehicle Dynamics Constraints
Under nominal driving conditions, a ground vehicle respects dynamical
constraints which can be leveraged as measurements to the EKF. This chap-
ter incorporates near-zero sideslip and vertical velocity constraints, commonly
referred to as nonholonomic constraints (NHC), as well as zero-speed updates
(ZUPT). The measurement models for these constraints are described below.
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Nonholonomic Constraints (NHC) The application of NHC is based on
the following assumptions:
[T1] There exists a fixed center of rotation, taken to be the origin of v, about
which the vehicle rotates when a steering control input is applied.
[T2] When a zero steering input is applied, the vehicle only moves in the vy
direction. This holds by definition of v.
[T3] The vehicle does not slip sideways or leave the surface of the road.
When the above assumptions hold, it follows that the velocity of the
vehicle, when expressed in v, is zero in the vx and vz directions at all times. In
practice, however, these assumptions only hold approximately. Accordingly,
the zero sideslip and vertical velocity constraints are applied as soft constraints
in the form of measurements with an associated measurement error covariance.






















vs are parts of the extrinsic calibration between v
and s. Precise manual measurement of pssv and R
vs is challenging. First, it is
not obvious where the origin of v lies, though the center of line connecting the
two rear axles might be a reasonable guess. Second, it would be challenging
to measure, for example, the pitch of the Sensorium relative to the plane of
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the vehicle chassis. Accordingly, this chapter takes a data-driven approach to
extrinsic calibration of v.
Once again, the extrinsic calibration technique relies on clear-sky pe-
riods with good CDGNSS availability, such that the nominal state estimates
of vnk , q
nb
k , and b
b
ω,k are close to their true values. Furthermore, calibration
begins with coarse initial guesses of Rvs and pssv, denoted R̄
vs and p̄ssv, respec-
tively, and attempts to estimate the orientation deviation ηsvs and lever arm
deviation δpssv with respect to these. With other quantities assumed known,















This model is nonlinear in ηsvs, and may be solved as a nonlinear least
squares problem, e.g., with the Gauss-Newton method. The Jacobian of hnhc,k
evaluated at ηsvs = 0 and δp
s
























where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product, subscript [(0, 2), (:)] denotes selection
of the first and third rows of a matrix, [·]× denotes the skew-symmetric cross-
product matrix corresponding to the 3-element argument, and î, ĵ, and k̂ de-
note the cardinal unit vectors. To make the system observable, measurements
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from multiple epochs must be stacked and solved as a batch. Additionally, the
nonlinear problem must be iteratively linearized and solved until convergence.
Zero-Speed Update (ZUPT) The ZUPT constraint is another valuable
measurement that limits odometric drift, especially in situations where the







k + ezupt,k (4.14)
The primary challenge of applying ZUPT is detection of epochs where
this constraint is valid. Importantly, this condition must be detected inde-
pendently from the EKF state estimate, e.g., by inspection of the raw IMU
measurements. In theory, it is not possible to make any claims about zero
speed based on acceleration and/or angular rate data, since IMU measure-
ments of a vehicle moving with a constant velocity and orientation must be
indistinguishable from those of a stationary vehicle. In practice, however, the
IMU measurements exhibit a distinct behavior when the vehicle is in motion,
e.g., due to road roughness and vehicle vibrations. Prior work has made use
of these artifacts to detect stationary periods. This chapter follows the angu-
lar rate energy method from [144] for ZUPT detection. In practice, if wheel
odometry data are available from the vehicle CAN bus, as is common in most
modern vehicles, then ZUPT detection can be performed trivially and with
high reliability.
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An observant reader might wonder why ZUPT is not applied directly to
vnk in 4.14. The advantage of applying ZUPT in v is that a tighter zero-speed
constraint can be reliably applied in the lateral and vertical directions.
4.5.5 Batch Smoothing & Update
Real-time estimates of the vehicle pose trajectory obtained from the
EKF may be used to string together individual scans and perform a radar
batch measurement update. However, since these data are processed batches,
it is desirable to perform backward smoothing over the short duration of the
batch. Backward smoothing enforces the dynamics function backwards in
time, ironing out any large jumps that may have occurred in the EKF forward
pass.
Accordingly, the batch smoother component in Fig. 4.3 stacks all in-
ertial measurements and snapshots of the estimator state over the duration
of the batch. When the batch is ready to be processed for correlation, back-
ward smoothing is enforced with the inertial measurements as control inputs.
The smoothing formulation in this case is somewhat more complicated than
usual [132] due to nonlinear backward dynamics and the error-state formu-
lation. Details on nonlinear error-state Rauch-Tung-Striebel smoothing are
provided in Appendix A.2.
The correlation peak search region is taken to be ±5 m and ±3°. The 3-
DoF pose offset Θ̂ from radar batch correlation is applied as horizontal position
and heading measurements to the EKF. Outliers from batch correlation are
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excluded in the EKF based on a χ2-test on the normalized innovation squared
(NIS) [11].
4.6 Experimental Results
The radar-inertial positioning system of Fig. 4.3 was evaluated experi-
mentally using the dataset described in [111], collected during approximately
1.5 h of driving on two separate days in and around the urban center of Austin,
TX. This section presents the evaluation results.
4.6.1 Dataset
Fig. 4.7 shows the route followed by the sensor-instrumented vehicle on
Thursday, May 9, 2019 (in blue) and Sunday, May 12, 2019 (in red). The test
route combs through every street in the Austin, TX downtown area, since such
environments are the most challenging for CDGNSS-based positioning [67]
and would benefit the most from multi-sensor all-weather positioning. The
route was driven once on a weekday and again on the weekend to evaluate
robustness of the proposed map-based approach to changes in the traffic and
parking patterns. Note that the final part of the route (the north-east segment)
was different on the two days, preventing the use of a map-based positioning
approach. This section of the test route has been omitted from the evaluation
results.
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Figure 4.7: Test route through The University of Texas west campus and
Austin downtown. These areas are the most challenging for precise GNSS-
based positioning and thus would benefit the most from radar-based position-
ing. The route was driven once on a weekday and again on the weekend to
evaluate robustness of the radar map to changes in traffic and parking pat-
terns. Red is the mapping run (May 12), blue is the localization run (May 9).









Figure 4.8: The University of Texas Sensorium is an integrated platform for au-
tomated and connected vehicle perception research. It includes three automo-
tive radar units, one electronically-scanning radar (ESR) and two short-range
radars (SRR2s); stereo visible light cameras; automotive- and industrial-grade
IMUs; a dual-antenna, multi-frequency software-defined GNSS receiver; 4G
cellular connectivity; and a powerful internal computer. An iXblue ATLANS-
C CDGNSS-disciplined INS (not shown) is mounted at the rear of the platform
to provide the ground truth trajectory.
132
4.6.1.1 Sensors
Designed for connected and automated vehicle research, the Sensorium,
shown in Fig. 4.8 is a self-contained sensor housing that can be mounted
atop any standard passenger vehicle. Two Antcom G8Ant-3A4TNB1 triple-
frequency patch antennas are flush-mounted in the cross-track direction on
the Sensorium’s upper plate, separated by just over one meter. The antennas’
signals are routed to a unified radio frequency (RF) front end whose output
intermediate frequency (IF) samples are processed in real-time (to within less
than 10 ms latency) by the Sensorium’s onboard computer. The samples are
also stored to disk for post-processing.
The Sensorium features a front-facing stereo camera rig composed of
two Basler acA2040-35gm cameras that capture synchronous stereo image pairs
when triggered by a signal tied to the GNSS front-end’s sampling clock. The
images are captured in grayscale at 10 frames per second and timestamped
by the Sensorium’s computer. The cameras are configured to automatically
adjust the exposure time based on lighting, while the focal length, focus, and
aperture are held fixed, having been adjusted physically prior to capture.
The Sensorium is also equipped with two types of automotive radars:
one Delphi electronically-scanning radar (ESR) in the middle and two Delphi
short-range radars (SRR2s) on the two sides. Both the ESR and the SRR2 are
commercially available; similar radars are available on economy-class consumer
vehicles. Fig. 4.9 shows the coverage patterns for the three radar units. The










Figure 4.9: Coverage patterns for the three Sensorium radar units. The ESR
provides simultaneous sensing in a narrow (±10°) long-range (175 m) coverage
area and a wider (±45°) medium-range (60 m) area. The SRR2 units each
have a coverage area of ±75° and 80 m. The line l1 marks the left-most extent
of the right SRR2’s field of view. Similarly, l2 marks the right-most extent of
the left SRR2’s field of view. Each SRR2 is installed facing outward from the
centerline at an angle of 30°.
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coverage area and a wider (±45°) medium-range (60 m) area. The SRR2 units
each have a coverage area of ±75° and 80 m. Each SRR2 is installed facing
outward from the center-line at an angle of 30°. The Sensorium’s onboard
computer timestamps and logs the radar returns from the three radar units.
The LORD MicroStrain 3DM-GX5-25 MEMS IMU is an industrial-
grade inertial sensor that acts as the core sensor of the localization pipeline.
The IMU provides temperature-compensated accelerometer and gyroscope read-
ings at 100 Hz.
4.6.1.2 Ground-Truth Trajectory
The ground-truth position and orientation trajectory for the data are
generated with the iXblue ATLANS-C, a high-performance CDGNSS coupled
fiber-optic gyroscope INS. The post-processed position solution obtained from
the ATLANS-C is decimeter-accurate throughout the dataset.
4.6.1.3 Dataset Splits
With a limited amount of field data available for development and
evaluation, it is critical to ensure that the proposed positioning technique
does not overfit this particular dataset. Accordingly, the data used in the
development of the algorithms were restricted to a fixed 30 min segment, where
the prior radar map was constructed with radar measurements from May 9 and
localization was performed with radar, inertial, and CDGNSS measurements
from May 12. In contrast, during evaluation the full 62 min of data were used,
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and the mapping and localization datasets were inverted, i.e., the prior map
was constructed with radar measurements from May 12, and localization was
performed with all sensor data from May 9. The algorithms have not been
modified to maximize the performance over the evaluation dataset.
4.6.2 Prior Radar Mapping
The first step to radar-map-based localization is the generation of a
radar map point cloud. Radar scans collected from the May 12, 2019 drive
were aggregated to create a map with the benefit of the ATLANS-C ground-
truth trajectory. In a practical system, the radar map may be generated during
favorable conditions for optical sensors such as cameras and lidar, such that
the mapping vehicle can accurately track its pose. Additionally, the mapping
process may be crowed-sourced from consumer vehicles [112, 113]. The map
point cloud is stored in a k-d tree for efficient querying during localization.
Two implementation notes are in order here. First, automotive radar
clutter is especially intense when the vehicle is stationary. Accordingly, radar
range measurements obtained when the vehicle was moving slower than 1 m s−1
were discarded for both mapping and localization. This implies that radar
correlation measurements were only available during periods when the vehicle
was moving faster than 1 m s−1. Second, it was observed that radar returns
far from the vehicle are mostly clutter and have negligible resemblance to
the surrounding structure. Radar returns with range larger than 50 m were
discarded for both the map and batch PHDs. It is noted that these two
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parameters have not been optimized to produce the smallest estimation errors;
instead they have been fixed based on visual inspection.
4.6.3 Offline Calibration
Extrinsic calibration among the IMU frame b, the Sensorium frame
s, and the vehicle frame v was performed offline with 125 s of sensor data
with CDGNSS availability. While it is possible to estimate the calibration
parameters online, it may not be desirable to do so if these parameters are not
expected to change over time.
The orientation deviation ηssb between the IMU body frame and the
Sensorium frame was calibrated for the localization dataset, as described in
Sec. 4.5.4.1. With two GNSS antennas, only two out of the three DoFs in
ηssb are observable. Accordingly, the orientation deviation around bx, which is
mostly unobservable, was tightly constrained to the initial guess of zero. The
deviations around by and bz rapidly converged to sub-degree offsets from the
mechanical specification.
Extrinsic calibration between v and s was similarly estimated over the
125 s period as detailed in Sec. 4.5.4.4.
The commercial automotive radars on the Sensorium do not offer any
mechanism to synchronize their scans with an external reference clock. Anal-
ysis of the radar range rate residuals in the EKF showed clear evidence of
latency between the data logging timestamp and the true scan times. Accord-
ingly, radar latency calibration was performed offline with a best fit approach.
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4.6.4 Implementation Notes
A few implementation- and dataset-specific notes relating to the local-
ization pipeline are documented below.
CDGNSS Measurements & Outages The CDGNSS position measure-
ments used in this evaluation are in fact the output of the post-processed
ground-truth system, i.e., these measurements have not been obtained from
an unaided CDGNSS receiver. While this is not ideal for realistic evaluation,
the evaluation results presented herein do not mislead because, first, CDGNSS
measurements are only applied for a 125 s period for initial calibration, and
second, any commercial CDGNSS receiver would be able to generate simi-
lar cm-accurate position solutions in the clear-sky region where the CDGNSS
measurements were applied.
Measurement Noise Correlation Observations from the field data re-
vealed that the measurement noise in the radar range rate measurements is not
independent between consecutive radar scans. This is problematic since the
EKF applied assumes each measurement to have errors that are uncorrelated
in time. Accordingly, the radar range rate measurements were decimated to
1 Hz such that the measurements were spaced out by roughly the decorrelation
time of the measurement noise. A more principled approach to this problem is
to augment the state vector with states to pre-whiten the measurements. But
this approach was empirically observed to not outperform the straightforward
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Table 4.1: Tuning parameters involved in the radar-inertial localization
pipeline
Minimum speed for valid radar range 1 m s−1
Maximum valid radar range 50 m
Minimum RANSAC inliers 10
Minimum fraction of RANSAC inliers 0.65
vriri,x (broadside) standard deviation 0.2 m s
−1
vriri,y (boresight) standard deviation 0.1 m s
−1
vvnhc,x (lateral) standard deviation 0.1 m s
−1
vvnhc,z (vertical) standard deviation 0.2 m s
−1
measurement decimation, while introducing additional complexity and tuning
parameters.
Similarly, the NHC and ZUPT measurements can in theory be applied
at every applicable IMU epoch. But to prevent correlated errors in these
constraints (e.g., due to sideslip experienced while cornering) from making the
EKF inconsistent, they are only applied at 1 Hz.
Filter Tuning Parameters The process noise covariance used in the EKF is
derived from the IMU datasheet parameters [88,168]. The measurement noise
covariance associated with CDGNSS measurements is available directly from
the ATLANS-C receiver. A few other measurement noise standard deviations
and tuning parameters are documented in Table 4.1.
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4.6.5 Localization Results with Perfect Odometry
This section evaluates the localization performance of the proposed
method on the May 12, 2019 radar data for the (hypothetical) case in which
odometric drift over the radar batch-of-scans interval is negligible. With de-
creasing quality of the odometry sensor(s), this assumption holds only over
ever shorter batch intervals. Therefore, the performance of the algorithm is
evaluated for a range of batch lengths.
4.6.5.1 Test procedure
A drift-free vehicle trajectory over a batch-of-scans interval is generated
with the reference solution from the iXblue ATLANS-C. This trajectory is
then artificially offset by a two-dimensional rigid transformation error. The
translational error is distributed such that ∆t ∼ N(0, σ2t I) with σt = 2 m,
and the rotational error is distributed such that ∆φ ∼ N(0, σ2φ) with σφ = 3°.
The proposed localization technique takes the erroneously-offset position and
heading trajectory as the initial guess of the vehicle state.
The prior radar map point cloud in the vicinity of the initial guess of
the vehicle position is retrieved with a query to the k-d tree. Additionally, the
batch of body-frame radar returns is transformed to a common reference frame
based on the erroneous trajectory. The goal is to align the two point clouds and
thereby estimate the artificially-induced translational and rotational offset.
As a first step, the map and batch occupancy grids are generated based
on the aggregated point clouds, following the procedure described in Sec. 4.4.
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The extent of the occupancy grids is determined by the bounds of the area
scanned by the radars during localization. Given the maximum range of radar
returns considered here, the correlation region is typically restricted to ±50 m
around the provided position at the end of the batch. With a grid cell size of
10 cm, the occupancy grid size in discrete coordinates is typically on the order
of n = 1000. The translation search space is limited to ±3σt = ± 6 m, resulting
in nl = 120. Similarly, the rotation search space is limited to ±3σφ = ± 9°
with 1° steps, resulting in m = 18.
4.6.5.2 Drift-Free 5 s Batches
This section evaluates and analyzes the proposed method for a fixed
batch length of 5 s. Before diving into the quantitative analysis, it is interest-
ing to inspect the example of a radar batch update shown in Fig. 4.10. For
ease of visualization, the batch point cloud to be localized has already been
adjusted for any translational or rotational offset from the ground truth. The
occupancy grid estimated from the 5 s batch of scans is shown in Fig. 4.10b.
Similarly, Fig. 4.10a shows the occupancy grid estimated from the map point
cloud retrieved from the map database. Fig. 4.10c shows the cross-correlation
between the batch and map occupancy grids. Given that the batch is already
aligned with ground truth, one should expect the correlation peak to appear
at (0, 0) in Fig. 4.10c. The offset of the peak from (0, 0) in this case would be
the translational estimate error.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































noting. First, the correlation peak decays slower in the along-track direction—
in this case approximately aligned with the south-southwest direction. This
is a general feature observed throughout the dataset, since most of the radar
reflectors are aligned along the sides of the streets. Second, there emerge two
local correlation peaks offset by ≈4 m along the direction of travel. These local
peaks are due to the repeating periodic structure of radar reflectors in both
the map and the batch occupancy grids. In other words, shifting the batch
occupancy grid forward or backward along the vehicle trajectory by ≈4 m
aligns the periodically-repeating reflectors in an off-by-one manner, leading
to another plausible solution. Importantly, the uncertainty envelope of the
initial position estimate can span several meters, encompassing both the global
optimum and one or more local optima. This explains why gradient-based
methods, which seek the nearest optimum, are poorly suited for use in the
urban automotive radar environment.
The complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDF), i.e., the
fraction of epochs exceeding any given level of error, of the horizontal position
and heading error magnitudes are plotted on a log scale in Fig. 4.11 for drift-
free (hypothetical) 5 s batches. In 95% of epochs, the horizontal position error
magnitude was no greater than 44 cm, and the heading error magnitude was
no greater than 0.59°.
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Figure 4.11: The complementary cumulative distribution (also known as a sur-
vival function) indicates how often (that is, in what fraction of 5 s epochs) the
localization procedure in the text was found to exceed a given level of error.
The logarithmic vertical scale makes the tails of the distribution, corresponding
to outliers that may cause tracking errors, more visible. For drift-free (hypo-
thetical) 5 s batches, the 95-percentile horizontal positioning error is observed
to be 44 cm and the 95-percentile heading error is observed to be 0.59°.
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Figure 4.12: CCDFs for different drift-free batch lengths between 1 s and 8 s.
The 50-percentile errors are similar for shorter and longer batch lengths, but
the difference becomes more noticeable at higher percentiles.
4.6.5.3 Sensitivity to Batch Length
The assumption of negligible odometric drift over the batch-of-scans
interval does not hold over 5 s for low-cost odometry sensors, but may hold for
longer than 5 s for high-performance sensors. Thus, is important to evaluate
the proposed localization technique’s sensitivity to batch length.
Fig. 4.12 shows the CCDF for different drift-free batch lengths between
1 s and 8 s. As expected, the errors are smaller for longer batch lengths. It
is interesting to note that the 50-percentile errors are similar for different
batch lengths, but difference between the CCDFs becomes more pronounced at
higher percentiles. This indicates that the shorter batch lengths are adequate
in most cases, but the longer batches help contain the estimation error in a few
cases. Such behavior must be taken into account in the integrity analysis of
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the system. For example, while all batch lengths exhibit similar 50-percentile
error behavior, batches shorter than 4 s cannot be used in applications with a
50 cm alert limit and integrity risk smaller than 0.05 per batch. On the other
hand, in applications where 50-percentile error is the performance metric, it
may be desirable to choose batches shorter than 4 s to relax the requirements
on short term odometric performance.
4.6.6 Localization Results with Odometric Sensors
This section removes the assumption of perfect drift-free odometry and
presents empirical error statistics obtained from field evaluation of the system
in 4.3. The test scenario evaluated in this section is an extreme one: the vehicle
starts off in a clear-sky environment with 125 s of CDGNSS availability, and
subsequently all CDGNSS measurements are cut off for the next 3600 s of
driving, during which the system must rely on radar and inertial sensing along
with vehicle dynamical constraints to maintain an accurate estimate of its
pose.
4.6.6.1 Performance with 4 s Radar Batches
Fig. 4.13 shows the east and north position error time histories from the
test scenario described above. For the results presented in Fig. 4.13 and 4.14,
a 4 s radar batch duration is chosen. In the first 125 s of clear-sky conditions
with CDGNSS availability, the east and north position errors with respect























Figure 4.13: East and north position error time histories from field evaluation.
In the first 125 s of clear-sky conditions with CDGNSS availability, the east
and north position errors with respect to the ground truth are sub-decimeter,
as expected. Over the subsequent 60 min of driving in and around the urban
center of the city, the proposed method maintains sub-35-cm (95%) horizontal
position errors. The horizontal position estimation errors are consistent with
the predicted standard deviation from the EKF.
60 min of driving in and around the urban center of the city, the proposed
method maintains sub-35-cm horizontal position errors (95%). The horizontal
position estimation errors are consistent with the predicted standard deviation
from the EKF. This is a remarkable result which shows that, given a prior
radar map, lane-level-accurate horizontal positioning is achievable under zero-
visibility GNSS-denied conditions with the types of sensors that are already
available on commercial vehicles. Vertical position errors are not shown in
Fig. 4.13 since these are not constrained by the two-dimensional radar batch
correlation update. For ground vehicle applications, a digital elevation map































Figure 4.14: Vehicle orientation estimation errors from field evaluation. The
proposed technique maintains vehicle heading estimates to within 0.5° of the
ground truth throughout most of the dataset, and the errors are consistent
with the predicted uncertainty. Roll and pitch estimation errors are smaller
and stay within 0.2° of the ground truth.
Vehicle orientation estimation errors for the same scenario are shown
in Fig. 4.14. Heading estimation error, shown in the bottom panel, is most
important for ground vehicle applications. The proposed technique maintains
vehicle heading estimates to within 0.5° of the ground truth throughout most
of the dataset, and the errors are consistent with the predicted uncertainty.
Heading error appears to be biased for a 600 s period beginning at 2500 s, but
it must be noted that this is only a single realization of a random process
with long time constants due to infrequent attitude changes. Roll and pitch
estimation errors are smaller and stay within 0.2° of the ground truth. Better
estimation of roll and pitch is expected since these are directly observable with
the accelerometer measurements. The same phenomenon explains the substan-
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tially shorter decorrelation times for roll and pitch errors as compared to the
heading error. Finally, it is noted that the EKF is mildly inconsistent in re-
gards to roll and pitch estimation errors. This suggests that the accelerometer
white noise and bias stability characteristics claimed in the IMU datasheet [88]
may be optimistic in field application.
4.6.6.2 Choosing a Radar Batch Length
The problem of choosing the duration of a radar batch during localiza-
tion presents an interesting trade-off. On the one hand, longer batch durations
are preferable because, as shown in Fig. 4.12, cross-correlation using a larger
patch of the radar environment is more likely to produce a strong and unam-
biguous correlation peak. As mentioned earlier, the 50th percentile horizontal
position errors are similar for different batch lengths. The difference between
the CCDFs becomes more pronounced at higher percentiles, implying that
errors for shorter batch lengths have heavy tails. Recall that in the overall
localization pipeline of Fig. 4.3, these errors will act as measurement errors
in Θ̂. An EKF models measurement errors to be Gaussian, which is not a
good model for heavy-tailed distributions. Accordingly, longer batch dura-
tions would appear preferable.
On the other hand, longer batches have several disadvantages. First,
longer durations between batch measurement updates leads to larger odometric
drift between updates, as well as poorer reconstruction of the radar batch
itself. Second, some of the worst outliers due to shorter batch lengths may
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Figure 4.15: End-to-end effect of different batch lengths on horizontal posi-
tioning performance. Other than the longest batch length of 8 s, most batch
lengths appear to perform similarly well, with 95th-percentile horizontal posi-
tion errors near 30 cm.
be rejected in the EKF based on the χ2 NIS test, thus blunting the relative
advantage of longer batches. Shorter batch lengths allow for a larger number
of measurement updates to be performed per unit time, even if a few of those
measurements may have to be rejected as outliers.
Fig. 4.15 reveals the end-to-end effect of different batch lengths. For
a given batch length, its measurement error standard deviation was obtained
from the corresponding CCDF in Fig. 4.12, i.e., the Θ̂ measurement standard
deviation is smaller for longer batches. Interestingly, other than the longest
batch length of 8 s, most batch lengths appear to perform similarly well, with
95-percentile horizontal position errors near 30 cm. Given the heavy-tailed na-
ture of measurement noise distributions when working with very short batches




A robust pipeline for all-weather sub-50-cm urban ground vehicle po-
sitioning has been proposed and evaluated. The positioning engine is based
on commercially-available low-cost automotive radars, MEMS IMU, ground
vehicle dynamics constraints, and, when available, precise GNSS measure-
ments. Remarkably, it has been shown that given a prior radar map, lane-
level-accurate horizontal positioning is achievable under zero-visibility GNSS-
denied conditions with the types of sensors that are already available on com-
mercial vehicles. In comparison with a post-processed ground truth trajectory,
it was shown that during 60 min of GNSS-denied driving in the urban center
of Austin, TX, the proposed pipeline has 95th-percentile errors of 35 cm in
horizontal position and 0.5° in heading. This is a significant development in
the field of AGV localization, which has traditionally been based on sensors
such as lidar and cameras that perform poorly in bad weather conditions.
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Chapter 5
Accuracy Limits for Collaborative
Globally-Referenced Digital Mapping with
Standard GNSS
5.1 Abstract
Exchange of location and sensor data among connected and automated
vehicles will demand accurate global referencing of the digital maps currently
being developed to aid positioning for automated driving. This chapter ex-
plores the limit of such maps’ globally-referenced position accuracy when the
mapping agents are equipped with low-cost GNSS receivers performing stan-
dard code-phase-based navigation. The key accuracy-limiting factor is shown
to be the asymptotic average of the error sources that impair standard GNSS
positioning. Asymptotic statistics of each GNSS error source are analyzed
through both simulation and empirical data to show that sub-50-cm accurate
digital mapping is feasible in the horizontal plane after multiple mapping ses-
This chapter is based on: Lakshay Narula, J. Michael Wooten, Matthew J. Murrian,
Daniel M. LaChapelle, and Todd E. Humphreys. Accurate collaborative globally-referenced
digital mapping with standard GNSS. Sensors, 18(8), 2018.
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sions with standard GNSS, but larger biases persist in the vertical direction.
5.2 Introduction
Localization is one of the primary operations that connected and auto-
mated vehicles must perform, both to navigate from one location to another
and to interact with each other and with their surroundings within a mapped
environment. Satellite-based navigation sensors have historically been the un-
rivalled sensor of choice for navigating from source to destination. However,
the high-reliability sub-50-cm precision demanded by automated vehicles for
lane-keeping and other applications, especially in urban areas, has significantly
changed this landscape [169]. In most automated vehicles being developed,
the GPS/GNSS receiver is relegated to a secondary sensor whose role is to
loosely constrain (within a few meters) the primary localization sensors, usu-
ally camera(s) and/or lidar, to a global reference frame when building a digital
map. The vehicles then locate themselves to decimeter accuracy within this
digital map.
Automated driving does not necessarily demand sub-50-cm agreement
between the coordinates of a given point in the digital map and the coor-
dinates of the same point in a well-defined global reference frame. Rather,
local self-consistency and accurate localization within the digital map is of
greater importance. However, consistency of the digital map with a global
coordinate frame is likely to become a pre-requisite for cooperative automated
driving. If all collaborating vehicles navigate within the same digital map,
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then precise exchange of information such as vehicle position, velocity, intent,
etc. is possible [82, 83], even if the map itself is only globally accurate to a
few meters. However, it is unlikely that automated vehicles from different
manufacturers will rely on a common digital map. Consequently, the accuracy
of the exchanged vehicle position is lower-bounded by the disagreement on
the coordinates of the same physical location between different maps. Thus,
exchange of accurate vehicle pose among vehicles, as well as other associated
high-level information such as sensor data in the vehicle’s body frame, will
demand consistency among, or translation between, different digital maps.
Standard code-phase-based GNSS position measurements, such as those
provided by all mass-market GNSS receivers, may be biased by as much as 3–5
meters on any given mapping session. Maps anchored by these measurements
may not exhibit lane-level consistency with each other. One possible solution
is to create digital maps with decimeter-accurate CDGNSS systems [64]. How-
ever, at current prices, such systems can only be installed on a limited fleet of
specialized mapping vehicles. Precise point positioning (PPP) techniques offer
a low-cost alternative to CDGNSS, but the frequent cycle-slipping experienced
in urban areas impedes the convergence of PPP techniques [68].
This chapter explores the accuracy limit of globally-referenced mapping
involving collaborating consumer vehicles whose sense of global position is
based on standard code-phase-based GNSS receivers. Key parameters in this
exploration are the asymptotic averages of the error sources that impair code-
phase-based GNSS positioning: receiver thermal noise, satellite clock and orbit
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errors, ionospheric and tropospheric modeling errors, and multipath. One
or more vehicles navigating through a digital map over time make multiple
time-separated GNSS measurements of the same location. If these vehicles
collaboratively update the map over multiple sessions, then the GNSS errors
are averaged across all sessions with appropriate weighting.
Are the GNSS errors at every map location—including deep urban
locations—asymptotically zero-mean, or, on the contrary, do location-dependent
biases persist in averages of time-separated standard GNSS measurements?
Such is the question this chapter seeks to address.
5.3 Related Work
Improving the accuracy of maps by averaging GPS/GNSS tracks has
been explored previously using a variety of approaches. An early effort, de-
tailed in [128], proposed the precise determination of lane centerlines by clus-
tering and averaging the GNSS tracks of probe vehicles. The accuracy of
the estimated centerline was assessed in terms of the spread of GNSS tracks,
assuming, without analysis, that the error was zero-mean at every location.
More recently, [73] proposed vehicle lane determination via PPP on a rural
road under open-sky conditions. The current chapter aims to perform local-
ization at a similar accuracy level, but in urban and suburban areas and with
the aid of a digital mapping sensor.
Minimizing the difference between GNSS measurements and the as-
signed map coordinates of locations visited multiple times by probe vehicles
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has been a common feature of the seminal works on map-based precise local-
ization in urban environments for automated driving [82, 83], but no analysis
of the accuracy of the resulting map in the global coordinate system was pro-
vided.
The effect of multipath on measured pseudoranges was studied exten-
sively for various signal types in [40]. However, this study was done under
open-sky conditions with a static survey-grade antenna, hardly representative
of a mass-market receiver in an urban environment. A detailed study on the
distribution of code-phase and Doppler offsets of the multipath components
from individual satellites in a dynamic urban setting was carried out in [170].
However, the error was characterized as the combined distribution of code
phase delays over the entire duration of the run, which marginalizes over the
temporally- and physically-local biases. On the contrary, this chapter explores
the errors in the position domain for repeated sessions through a given real-
ization of an urban corridor.
Other GNSS error sources such as errors in modeling of ionospheric [130]
and tropospheric [23] delay have been studied extensively over many decades,
and their long-term error characteristics have also been reported in the lit-
erature. However, the impact of these errors on the asymptotic statistics of
code-phase-based GNSS position estimates has not been previously presented.
To the authors’ best knowledge, despite the apparent simplicity of the
problem, no prior work has studied the long-term statistics of GNSS errors in
an urban environment representative of the conditions to be encountered by
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consumer vehicles creating digital maps.
5.4 GNSS Error Analysis
5.4.1 Low-Cost GNSS in Urban Areas
Low-cost multi-GNSS receiver manufacturers have recently announced
the development and release of low-cost multi-frequency multi-GNSS receivers
[157]. Accordingly, the analysis in this section considers a vehicular platform
equipped with a multi-frequency multi-GNSS receiver capable of tracking both
code and carrier phase of GNSS signals.
Development of an extensive dense reference network in support of
CDGNSS consumer vehicular positioning in urban areas, as suggested in [105],
could be an expensive affair. PPP is a low-cost alternative to CDGNSS that
requires only a sparse network of reference stations across the globe, but is not
considered a viable option for urban GNSS positioning in this chapter because
the constant cycle slips and outages experienced in urban areas [64] make it
difficult for PPP’s float carrier phase ambiguity estimates to converge [68], in
which case PPP degrades to code-phase positioning accuracy.
While convergence of PPP carrier-phase ambiguities may be infeasible
in urban areas, a partial PPP solution that exploits precise satellite orbits
and clocks, as well as ionospheric and tropospheric corrections, can certainly
improve the accuracy of code-phase-based GNSS position estimates. Since
connected and automated vehicles will perforce enjoy network connectivity,
this chapter assumes the availability of such GNSS corrections. Thus, the
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kind of GNSS errors assessed in this section lie between those corresponding
to the two extremes of standard standalone code-phase positioning and PPP.
This type of GNSS positioning, hereafter referred to as enhanced code-phase
positioning, exploits both code and carrier phase or frequency tracking, but,
as opposed to PPP, does not attempt to estimate a quasi-constant float carrier
phase ambiguity, making it suitable for urban applications.
5.4.2 Pseudorange Measurement
The pseudorange measurement at receiver R from satellite Si is modeled
as
ρi(tR) = hi[x(tR), Iρi(tR), Ti(tR), tR] + wρi(tR)







is the state of the receiver, comprising the receiver position, rR(tR), at the
time of the signal receipt event, tR, and the receiver clock bias, δtR(tR) =
tR − t, with respect to true time t. The nonlinear measurement model is
denoted by hi; ρi denotes the measured pseudorange to Si; c denotes the
speed of light in vacuum; δtSi(t) = tSi − t denotes the satellite clock bias
with respect to t; δtTOFi denotes the time-of-flight of the signal from Si, as
an increment in true time; Iρi and Ti denote the ionospheric and tropospheric
delay experienced by the signal from Si, respectively; wρi ∼ (µwi , σ2wi) denotes
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the sum of measurement thermal noise, multipath interference, non-line-of-
sight (NLOS) delay, and other unmodeled errors; and ∆ri denotes the true
range between R and Si, given as
∆ri = ‖rR(tR)− rSi(tR − δtR(tR)− δtTOFi)‖,
where rSi is the satellite position at the signal transmit event. Note from (5.1)
that the receiver clock bias component of the state contributes identically to
all pseudorange measurements.
Taking nz pseudorange measurements {ρi}nzi=1 and predictions Īρi and
T̄i for each measurement, R estimates its state by solving a nonlinear least
squares problem based on (5.1). First, it linearizes the measurement model













(x− x̄) + Ĩρi + T̃i + wρi ,
with Ĩρi = Iρi − Īρi and T̃i = Ti − T̄i. Representing all nz measurements in
matrix form yields ρ1...
ρnz
 =
 h1(x̄, Īρ1 , T̄1, tR)...















ρ = h(x̄, Ī, T̄ , tR) +H(x− x̄) + Ĩ + T̃ +w. (5.2)
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Rearranging measured and modeled quantities on the left-hand side to
get the standard form for a linearized measurement model yields
z , ρ− h(x̄, Ī, T̄ , tR) +Hx̄ = Hx+ Ĩ + T̃ +w. (5.3)
The ith row of the measurement sensitivity matrix H is
Hi ≈
[





By solving (5.3) for x, updating x̄, and iterating until convergence, R







For dynamic applications such as vehicle tracking, the state x(tR) is
typically augmented to include the time derivatives of rR(tR) and tR(tR), and
the measurement model typically assumes direct measurement of apparent
Doppler frequency.
5.4.3 Error Sources
The major sources of error in the estimates r̂R and δ̂tR are as follows:
5.4.3.1 Thermal Noise
Measurement thermal noise at the receiver is one of the components of
wρi in (5.1). The effect of thermal noise can be accurately modeled as a white
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and standard deviation σT. For
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the pseudorange measurement, σT is typically between 10–30 cm, depending
on the signal carrier-to-noise ratio, signal bandwidth, and receiver tracking
bandwidth [96]. Estimation of the receiver state from multiple appropriately-
weighted measurements with independent thermal-noise errors, and processing
such measurements over time through a filter based on the modeled dynamics
of the receiver, renders negligible the position-domain effects of uncorrelated
zero-mean thermal noise. As a result, thermal noise is not a major contributor
to the asymptotic accuracy of a digital map.
5.4.3.2 Satellite Orbit and Clock Errors
Satellite orbit and clock errors manifest in the modeled satellite position
r̄Si and the modeled satellite clock bias δ̄tSi . The International GNSS Service
(IGS) provides orbit and clock models for GNSS satellites. The predicted ultra
rapid orbits and satellite clocks have an accuracy of ∼5 cm and ∼3 ns, respec-
tively [1]. These may add up to ∼1 m of combined pseudorange model error
for a given satellite. The 17-h retroactively-available rapid orbits and satellite
clock models are accurate to ∼2.5 cm and ∼75 ps RMS errors, respectively [1],
adding up to less than 5 cm of RMS error in the modeled pseudorange for
a given signal. Since the orbit and clock parameters are fit to measurements
made at IGS analysis centers, the errors in the estimated parameters must be
asymptotically zero-mean by design of the estimator. For post-processing ap-
plications such as mapping, it is reasonable to assume the availability of rapid
orbit and satellite clock products, and thus the asymptotic average position
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errors due to errors in modeled satellite position and clock bias can be reduced
to a sub-5-cm level.
5.4.3.3 Ionospheric Modeling Errors
The code-modulated GNSS signal propagates slower through the iono-
sphere as compared to vacuum due to the slightly-greater-than-unity group






where TEC is the total electron content in electrons/m2 and f is the frequency
of the propagating signal. At the GPS L1 frequency centered at 1575.42 MHz,
the excess ionospheric group delay is roughly 16.24 cm per TECU (1 TECU ,
1016 electrons/m2). If not modeled, the ionospheric delay can lead to ranging
errors greater than 15 m.
The ionospheric delay can be estimated via an ionosphere model or, in
case of a multi-frequency receiver, eliminated via a combination of multiple-
frequency pseudorange measurements. The latter technique does not require
any external aiding, but the formation of the ionosphere-free combination exac-
erbates pseudorange noise, including any biases due to tracking of multipath
signals. Compensating for ionospheric delay with the aid of an ionosphere
model is applicable to both single- and multi-frequency receivers. It relies
on accurate delay modeling based on ionospheric measurements at permanent
GNSS reference stations, such as those that form the IGS network. While
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both methods have their merits, the analysis in this section considers correc-
tions from an ionospheric model, and thus will not be relevant to applications
where the ionosphere-free combination is applied. Note that those applications
would likely experience worse multipath errors than the ones presented later,
requiring a separate multipath analysis along the lines of Sec. 5.4.3.5.
Ionospheric model accuracy was studied comprehensively in [130]. The
method in [130] generates unambiguous carrier-phase measurements from a
global distribution of permanent receivers to compute the true slant total
electronic content (STEC) for each satellite, and compares the model predic-
tion for a number of models with the ground truth. In [129], the same authors
compared PPP convergence times when applying different ionospheric correc-
tion models. This section extends the analysis in [130] and [129] to examine
whether there exist long-term position-domain biases in enhanced code-phase
positioning.
The post-fit residuals for multiple regional and global ionospheric mod-
els, computed as described in [130], were graciously made available by the
authors of [130] for the year 2014. These residuals were computed for GPS
signals as observed at about 150 reference stations around the globe at 5 min
intervals.
To observe the position-domain effect of the ionospheric modeling errors
in isolation, this section neglects all other error sources, reducing the linearized
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measurement model in (5.3) to
z = Hx+ Ĩ.
Historical GPS satellite almanacs can be combined with the timestamps
from the residuals data to obtain the measurement sensitivity matrix H at each
epoch for each station. With an elevation-dependent measurement covariance







Fig. 5.1 summarizes the results for ionospheric corrections obtained
from the IGS global ionospheric map (GIM). Each of the arrows in Fig. 5.1
points in the direction of the position bias in the east-north plane, as estimated
over 12 months of data from 2014 (more than 800,000 samples per station).
The magnitude of the horizontal position bias is depicted by the color of the
arrow according to the scale shown on the right. Interestingly, there is a clear
trend of southward bias in the position error for most stations in the north-
ern hemisphere, and a mild trend of northward bias in the position error for
stations in the southern hemisphere. A numerical summary of the IGS GIM
position bias is presented in Table 5.1, along with a similar analysis for the
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) ionospheric corrections available
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Figure 5.1: Direction and magnitude (the latter represented by color, in me-
ters) of the long-term average horizontal position error due to errors in the
delay estimates provided by the IGS GIM. Note that the meridians are curved
outwards due to projection of the spherical map, and that arrows parallel to
the curved meridians point directly south or north.
WAAS model was found to exhibit a significantly smaller RMS error in iono-
sphere TEC estimates when compared to the IGS GIM; however the long-term
position bias due to WAAS corrections is similar to or worse than those for
the IGS model.
Another global ionospheric model, the Fast PPP model [129], was also
studied as above. Fast PPP natively models the ionosphere as a two-layered
shell, but is also made available in the standard one-layer IONEX (ionosphere-
map exchange) format [130] for dissemination. The results presented in Table
5.1 represent the IONEX version of Fast PPP. In comparison with the IGS
corrections, it is clear that the Fast PPP IONEX GIM corrections result in
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Table 5.1: Long-term average position error due to ionospheric model errors (φ
denotes station latitude). IGS: International GNSS Service; PPP: precise point
positioning; WAAS: Wide Area Augmentation System; CONUS: contiguous
United States; IONEX: ionosphere-map exchange format
Ionosphere Model Region East (m) North (m) Up (m)
IGS
φ ≥ 30◦ 0.0107 −0.2129 0.6733
30◦ > φ >−30◦ −0.0651 −0.0692 1.5467
φ ≤−30◦ 0.0237 0.2450 0.3355
WAAS CONUS −0.0048 −0.2916 −0.1248
Fast PPP IONEX
φ ≥ 30◦ −0.0042 −0.0099 −0.0122
30◦ > φ >-30◦ −0.0390 0.0013 −0.3053
φ ≤-30◦ −0.0325 −0.0087 0.0309
substantially unbiased long-term position errors at the global test locations.
However, it must be conceded that the results in Table 5.1 are best-case results,
as they are based on data from the same permanent reference stations used to
constrain the model.
To understand the reason behind the systematic biases with IGS cor-
rections, note that any ionospheric modeling bias that identically affects all
satellites does not have any impact on the accuracy of the GNSS position solu-
tion, as this common error is absorbed in δ̂tR. Rather, position-domain biases
arise from the azimuthal- and elevation-dependence of ionosphere model errors.
From analysis of the spatial distribution of post-fit residuals, it was found that
appreciable azimuthal and elevation residual gradients persist in the IGS iono-
spheric corrections. These gradients are represented graphically in Fig. 5.2 for
one representative station from the northern hemisphere (station code: EUSK,
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latitude: 50◦40′26.87′′, longitude: 6◦45′48.72′′) and one representative station
from the southern hemisphere (station code: VACS, latitude: -20◦17′48.47′′,
longitude: 57◦29′13.79′′). The post-fit residuals are binned in azimuth and
elevation and the average value in each bin is denoted by the color of the
representing disc. The size of the disc denotes the number of samples of post-
fit residuals available in each bin. Due to the inclination angle of the GPS
satellite orbits, the angular distribution of satellites at any given latitude is
non-uniform.
From Fig. 5.2, it is clear that the elevation gradients in the ionospheric
residuals are pronounced. A subtle azimuthal gradient also exists, mainly
along the north-south direction. Such spatial non-uniformity, coupled with the
non-uniform satellite angular distribution, may be the reason for the observed
persistent position biases. While the elevation gradients are consistent for
stations at all locations, the azimuthal gradients appear to invert along the
north-south direction between the northern and southern hemisphere. This is
likely the reason for the opposite direction of the average horizontal position
bias in the northern and southern hemispheres.
Such persistent position-domain biases due to inaccurate ionospheric
modeling have not been previously reported in the literature, and are a rather
remarkable result. While some single-frequency PPP (SF-PPP) techniques
eliminate the ionospheric delays based on the GRAPHIC combination [175],
many other techniques that rely solely on ionospheric corrections from GIMs


















































Figure 5.2: Azimuth and elevation dependence of post-fit IGS global iono-
spheric map (GIM) residuals. (a) A representative station from the northern
hemisphere. (b) A representative station from the southern hemisphere. The
average residual error (in TECU) is denoted by the color of the disc. The size
of the disc indicates the number of samples of post-fit residuals available in
each bin.
convergence, with sub-10-cm bias [160], seemingly contradicting the results
here. The key difference is that the SF-PPP methods involve estimation of
a float carrier ambiguity term for each satellite arc. A portion of the sys-
tematic biases in the GIM estimates is likely absorbed in these states of the
estimator, thereby attenuating the position biases in the east-north plane. For
instance, the SF-PPP technique in [160] is based on the phase-adjusted pseu-
dorange algorithm [78], wherein the ambiguity term for each satellite, phys-
ically an unknown constant, is in fact iteratively estimated with small but
non-zero process noise. In such an estimator, the ambiguity term can absorb
slowly time-varying systematic biases. In other SF-PPP techniques, the iono-
spheric correction term is explicitly included as a state to be estimated, and
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the estimates from GIM are applied as pseudo-observations [116, 143]. Once
again, decimeter-level biases in the GIM estimates of the ionospheric delay
may not necessarily appear in the final reported position accuracy of the SF-
PPP method. Of course, such absorption of biases in augmented states is not
undesirable. However, for the case of urban vehicular positioning, convergence
of SF-PPP is a concern due to carrier phase cycle slipping, as discussed ear-
lier. In an enhanced code-phase-based receiver, the high variance of the code
noise leads to poor observability of the decimeter-level horizontal position bias
due to ionospheric modeling errors. Thus, ionospheric biases are not often
estimated in a code-phase-based GNSS estimator.
Another factor of note is that 2014 was a maximum in the 11-year solar
activity cycle, and thus the IGS GIM accuracy may have been worse than usual
over this period of time.
In conclusion, persistent decimeter-level biases in the east-north plane
and meter-level biases in the vertical direction can arise when ionospheric delay
corrections are sourced from the IGS GIM, or similar, even under ideal open-
sky conditions. More advanced models of the ionosphere with more accurate
slant TEC measurements may achieve better results. Elimination of the iono-
spheric delay based on the ionosphere-free combination is another option, but
tends to worsen multipath-induced position errors. If corrections from some
ionosphere model lead to unbiased position errors, then for globally-referencing
digital maps by averaging GNSS measurements over many sessions it is advis-
able to avoid the combination of multi-frequency signals.
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5.4.3.4 Tropospheric Modeling Errors
In the troposphere, or more generally the neutral atmosphere, the in-
dex of refraction departs from unity much less than in ionosphere at GNSS
frequencies, causing a delay of ∼2.4 m at zenith. The index of refraction in the
troposphere is non-dispersive, and thus cannot be estimated using multiple-
frequency signals. The tropospheric delay is obtained from models of the
climatological parameters (temperature, pressure, and water vapor pressure)
along the propagation path.
State-of-the-art tropospheric models [23] fit a small number of location-
and day-of-year-dependent coefficients to climatological data from numerical
weather models (NWMs) to model the zenith tropospheric delay. The zenith
delay is mapped to any elevation angle using mapping functions [22]. Similar
to the ionospheric models, the tropospheric mapping functions may introduce
a differential azimuth- and elevation-dependent error. For empirically-derived
mapping functions such as VMF1 [22] and GMF [24], the mean error at lowest
elevation of 5◦ has been shown to be under 50 mm (this value is typically
reported as 10 mm station height error, which is approximately one-fifth of
the delay error at lowest elevation [22]). As a result, this chapter assumes
that time-averaged tropospheric model errors would introduce sub-5-cm er-
rors in the position domain, and would thus not impede asymptotically accu-




In ideal circumstances, each signal received from an overhead satellite
arrives only along the least-time path. In practice, however, this so-called line-
of-sight (LOS) component is accompanied by other components due to signal
diffraction and single- or multiple-signal reflections off surrounding surfaces
and obstacles (e.g., the glass facade of a nearby building, poles, trees, etc.).
The complex baseband representation of the N signal components received





where Ai is the amplitude of the ith component, C(t) is the GNSS code modu-
lation, τi(t) is the delay of the ith signal component relative to an unobstructed
LOS signal, and θi(t) is the beat carrier phase of the ith component. The com-
bination of multiple components distorts the received signal and causes errors
in the pseudorange and phase measurements.
Unlike the study of ionospheric modeling errors, for application in ur-
ban mapping, multipath errors cannot be characterized with data from survey
stations with a clear view of the sky. This section considers a simulation
approach for scalable analysis of multipath tracking errors in an urban envi-
ronment. The objective of this study was to inspect the presence of persistent
biases caused by multipath due to the surrounding structure in the navigation
solution averaged over multiple sessions
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Table 5.2: Urban scenario parameters used in the multipath simulation.
Distance from road center to buildings 24 m
Distance from road center to vehicle 5 m
Mean distance between road center and trees 20 m
Antenna height 2 m
Mean building width 30 m
Building width standard deviation 25 m
Mean building height 40 m
Building height standard deviation 20 m
Probability of gap between buildings 0.5
Mean gap width 30 m
Mean distance between trees 60 m
Mean distance between poles 25 m
Scenario Setup The present simulation study was based on the open-access
Land Mobile Satellite Channel Model (LMSCM) [79], itself based on extensive
experimentation with a wideband airborne transmitter at GNSS frequencies
in urban and suburban environments. First, an urban corridor was simulated
stochastically following the procedure described in [80]. The corridor was com-
posed of buildings, trees, and poles. Some of the important parameters for the
generation of the scene are summarized in Table 5.2, and a part of the scene
realization is shown in Fig. 5.3. Multi-GNSS satellite trajectories were gener-
ated at randomly-selected times based on GPS and Galileo satellite almanac
data. An average of 25 satellites were available above an elevation mask of 5◦,
consistent with modern multi-GNSS receivers. The satellites were assumed to
be stationary over the simulation period of 60 s. Navigation solution errors































Figure 5.3: Initial segment of the simulated urban corridor. Red lines across
the road denote the positions where the vehicle is momentarily stopped.
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Figure 5.4: Vehicle speed (solid line) and heading (dashed line) simulating
stop-and-go motion with a 90◦ right turn.
The vehicle trajectory was kept consistent across all 1000 driving ses-
sions to avoid decorrelation of multipath error due to variable receiver motion.
The trajectory was parametrized by its speed and heading, as described in [80].
The vehicle started at the zero coordinate on the along-track axis, and traveled
in the positive direction, which was assumed to be aligned with the local north.
The simulated trajectory was 60 s long and simulated a vehicle in stop-and-go
traffic executing one 90◦ right turn, as shown in Fig. 5.4. The vehicle traveled
roughly 430 m and faced eastwards at the end of the trajectory. The three
low-speed intervals, marked with red line segments in Fig. 5.3, are expected
to present severe multipath effects since multipath errors decorrelate slowly,
and thus tend to reinforce one another within the navigation filter, when the
vehicle moves slowly.
Multipath Simulation The LMSCM generates power, delay, and carrier
phase for N LOS and echo signals. The interaction of the LOS with the simu-
lated obstacles is governed by deterministic models for attenuation, diffraction,
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and delay. The LOS components of the combined signal, denoted rLOS(t), may
be composed of multiple components due to signal diffraction. These compo-





In the special case of an unobstructed LOS signal, NLOS = 1, A0(t) = 1,
τ0(t) = 0, and
θ0(t) =
‖rR(t)− rS(t)‖ · 2π
λ
+ γ0,
where λ denotes the wavelength and γ0 is a constant due to phase initialization
in the satellite and receiver [124].
The LMSCM generates the N−NLOS NLOS echoes stochastically based
on satellite azimuth and elevation, receiver dynamics, and general character-
istics of the scene (e.g., an urban car scenario). This stochastic procedure
might not be representative of multipath over multiple sessions through the
same urban corridor, where certain echoes might persist over different ses-
sions. To address this limitation, the LMSCM was augmented by the present
authors to generate one- and two-bounce deterministic reflective NLOS echoes
off the simulated buildings, and a one-bounce NLOS echo off the ground sur-
face. These three additional reflective NLOS echoes, denoted rDET(t), were




bi(t)Ai(t)C[t− τi(t)] exp[j(θi(t) + θ′i(t))],
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where bi(t) ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether the surrounding geometry supports the
reflective echo. Since these reflections are expected to be the stronger than
other diffracted and multiple-bounce NLOS echoes, the amplitudes Ai(t), i ∈
{N,N + 2} for reflective echoes were drawn from the distribution of the
strongest echo generated stochastically by the LMSCM at each epoch. By
experiment, this distribution was found to be log-normal with 20 log10(Ai) ∼
N(−22, 5), i ∈ {N,N + 2}. The delays for the reflective echoes are given as
τi(t) =
‖r′R(t)− rS(t)‖ − ‖rR(t)− rS(t)‖
c
, i ∈ {N,N + 2},
where r′R(t) is the position of the imaginary image antenna [26] about the re-
flecting plane (building or ground). Similarly, the carrier-phase of the reflective
echoes is computed geometrically as
θi(t) =
‖r′R(t)− rS(t)‖ · 2π
λ
+ γ0, i ∈ {N,N + 2}.
A random carrier-phase offset θ′i(t) ∈ [0, 2π) was added at the reflection
point every time a new reflective echo was spawned to simulate the material-
specific phase offset introduced by the reflection process.
Receiver A receiver simulator was developed to account for the mediating
effects that a receiver’s tracking loops and navigation filter have on multipath-
induced position errors in a receiver’s reported position solution. The sim-
ulated receiver tracks the combination of all NLOS line-of-sight signals and
N + 2−NLOS multipath echoes for a given signal. If R(τ) denotes the corre-
lation function of the GNSS signal’s spreading code, then the multipath delay
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error in the tracked code phase, relative to unobstructed LOS, is given as the
solution to [26]
0 = Scoh(τ) =
N+2∑
i=0




















AiR(τc − τi) sin(θi),
N+2∑
i=0
AiR(τc − τi) cos(θi)
)
.
The parameter d is the early-to-late correlator spacing in the receiver. It
is well-known that a wide-bandwidth receiver with narrow correlator spacing
mitigates the effect of multipath [26]. To this end, the receiver considered
in this simulation implements d = 0.1. It must be mentioned that R(τ) was
implemented as the correlation function for GPS L1 C/A identically for all the
simulated signals. Modernized GNSS signals have better multipath mitigation
characteristics [40], but this behavior was not included in the simulation.
Another important observation is that when the LOS signal is strong
as compared to the echo signals, the time derivative of the tracked carrier-
phase is equal to the Doppler frequency of the LOS signal, which changes
smoothly in accordance with the motion between the satellite and the receiver.
However, when the LOS signal is comparable to or weaker than other rapidly-
decorrelating echoes, the combined carrier-phase is uniformly random. In a
GNSS receiver, the phase lock loop’s phase-lock indicator indicates whether
a sufficiently strong LOS signal is available, enabling carrier lock [64]. The
simulator’s phase-lock indicator is asserted only if (1) the tracked Doppler
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frequency does not deviate significantly from a second-order polynomial, and
(2) the strongest received component (either LOS or NLOS) is attenuated no
more than 25 dB with respect to an unattenuated signal.
Navigation Filter At each epoch, nz multipath-free, ionosphere-free, and
troposphere-free simulated pseudorange measurements were combined with
corresponding simulated multipath tracking delay errors and fed to a naviga-
tion filter that estimates the receiver state. The navigation filter implemented
in this chapter is an extended Kalman filter (EKF) with a nearly constant
velocity motion model following [11]. The standard details of the EKF are
omitted for brevity.
The effect of multipath tracking on the navigation solution is strongly
dependent on the receiver’s multipath rejection scheme. Two schemes are
explored here. The first is a hypothetical ideal multipath rejection scheme
that excludes all signals for which the LOS signal has a smaller-than-10-dB
advantage over its multipath echoes. The second scheme implements a nor-
malized innovation squared (NIS) test to reject multipath signals based on
measurement innovations [11]. At the (k+1)th measurement update step, the
difference between the predicted and observed measurement vector, called the
innovation and denoted ν(k+ 1), is squared and normalized by its covariance,
which is the sum of the measurement covariance matrix, R(k + 1), and the
propagated state covariance transformed through the measurement sensitivity
matrix, H(k + 1)P (k + 1|k)H(k + 1)T . In the absence of multipath tracking
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errors, the resulting NIS statistic is chi-squared distributed with nz degrees of
freedom. If the NIS statistic exceeds a chosen threshold, then the signal with
the largest normalized innovation is dropped. This continues until the NIS
statistic falls below the threshold or the number of remaining signals drops to
a preset minimum number of required signals.
Simulation Results Fig. 5.5 shows the mean position error in the east,
north, and up directions over 1000 sessions for the two multipath rejection
schemes mentioned previously. From Fig. 5.5a, it can be seen that sub-20 cm
average error is achievable with hypothetical ideal multipath exclusion. A
closer look at Figs. 5.4 and 5.5a reveals that the decimeter-level sinusoidal
position error trend, initially in the north direction and later in the east di-
rection, in fact corresponds with the along-track accelerations of the vehicle
that were not adequately tracked by the nearly-constant-velocity-model-based
navigation filter.
Fig. 5.5b shows that the NIS test based exclusion of signals was able to
approach the performance of ideal exclusion in the horizontal plane, save for
the first stationary period where the vehicle was moving at low speed between
buildings on both sides. The average vertical position error was much worse,
growing as large as 1.75 m in magnitude.
To determine whether the average errors shown in Fig. 5.5 are in fact
persistent biases, a study of the standard deviation of position errors was
conducted. The standard deviation of the average errors in east, north, and
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Figure 5.5: Mean position error in the east-north-up (ENU) frame over 1000
sessions due to multipath. (a) Ideal multipath exclusion. (b) NIS-based mul-
tipath exclusion. The black, gray, and dashed-black lines represent the error
in the east, north, and up directions, respectively. The up error in the bottom
panel reached a maximum magnitude of 1.75 m.
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up directions was computed for disjoint averaging ensembles of size 1, 2, 4, 8,
16, 32, 50, and 100 sessions taken from the total of 1000 simulated sessions.
For instance, 125 disjoint ensembles of eight sessions were selected, and the
position errors were averaged over the eight sessions in each set. The standard
deviation of the eight-session-averaged errors was then computed across the
125 ensembles. In the case of an averaging ensemble with only a single session
(i.e., no averaging), the computed standard deviation is simply the measured
standard deviation of the position error across all 1000 simulated runs. In the
case of averaging over 100 sessions, the standard deviation is computed based
on 10 disjoint averaging ensembles of 100 sessions each.
Note that because the simulation study was based on the same 1000
simulations for all averaging ensembles, the east, north, and up means taken
across all averaging ensembles are equivalent to those shown in Fig. 5.5. The
more interesting trend is the decreasing standard deviation with increasing size
of the averaging ensemble, as shown in Fig. 5.6 for the case of NIS-based mul-
tipath rejection and for the east and north error components. As expected, the
standard deviation of errors was higher at locations where the vehicle moved
at low speed and multipath decorrelated slowly. Additionally, the standard
deviation was larger at the beginning of the trajectory where the street was
lined with tall buildings on both sides.
The standard deviation of the average east and north position error
over 100 sessions was bounded below 15–20 cm. Thus, it is highly likely that
the ∼40-cm error in the north direction between 15–20 s in Fig. 5.5b is in fact
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Figure 5.6: Standard deviation of average position error in east and north
directions for NIS-based multipath exclusion as a function of the number of
sessions over which the errors are averaged. Top panel: standard deviation in
the east direction. Bottom panel: standard deviation in the north direction.
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a persistent non-zero bias.
Table 5.3 summarizes the results of the multipath simulation study. It
shows the 95-percentile horizontal error magnitude for increasing averaging
ensemble sizes and for both ideal and NIS-based multipath exclusion. The
0–60 s average case lists the 95-percentile error over the entire trajectory,
whereas the 13–19 s average case lists the 95-percentile error in the worst-case
segment of the trajectory in terms of horizontal position bias and standard
deviation. This challenging segment is illustrative of persistent problem spots
that will arise in urban areas, within which multipath-induced biases will be
larger than average. As expected, the 95-percentile error in Table 5.3 shrank as
the averaging ensemble size became larger. For the urban corridor and vehicle
dynamics considered in this simulation, NIS-based exclusion achieved 35 cm
95-percentile horizontal error with averaging over 100 sessions. Even in the
worst-case region of the trajectory, the 95-percentile horizontal error remained
below 50 cm. As multipath exclusion approaches the ideal case, with aid from
other sensors or a 3D model of the surroundings, for example, the 95-percentile
horizontal error could be reduced to as low as 25 cm for the simulated corridor.
5.5 Empirical Results
To validate the results obtained in the above analyses, GNSS and visual
data were collected in a moderate urban area north of the University of Texas




















































































































































































































































various flavors of code-phase GNSS positioning.
5.5.1 Rover and Reference Platforms
The rover GNSS receiver is one among several sensors housed inside
the Sensorium (described in Sec. 4.6). The GNSS data are processed by
a software-defined GNSS receiver tracking signals from GPS L1 C/A, GPS
L2CLM, Galileo E1, and SBAS. Data from both the primary (passenger’s
side) and secondary (driver’s side) antennas are used to reconstruct a sub-
dm-accurate CDGNSS-based ground truth trajectory, as described in [64].
Enhanced code-phase positioning is performed on the data from the primary
antenna, incorporating precise orbit and clock products from IGS, ionospheric
corrections from WAAS satellites, and the Saastamoinen model for tropo-
spheric corrections, in addition to NIS-based exclusion of multipath signals.
Double-differenced pseudorange-based positioning is also performed with the
data from the primary antenna, as discussed later in this section. The code-
phase-based position estimates are compared against the ground truth from
the primary antenna to study the code-phase positioning error statistics. The
primary antenna feed is also input to a ublox M8T receiver for comparison
against the enhanced code-phase software receiver.
5.5.2 Test Route
The test route is a 1-km loop north of the University of Texas at Austin
campus in Austin, TX. The route includes a variety of light-to-moderate urban
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Figure 5.7: An overview of the 1-km test route. The Dean Keeton corridor,
toward the left, is spanned by a pedestrian bridge and flanked by buildings on
both sides. A total of 75 laps of the test route were driven over six separate
campaigns.
conditions, from open-sky to overhanging trees to built-up areas. The Dean
Keeton corridor, toward the left in Fig. 5.7, is the most challenging stretch
along the test route for GNSS positioning. It passes below a pedestrian bridge
and is flanked on both sides by buildings ranging from 30 to 65 meters tall set
back 28 meters from the center of the roadway.
To study the code-phase-based positioning error characteristics over
time-separated sessions in the same area, multiple laps of the test route were
driven over six separate campaigns. The first two campaigns were conducted
on 21 December 2017 and 15 January 2018, while the other four campaigns
were conducted in pairs of two on 3 June 2018 and 4 June 2018. The GNSS
error charts are presented for a total of 75 laps of the test route.
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5.5.3 Empirical GNSS Error Analysis
Fig. 5.8 shows the error in the enhanced code-phase GNSS position
solutions with respect to the ground truth. The error is plotted versus the
distance along the 1-km loop. The beginning of this loop is taken to be imme-
diately after the overhead pedestrian bridge along the Dean Keeton corridor.
It is observed that the enhanced code-phase GNSS errors are clustered sepa-
rately for each of the campaigns, and that each cluster is offset from zero by as
much as 1 m in the horizontal plane. Such error characteristics are represen-
tative of ionospheric modeling errors, which have a long decorrelation time. It
is also evident that the error variance is larger as the receiver exits the chal-
lenging portion of the loop at which point the tracking loops were recovering
from signal loss under the bridge. The effect is especially pronounced in the
vertical direction. Fig. 5.9 shows similar errors for the commercial ublox M8T
receiver. The error traces from the ublox receiver show a wider spread than
the enhanced code-phase receiver, likely due to lack of precise orbit and clock
corrections.
On the basis of Figs. 5.8 and 5.9, one might be tempted to conclude that
errors in enhanced code-phase and stand-alone GNSS navigation solutions are
substantially non-zero-mean, especially in the north and up directions, despite
the overhead GNSS constellation changing substantially between sessions. It
certainly appears that the permanent structures (buildings, bridge) along the
test loop left a bias in the vertical direction during the first 400 m along the
loop. However, the bias in the north direction, and to a lesser extent in the
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Figure 5.8: Errors in enhanced code-phase position estimates with respect to
ground truth in the east, north, and up directions. Different colors distinguish
data from six different campaigns. The dashed reference lines are drawn at
± 50 cm. The solid black lines show the mean positioning error over the six
campaigns. The error standard deviation is nearly constant along the path in
the horizontal plane at ∼0.6 m in the east and ≈0.4 m in the north direction.
In the up direction, the standard deviation is ∼2.1 m for the first 400 m along
the path, and ≈1.3 m for the rest.
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Figure 5.9: Errors in ublox M8T position estimates with respect to ground
truth in the east, north, and up directions. Different colors distinguish data
from six different campaigns. Dashed reference lines are drawn at ± 50 cm.
The solid black lines show the mean positioning error over the six campaigns.
The error standard deviation in the east is ∼1.5 m over the first 100 m along
the path and ∼0.7 m over the rest; ∼0.9 m in the north; and ∼2.7 m over the
first 400 m and ∼2 m over the rest in the up direction.
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east, may only be an artifact of the small sample size: ionospheric modeling
errors were not yet averaged down to nearly zero in the east and ∼30 cm in the
north, as one would expect from the WAAS ionospheric model (see Table 5.1).
Given that the asymptotic properties of ionospheric modeling errors
are better understood than those of multipath errors, it is instructive to elim-
inate, insofar as possible, all ionospheric modeling errors from the along-track
error histories. To this end, a differential code phase GNSS technique is ap-
plied whereby the navigation solution was based on double-difference pseudo-
range measurements using data from a nearby reference station at a precisely
known location. Such double differencing over a short 1-km baseline eliminates
virtually all ionospheric and tropospheric errors, but does nothing to reduce
vehicle-side multipath. Thus, one can empirically examine multipath effects
in isolation from ionospheric effects.
Fig. 5.10 shows the results of this study based on all six data capture
campaigns. Note that biases for all components are much smaller. It appears
that for the test route chosen, non-zero-mean horizontal errors in the enhanced
code phase positions are almost entirely driven by ionospheric modeling errors,
and not by persistent effects of multipath due to the permanent structures
along the test route. This is broadly consistent with the analyses presented
earlier in this chapter on position-domain biases due to ionospheric and mul-
tipath errors. However, it does appear that a bias due to multipath remained
in the vertical direction over the first 400 m, even when ionospheric errors
were removed. Apparently, the arrangement of buildings over this segment
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Figure 5.10: Errors in double-differenced pseudorange-based position estimates
with respect to ground truth in the east, north, and up directions. Different
colors distinguish data from six different campaigns. Dashed reference lines
are drawn at ±50 cm. The solid black lines show the mean positioning error
over the six campaigns. The error standard deviation in the east and north
directions is ∼0.9 m over the first 200 m along the path and ∼0.4 m over the
rest. In the up direction, the standard deviation is ∼1.9 m over the first 400
m and ∼1 m over the rest.
caused non-line-of-sight effects that did not average away. Mercifully, hori-
zontal errors, which appear to be close to zero-mean over the six campaigns,
matter most for high-accuracy digital mapping, since obstacle avoidance and
vehicle coordination are largely 2-D problems, and since multiple vehicles can
straightforwardly agree on a particular feature’s relative vertical position from
an inferred road surface.
Based on Fig. 5.10, one can conclude that multi-session averaging with
a sufficiently accurate ionospheric model, such as the Fast PPP model, yields
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sub-50-cm global referencing accuracy for digital maps in the horizontal plane
with code-phase-based GNSS, even in the presence of persistent multipath.
5.6 Conclusion
The accuracy limits of collaborative global referencing of digital maps
with standard GNSS were explored through modeling and simulation. The
asymptotic average of position errors due to thermal noise, satellite orbit and
clock errors, and tropospheric modeling errors were assumed to be negligi-
ble. From Sec. 5.4.3.3’s analysis of asymptotic ionospheric errors, and from
Sec. 5.4.3.5’s multipath simulation study, one can draw the following conclu-
sion: so long as the asymptotic horizontal position errors of the ionosphere
corrections are below 5 cm, as is true for the Fast-PPP model, and assuming
statistical independence of ionospheric and multipath errors, it appears feasi-
ble to achieve 50-cm horizontal positioning accuracy at approximately 95% by
averaging over 100 mapping sessions. Empirical results from a field experiment





This chapter presents a globally-referenced electro-optical simultane-
ous localization and mapping pipeline, called GEOSLAM, designed for crowd-
sourced mapping and localization. This pipeline serves as a demonstration
of a system that achieves the asymptotic accuracy limit of collaborative dig-
ital mapping described in Chap. 5. GEOSLAM achieves this accuracy by (i)
incorporating standard GNSS position estimates in the visual simultaneous
localization and mapping (SLAM) framework, (ii) merging digital maps from
multiple mapping sessions, and (iii) jointly optimizing structure and motion
with respect to time-separated GNSS measurements. Field experiments are
conducted in a moderately-urban environment to show that after 8 sessions of
joint optimization, GEOSLAM generates a map of visual features with 50 cm
global accuracy.
6.2 Introduction
Mapping of the static driving environment is key to robust positioning
and navigation systems, including the radar-based positioning engine described
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in Chap. 4. These so-called high-definition (HD) maps for AGVs have many
other applications beyond localization: responding to traffic signs and signals,
for example, is greatly simplified if the vehicle has prior knowledge of where
such signs are located. In short, a map of the surrounding environment enables
an AGV to expect the expected.
Generating and maintaining these HD maps, however, is a major chal-
lenge. Most AGV manufacturers, such as Waymo and General Motors, deploy
specialized fleets of mapping vehicles. Generating a map of the environment
requires precise knowledge of the vehicle pose (position and orientation) that
must be obtained with either an expensive tactical-grade INS or with a high-
resolution lidar in a SLAM framework, or a combination thereof. Furthermore,
the map must be updated whenever the static environment changes, e.g., due
to construction. It is time-consuming and impractical to maintain HD maps
of entire continents.
A key enabler for large-scale up-to-date maps will be enlisting the help
of the very consumer vehicles that need the map to build and update it. Con-
sumer vehicles are typically equipped with low-cost consumer-grade sensor
suites. As mentioned in Chap. 5, it is likely that different car manufactur-
ers would not share a common HD map, and that data sharing for increased
situational-awareness would require all such maps to be consistent in a global
frame of reference. Chap. 5 further claimed that such maps can be crowd-
sourced from the consumer vehicles, provided that the map generation system
can jointly optimize the crowd-sourced data over time-separated measurements
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from standard code-phase-based GNSS receivers.
The goal of this chapter is to describe and demonstrate one such pipeline
named GEOSLAM (globally-referenced electro-optical simultaneous localiza-
tion and mapping) that is capable of globally-referenced collaborative multi-
session digital mapping. The pipeline combines visual measurements from a
stereo visible-light camera system with position measurements from GNSS sig-
nals. The basic intuition is that if one or more camera-equipped vehicles nav-
igating through a digital map over time make multiple time-separated GNSS
measurements of the same location, then the GNSS errors can be averaged
across all sessions with appropriate weighting.
As such, visual SLAM is a mature field of research. The contributions of
this chapter deal with the integration of GNSS measurements in visual SLAM,
and with other challenges that arise specifically in the case of multi-session or
crowd-sourced mapping and localization. This chapter details the techniques
GEOSLAM invokes to smoothly transition between unmapped and previously-
mapped regions, consistently fusing current and prior maps without the need
for a six degrees-of-freedom (6-DoF) pose from an INS. GEOSLAM enables
multi-agent collaborative mapping by storing and rendering its map in a global
frame of reference, such as the World Geodetic System 1984 or the Interna-
tional Terrestrial Reference Frame. Multi-session operation of GEOSLAM is
demonstrated using camera and GNSS data collected in a moderate urban
environment, and the accuracy of global localization with the multi-session
GEOSLAM map is assessed with respect to CDGNSS-based ground truth.
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6.3 Related Work
Sensor fusion of visible-light cameras and GNSS has been extensively
studied [10,29,39,49,76,84,85,118,141,142,147,162]. Some of these works [10,
39,162] have proposed visual odometry as a replacement for, or an augmenta-
tion of, the traditional GNSS/INS architecture. Visual data from cameras are
exploited to perform dead reckoning in a visual odometry pipeline, wherein
an important distinction from the current chapter is that the 3D map points
do not persist after a window of time has elapsed—that is, no map of feature
points is maintained. Clearly, such an approach does not allow improvement
of the 3D map point positions over multiple mapping sessions.
In [147], the relative change in position between two image frames is first
estimated based on time-differenced GNSS carrier phase measurements. The
metric-accurate GNSS-derived change in position is exploited to initialize the
otherwise unobservable scale in a monocular visual SLAM system. However,
GNSS measurements are not incorporated any further once the absolute scale
has been initialized. Unlike the current chapter, the visual SLAM map is
rendered in the arbitrary SLAM coordinate frame since only the relative change
in position, and not the absolute position, was estimated based on GNSS
measurements.
The vision-GNSS fusion in the current chapter is closely aligned with
the bi-objective bundle adjustment (BA) optimization techniques previously
reported in [29, 76, 84, 85, 141, 142]. In [29, 76, 141, 142], the traditional vi-
sual SLAM reprojection cost function is jointly minimized along with a GNSS
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position error term. The methods proposed in [84, 85] are also similar, but
guarantee that the visual reprojection cost after incorporation of the GNSS
term is not significantly greater than the visual-only case. However, none
of these works showed significant empirical evidence of their efficacy on real-
world vehicle data sets. Furthermore, collaborative mapping or multi-session
improvement of the map was not discussed.
Collaborative multi-agent mapping, without GNSS aiding, has also
been extensively discussed in the literature [6,44,55,69,121,131,177]. Some of
these proposed solutions require significant overlap in the field-of-view of the
agents, or require that the relative pose transformation between the agents
be known a priori [121,177]. Other solutions, such as in [6, 44, 55, 69], enable
collaboration by performing data association between non-concurrent mapping
sessions where the relative pose transformation between the agents is unknown.
The multi-session strategy employed in this chapter is similar, but with an
important distinction: none of the previous works on collaborative mapping
have incorporated GNSS measurements in the map-building process. Without
global referencing, the problem of data association between non-concurrent
sessions becomes intractable. With no estimate of the pose for the mapping
platform in relation to the existing map, data association must be attempted
against the entire map. It is easily observed that such data association will
become infeasible when scaled to city- or country-wide maps. The current
chapter proposes rendering and storage of digital maps in a global coordinate
frame, such that a new mapping session can readily estimate its approximate
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pose in relation to the prior map, and perform data association on a small
segment of the prior map that is expected to be in view of the vision system.
The work presented in [45] is perhaps the most closely related to the
current chapter. In [45], a particular stretch of roadway is mapped 25 times
with a low-cost sensor setup. However, [45] assumes, without detail, the avail-
ability of a lane-level accurate low-cost positioning module that provides the
full 6-DoF pose for the mapping platform. This greatly simplifies the ensuing
data association and mapping pipeline. No mention is made of the general
setting of the roadway being mapped (open-sky highway, urban canyon, etc.),
and while the accuracy of the mapped traffic signs is adequately reported,
localization within the map is not discussed, presumably since lane-level ac-
curate positioning is already available. Meanwhile, the current chapter only
assumes the availability of a meter-level accurate code-phase-based GNSS re-
ceiver that provides 3D position estimates. Global localization accuracy of a
vehicle operating within the multi-session map is presented as the key perfor-
mance indicator.
6.4 Visual SLAM
The visual SLAM component of GEOSLAM is similar to existing high-
performance SLAM pipelines developed in the robotics community [50,81,103].
Visual SLAM algorithms may be categorized as either sparse or dense. Sparse
visual SLAM algorithms [81, 103] create a map of distinctive features such
as corners or edges in the scene, while dense SLAM algorithms [50] map the
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depth for each pixel in the captured frames. The point cloud generated by
sparse SLAM algorithms is sufficient for the purpose of localization. Dense re-
construction is appealing to the human eye, but does not provide any tangible
benefit to localization, while consuming much more computational resources.
As a result, GEOSLAM implements sparse feature-point-based SLAM.
In [151] it was shown that for the visual SLAM problem, structure-
from-motion BA (batch non-linear optimization) outperforms filtering tech-
niques such as the extended Kalman filter, yielding higher accuracy per unit
of computing time. It was also noted that having a high number of features
points per image frame provides better accuracy than having a large num-
ber of frames with fewer feature points per frame. Thus, in typical practice,
only a select subset of frames among those captured is retained for processing;
frames in this subset are called keyframes. Most recent state-of-the-art visual
SLAM algorithms use a keyframe-based BA approach instead of sequential
filtering. Likewise, GEOSLAM performs BA-based non-linear optimization to
refine both structure and motion.
Fig. 6.1 shows a block diagram representation of the system architec-
ture proposed in this chapter. The yellow-colored blocks in this figure are
components of the GEOSLAM pipeline, detailed next.


























































































































































































































































mth map point, pm, in the nth stereo keyframe, Kn. The horizontal and ver-
tical coordinates are denoted u and v, respectively, while the superscripts l
and r denote the left and right camera frames, respectively. Note that the
feature location is specified by only three coordinates. The vertical feature co-
ordinate in the right camera frame, vrnm, is omitted because for an undistorted
and rectified camera model it must hold that vlnm = v
r
nm, making one of the
coordinates redundant. If pm is not matched to any feature in Kn, then let
zlrnm = ∅. Furthermore, let
Mn =
{
m : zlrnm 6= ∅
}
denote the set of indices of all map points matched to some feature in Kn. In
the visual SLAM literature, the covisibility window of keyframeKi is defined as
the set of keyframes that share at least T map points with Ki. Mathematically,
the covisibility window of keyframe Ki is the set of keyframes with indices
cov(i) , {n : |Mn ∩Mi| > T},
where |A| denotes the cardinality of the set A. The covisibility window de-
termines the keyframes to be optimized in a windowed BA. The visibility of
common points is regarded as a proxy for correlation between the structure-
from-motion states. However, in a sensor fusion architecture, the states for
other sensors (e.g., GNSS) may be spatially correlated beyond the covisibil-
ity window. Furthermore, other sensors may experience outages that extend
beyond the covisibility window. In such a scenario, it would be desirable to
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optimize over a batch of keyframes that span the availability gap. Accordingly,
GEOSLAM extends the concept of covisibility to N levels as
cov(i, N) ,
{{







{n : |Mn ∩Mi| > T} N = 1.
When processing Ki, GEOSLAM’s objective is to estimate the map
point 3D locations xSpm ∈ R






∈ (R3,R3) in the
N -level covisibility window for the ith keyframe, where S stands for the local
SLAM frame, Cn is the left camera coordinate frame associated with Kn, and
θSCn is the angle-axis representation of the keyframe orientation. The state











xSpm : m ∈ ∪k∈cov(i,N)Mk
}]T
, (6.1)
where the two sets on the right-hand side are arranged as a concatenation of
row vectors so that Xi becomes a column vector.
When triggered by the GNSS front end, the camera setup captures a
pair, denoted Ilri , of concurrent images from the left and right cameras, where
the subscript denotes that the current pair is a candidate to be the ith stereo
keyframe Ki. The intrinsic and extrinsic parameters of the stereo camera setup
are assumed to have been calibrated a priori. The stereo image pair is then
undistorted and rectified according to the given calibration, and SIFT fea-
tures are detected and computed separately for each image [89]. SIFT feature
matching is performed between the left and right image with the additional
constraint that matching features must have approximately the same vertical
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coordinate to within a few pixels. The set of stereo feature measurements for
Ilri , f
lr
i , and the set of feature descriptors as computed in the left image, d
l
i,
are passed on to the tracking module.
The tracking module has access to the 3D map point positions within
Xi and to the set of SIFT descriptors, D
map
i , corresponding to the map points
expected to be seen in the candidate keyframe Ilri . The tracker performs
directed matching of the features between the stereo image and the map. First,
a quick feature matching is performed using the Fast Approximate Nearest
Neighbor Search Library (FLANN) [100]. With sufficient matches, an initial
approximation of the current camera pose is obtained using the five-point
algorithm wrapped in RANSAC iterations. With this approximate pose, an
iteration of exhaustive nearest neighbor search is performed for each map
point potentially in view of the camera, but only within a small window of
its projected position on the image plane. Subsequently, RANSAC iterations
are performed on the full set of feature matches to remove any remaining
outliers, and a motion-only BA is performed wherein the current camera pose
is optimized based on the feature matches to a fixed set of 3D map points.
After tracking the stereo image pair as described above, GEOSLAM de-
cides whether or not the candidate keyframe Ilri must be selected as a keyframe.
This decision is made based on the number of map points that were matched
to the image features, and the distance traveled by the platform since the last
keyframe was chosen. New keyframes are not spawned if the platform is nearly
stationary. If the platform is in motion, and the number of feature matches to
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the map drops below a threshold, then the candidate keyframe Ilri is chosen
as keyframe Ki, windowed BA is performed over N levels of covisibility, and
the unmatched stereo features in Ki are spawned as new map points. Ad-
ditionally, if Ilri is selected to be Ki, then the set of measurements from the
features matched to the map, denoted zlri ,
{
zlrim : m ∈Mi
}
, along with
their SIFT descriptors, are passed on to the map module for storage, future
feature matching, and processing in the windowed BA routine.
In a visual-only SLAM system, the state vector Xi is optimized with
respect to the measurement vector Zi, defined as
Zi ,
[{
zlrn : n ∈ cov(i, N)
}]T
.
The windowed BA routine in GEOSLAM minimizes the 3D-to-2D re-
projection error. The error term enm for observation of map point pm in the






































in which R(·) denotes the rotation matrix corresponding to the argument
angle-axis vector, and f , (cu, cv), and b are the focal length, the principal
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point, and the baseline distance between the left and right cameras of the rec-
tified stereo camera model, respectively. The cost function to be minimized













where ρ may be the standard least squares cost function ρ(·) = (·) or a more
robust cost function such as the Huber or Tukey cost functions, and where
Ωnm = σ
2
nmI3×3 is the covariance of the feature measurements.
GEOSLAM performs BA minimization via Google’s ceres-solver.
The automatic differentiation feature of ceres-solver is used to compute
the Jacobian for the measurement model.
An important feature of the GEOSLAM visual pipeline is the ability to
merge maps from multiple mapping sessions. This is embodied in an algorithm
similar to the loop closure technique from the visual SLAM literature [102].
Map merging is described in detail in Sec. 6.6.2.
6.5 GNSS Aiding
Conventional visual SLAM algorithms are known to drift from the true
platform trajectory as a function of the distance traveled by the platform.
Furthermore, the map of the structure is created in the arbitrary S frame.
Such a map cannot be intelligibly shared with another mapping agent having
a different S frame. Meanwhile, GNSS position estimates are obtained in the
global G frame and do not exhibit any distance-dependent drift. Accordingly,
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GEOSLAM ingests standard GNSS position estimates from a software-defined
GNSS receiver, called GRID/pprx [64,87], in a tightly-coupled architecture to
create a globally-referenced map, enable cooperative multi-session mapping,
and constrain the drift of visual SLAM. Since the stereo camera setup is trig-
gered by the same clock that drives digitization of the GNSS samples (see
Fig. 6.1), it is possible to produce GNSS measurements synchronized with the
camera image epochs. This section details the various coordinate frames in
GNSS-aided visual SLAM, the updated BA cost function, and an initialization
routine required to enable GNSS aiding in SLAM.
6.5.1 Coordinate Frames
The GNSS-aided visual SLAM system has three coordinate frames of
interest: the Ki camera frame Ci, the local SLAM frame S, and the global
frame G. The SLAM frame S adopts the position and orientation of the first
keyframe prior to optimization as its origin and orientation. Thus, S is fixed
relative to G, but each Ci changes relative to G as the platform moves.
Note that the structure-from-motion states in Equation (6.1) are rep-
resented in the S frame, whereas the Knth keyframe’s corresponding GNSS
measurement, denoted zGAn ∈ R
3, is natively represented in the G frame. The
latter is transformed to the S frame through an unknown but fixed rotation,
RSG ∈ SO(3), and translation, tSG ∈ R3. This transformation is estimated at









GEOSLAM estimates the 6-DoF pose of the left camera, but the GNSS
antenna phase center is not co-located with the camera center; rather, it is
offset from the camera center by a fixed vector (same for all n) in Cn denoted,
tCnAn ∈ R
3. Thus, the error term associated with the GNSS position estimate













Under the assumption of temporally-uncorrelated GNSS errors, the up-

























and Γ′n is the covariance matrix of the GNSS position
estimate associated with Kn, expressed in G.
6.5.2 Initialization in GNSS-Aided SLAM
When initializing, GEOSLAM performs visual-only SLAM for the first
Ni keyframes in the S frame, and stores the GNSS position measurements
of the antenna provided in the G frame. Subsequently, GEOSLAM finds the
least-squares Euclidean transformation to obtain the optimal rotation matrix
RSG and translation vector t
S
G between the two coordinate systems from the
set of vector observations. Note that a full similarity transformation is not
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required since the known stereo baseline renders the S frame with correct scal-
ing. The estimated Euclidean transformation minimizes the squared difference
between the transformed GNSS measurements in S and the visual SLAM pre-
dicted trajectory of the GNSS antenna, also in S. The specific method used











∥∥(RzGAn + t)− (xSCn +R(θSCn)tCnAn)∥∥2 (6.2)
It must be noted that this transformation need only be approximately
correct such that the GNSS estimates, used as measurements, will not diverge
with respect to the visually-derived trajectory. Because the jointly estimated
trajectory in S gets transformed back to G using the same approximate trans-
formation, any errors in the transformation are cancelled.
6.6 Multi-Session Mapping
Refinement of the visual feature map over multiple sessions with time-
separated GNSS measurements is central to the idea of approaching the accu-
racy limit of mapping with standard GNSS. Consider a vehicle revisiting an
area mapped previously in one or more sessions. When GEOSLAM matches
greater than T features in the current keyframe to the features already present
in the prior map, the keyframes from the previous sessions in that section of
the map are included in the covisibility window of the current keyframe. After
such a merge is detected and verified, a BA may be performed on the covisible
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keyframes from multiple sessions to average time-separated standard GNSS
errors. It is important to note that multi-session mapping can only be realized
when sufficient feature matches are found between multiple sessions. This is
not a straightforward task, as evidenced by recent efforts on lifelong feature
mapping efforts [99]. This issue is further discussed in Sec. 6.7. In the cur-
rent section, multi-session map database management and map merging are
discussed.
6.6.1 Map Database
Storage and reuse of maps is a pre-requisite for multi-session mapping.
For a given session, the SLAM map is created in the S frame. However, such
a map is not readily usable in successive mapping sessions since the S frame
is distinct for each session. Fortunately, the integration of visual SLAM with
GNSS enables transformation of the SLAM map in to the G frame.
At the end of the pth mapping session in the local frame Sp, GEOSLAM









as estimated during initialization for the pth session, to all map point positions,






























































transformation during initialization. The map database
from previous session(s) is then loaded after applying the transformation for
the p+1 session, such that the prior map points, keyframes, and measurements














































After loading the prior map, the standard GEOSLAM pipeline is exe-
cuted for each stereo image pair in the (p+1)th session. In addition, GEOSLAM
attempts to detect if the vehicle is currently passing through a previously-
mapped region. If so, a map merge is declared and the current and prior
keyframes are jointly optimized, as detailed in Sec. 6.6.2. Finally, at the end
of the mapping session, the combined map is stored back in the database as
described before.
6.6.2 Map Merging
As mentioned before, the matching of feature points across multiple
sessions is central to the idea of averaging standard GNSS errors. Once suffi-
ciently many features are matched between the current stereo keyframes and
prior map points, GEOSLAM declares a map merging event. This is akin to
the well-known problem of detecting loop closure in the visual SLAM litera-
ture [102]. This section details GEOSLAM’s map merging and loop closing
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routine. Hereafter, the terms map merging and loop closure are used inter-
changeably since GEOSLAM treats them identically.
First, note that when detecting a map merge event, feature matching
must be attempted against map points that have not been matched in the
most recent keyframes. Thus, after processing the ith keyframe, a possible
merge is checked for against the set of map points {m : m /∈ ∪n∈cov(i,N)Mn}.
If this bag-of-words-style feature matching succeeds, then RANSAC iterations
are performed to determine whether the matches are geometrically consistent,






implied by the merge
event. If enough inliers are found, the map merge routine is executed.
The map merging process is depicted visually in Figs. 6.2–6.4. A typ-
ical merge situation is shown in Fig. 6.2, where the platform pose at the ith
keyframe is inconsistent with the prior map at the merge location. To avoid
such discontinuity in the ensuing joint BA, as an initial guess GEOSLAM en-







, and that the keyframes and map points from
the prior session(s) be unchanged. To this end, a pose-graph optimization [150]
is performed over a large Nm-level covisibility window for Ki, where the rel-
ative translations and rotations between covisible keyframes, as estimated in
the current session, are provided as delta-pose measurements, while the 6-DoF
poses for the terminal nodes in the covisibility window, as well as for Ki, are
held constant. In particular, let K0 denote the set of terminal keyframes in


















where the superscript (̂·) denotes GEOSLAM’s estimate of the state before
the merge event, and θ(·) denotes the angle-axis representation of the input
rotation matrix. The pose-graph optimization minimizes the following cost












[∥∥(xSCn − xSCk)− δxSnk∥∥2P−1δx +∥∥∥θ(R(θSCn)R(θSCnk)T)− δθSn−1∥∥∥2P−1δθ
]
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As a result of this pose-graph optimization, any discontinuity at the
merge location between the prior and current keyframes is smoothed out,
as shown in Fig. 6.3. Subsequently, the map points as seen in the current
keyframes are also adjusted in accordance to the pose-graph optimization. Fi-
nally, the duplicated map points near the merge location are fused together. As
a result of shared feature matches between the current and prior keyframes, the














































Figure 6.2: GEOSLAM trajectories at the instant when a merge has been
detected and verified. The cameras colored black are keyframes from a prior
map, and those colored red are from the current session. (a) Top view of the
trajectories. (b) View from 5◦ elevation showing a discontinuity in the vertical
component.
The merged map is then optimized in a windowed BA, this time with
feature point coordinates and GNSS positions as measurements. Note that this
is a joint windowed BA with both current and prior keyframes and map points.
As a result, both the current and prior states are appropriately adjusted based
on the number and covariance of the feature point and GNSS measurements.
The result of the map merging routine is shown in Fig. 6.4.
6.7 Empirical Results
To validate the results obtained in the above analyses, GNSS and vi-
sual data were collected in a moderate urban area north of the University of














































Figure 6.3: GEOSLAM trajectories post-pose-graph optimization (in blue),
overlaid on the corresponding (black and red) trajectories from Fig. 6.2. All
keyframes are colored blue at this stage since prior and current keyframes are
now connected. (a) Top view of the trajectories. Note that the discontinuity
at the merge location is smoothly distributed across Nm levels of covisibility
in the current session, and that the keyframe poses from the prior map are
unchanged at this stage. (b) View from 5◦ elevation. Keyframes from the
current trajectory have been adjusted to remove the discontinuity, blue and
black keyframes exactly overlap. Not shown: the corresponding map points in














































Figure 6.4: GEOSLAM trajectories after joint BA of current and prior
keyframes (in green), overlaid on the corresponding (black and red) trajec-
tories from Fig. 6.2. (a) Top view of the trajectories. Note that both the
current and prior keyframes (and map points, not shown) have been adjusted
to optimally minimize the BA cost function over Nm levels of covisibility. (b)
View from 5◦ elevation.
GEOSLAM’s multi-session GNSS-aided-visual mapping.
6.7.1 Sensor Platform & Test Route
The sensor platform and test route considered in this chapter are iden-
tical to ones described in Sec. 5.5. In fact, the data used here are a subset of
the data analyzed in Sec. 5.5. Multi-session mapping with GEOSLAM is per-
formed over eight laps/sessions of data from the four data collection campaigns
conducted on June 3, 2018 and June 4, 2018.
Imagery collected over the four June 2018 campaigns exhibits apprecia-
ble visual diversity, offering a real-world challenge to multi-session GEOSLAM
operation. Figs. 6.5a,b show the variation in lighting and visual features be-
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Figure 6.5: Different visual conditions on two days of data collection. (a) An
image captured on the first day of data collection. Note the sharp shadows
and absence of parked cars. (b) An image captured on the second day of data
collection. Note the absence of sharp shadows and complete blockage of curb
due to parked cars.
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tween the data collected on June 3, 2018 and June 4, 2018.
6.7.2 Multi-Session Mapping Results
GEOSLAM processed two laps/sessions of data from each of the four
campaigns conducted on June 4 and 5, fusing the visual data from the cap-
tured images with the double-differenced pseudorange-based position estimates
of the primary antenna. Fig. 6.6 summarizes the result from GEOSLAM’s
multi-session GNSS-aided-visual SLAM. The black data points denote the dif-
ference between the ground truth trajectory of the primary GNSS antenna
and GEOSLAM’s estimate of the same in local east, north, and up directions
for all eight sessions. The gray data points denote the difference between
the ground truth trajectory of the primary GNSS antenna and the coinci-
dent double-differenced pseudorange-based estimate of the same for all eight
sessions.
As one might expect, the error in GEOSLAM’s estimate of the an-
tenna position is approximately the same as the average double-differenced
pseudorange-based error over eight sessions. Furthermore, due to the approx-
imately zero-mean nature of the double-differenced pseudorange-based esti-
mates, the GEOSLAM estimate of the trajectory is within 50 cm of the truth
trajectory in the horizontal plane. Note that the error in GEOSLAM’s po-
sition estimate is highly repeatable over eight different sessions, so much so
that it appears there is a single black trace in Fig. 6.6, while in truth eight
independent traces were plotted. This indicates that (i) the localization of the
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Figure 6.6: Errors in GEOSLAM’s estimate of the primary antenna position
(in black) with respect to ground truth in the east, north, and up directions
for eight mapping sessions from four different data collection campaigns. The
errors in double-differenced pseudorange-based primary antenna position esti-
mates for each of the eight sessions, fed as measurements to GEOSLAM, are
plotted in gray for reference. Dashed reference lines are drawn at ±50 cm.
vehicle within the visual map was highly precise: GEOSLAM made the same
errors with respect to ground truth over eight different sessions; and (ii) the
visual map was merged across eight sessions from four different campaigns: if
the maps from any two campaigns were not merged through visual matching of
features, then the GNSS position estimate for a keyframe from one campaign
would not affect another keyframe from a different campaign since they would
not be covisible, and thus the eight black traces in Fig. 6.6 would not overlap.
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6.8 Conclusion
A globally-referenced electro-optical SLAM pipeline, termed GEOSLAM,
has been presented. Notably, this chapter details the techniques that GEOSLAM
invokes to smoothly transition between unmapped and previously-mapped re-
gions, including initialization for GNSS-aided SLAM and crowd-sourced map
merging. GEOSLAM enables multi-agent collaborative mapping by storing
and rendering its map in a global frame of reference. GEOSLAM is demon-
strated to achieve sub-50-cm horizontal localization accuracy in a moderate
urban environment by incorporating code-phase-based GNSS position esti-




Conclusions & Future Work
Four contributions have been presented in support of robust and secure
PNT for automated systems. First, a fundamental theory for provably-secure
clock synchronization was established. In contrast to prior work in this field,
the security conditions identified were shown to be both necessary and suffi-
cient for provably-secure clock synchronization. Second, a three-year study of
world-wide GPS interference was presented. Using data from a GNSS receiver
on the International Space Station, three major hotspots of persistent and on-
going GNSS interference were detected. This work was a part of the first-ever
space-based survey of GNSS interference. Third, a robust, all-weather radar-
based ground vehicle positioning system was developed. The proposed system
relies on sensors that are available on automated vehicles and are insensitive
to lighting and inclement weather: automotive radars, a low-cost IMU, and
GNSS. Remarkably, it was shown that, given a prior radar map, these off-the-
shelf all-weather automotive sensors maintained sub-50-cm horizontal position
accuracy during 60 min of GNSS-denied driving in downtown Austin, TX.
Fourth, an analysis and demonstration of the feasibility of crowd-sourced digi-
tal mapping for automated vehicles was presented. In an experiment involving
multiple laps of a 1 km semi-urban route, it was shown that low-cost consumer
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vehicles can incrementally improve the accuracy of a jointly-optimized digital
map over time enough to support sub-lane-level positioning in a global frame
of reference.
7.1 Future Work
The conditions for secure clock synchronization proposed in Chap. 2,
while shown to be necessary and sufficient, are difficult to satisfy under certain
scenarios. For example, an alert limit of 1 µs demands that the RTT between
A and B be known to well within 1 µs a priori, and that the path between A
and B be irreducible to well within 1 µs. Such conditions are nearly impossible
to meet over the Internet, but may be met in a wireless sensor network or a
dedicated local area network with reasonable care. Accordingly, it would be
instructive to conduct a survey of the achievable alert limit under a variety of
synchronization network scenarios.
The global GPS interference survey of Chap. 3 was conducted on the
ISS with an aft-pointing antenna flanked by moving solar panels. As such,
the setup was only sufficient for a proof-of-concept. An ideal LEO interfer-
ence probe would be equipped with two GNSS antennas: one pointed towards
zenith to track the authentic signals (while attenuating the interfering sig-
nals), and the other pointed towards nadir to receive interfering signals from
the ground. Data from such probe(s) should dramatically improve the sen-
sitivity and resolution with which global GNSS interference sources can be
characterized.
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The CINR-based detection technique described in this dissertation only
provides a coarse strength- and location-characterization of the interference
source with a single probe in LEO. Similarly, the Doppler-based source local-
ization technique of [106] works with a single LEO probe so long as a Doppler
time-history can be obtained from the interfering signal. In general, for signals
from which no carrier can be isolated, multiple synchronized LEO-based sen-
sors must be deployed with TDOA and FDOA techniques to infer the source’s
location [20, 21]. A constellation of synchronized dual-antenna probes would
be the ideal next step for this dissertation’s second contribution.
Space-based interference monitoring and countermeasures shall inevitably
be met with counter-countermeasures by interference sources that pretend to
be situated at a location other than their actual coordinates. For example,
with a sufficiently-accurate prediction of satellite’s position and velocity, an
interference source may generate a Doppler signature that leads to incorrect
geolocation by the probing satellite. Future work must address such adver-
saries, e.g., with use of directional antennas and TDOA techniques.
This dissertation has presented a remarkable proof-of-concept for all-
weather sub-50-cm radar-inertial positioning. The field experiments presented
in Chap. 4 evaluate the robustness of the proposed technique by introduc-
ing deliberate variation in traffic and parking patterns between the mapping
and localization sessions. Nevertheless, further experimentation is required
to assess the limits of structual variation in the radar environment that can
be handled by the current method. Additionally, while all sensors involved
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in the proposed pipeline are weather-resistant in theory, it may be instruc-
tive to evaluate the system’s performance during and/or after heavy rain and
snowfall.
The inverse sensor model applied in Chap. 4 is pessimistic and avoids
explicit characterization of the detection and clutter distributions for low-
cost automotive radars. While convenient to avoid, such characterization may
further improve localization performance, especially if combined with esti-
mation frameworks that directly incorporate these parameters, such as PHD-
SLAM [101] with extended target tracking, or its discrete approximation based
on the bin occupancy filter [51].
While the localization pipeline in Chap. 4 already estimates the in-
trinsic and extrinsic calibration parameters for many sensors during periods
of CDGNSS availability, in some cases it may be necessary to estimate even
more calibration parameters to achieve maximum accuracy. In particular,
intrinsic calibration of automotive radars, i.e., estimation of biases in the re-
ported range, range rate, and bearing, may lead to improved mapping and
localization accuracy.
Chaps. 5 and 6 explore the limit of mapping and localization accuracy
with standard low-cost code-phase GNSS. Simulation modeling and field data
collected in a moderately-urban environment indicate that sub-50-cm accu-
racy is achievable with vision-based GNSS-aided SLAM. While the field data
analyzed in this dissertation support the simulation results, a much larger and
diverse dataset (with cm-accurate ground truth reference) would be necessary
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to claim that the simulation results are reprsentative of the in-field perfor-
mance of standard GNSS receivers.
GEOSLAM, the GNSS-aided visual SLAM pipeline developed in Chap. 6,
jointly optimizes camera and GNSS data from multiple sessions to incremen-
tally improve the mapping and localization accuracy. An obvious drawback of
such a design is that the required computational resources grow unbounded
as the number of optimization sessions increase over time. While the batch
approach of GEOSLAM is important to represent the time-correlated errors
between multiple sessions, in practice it would be necessary to develop a win-





Appendix to Chapter 4
A.1 Partial Derivatives
A.1.1 Linearized Forward Dynamics















































‖θ‖ − sin ‖θ‖
‖θ‖3
[θ]2×














A.1.2 Linearized Measurement Models









































with q̃nbk = [qw, qx, qy, qz]. The expression for derivative of the rotation with
respect to the quaternion can be found in [145, Sec. 4.3.2].























A.2 Nonlinear Error-State Rauch-Tung-Striebel Smoother
The conventional expression for the extended Rauch-Tung-Striebel (RTS)
smoother is given as [132, Chap. 9]
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where ? indicates the smoothed estimate andˆindicates the filtered estimate.
This expression is derived by linearizing the dynamics at the filtered state
estimate during the backward smoothing pass.
In contrast, this paper prefers to linearize the dynamics at the predicted







This formulation results in a similar but slightly modified expression
for the extended RTS smoother



























where F ?k and G
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D Ibáñez. Accuracy of ionospheric models used in GNSS and SBAS:
methodology and analysis. Journal of geodesy, 90(3):229–240, 2016.
[131] Saeedi Sajad, Trentini Michael, Seto Mae, and Li Howard. Multiple-
robot simultaneous localization and mapping: A review. Journal of
Field Robotics, 33(1):3–46.
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